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Abstract
During the nineteen sixties in Britain and the United States,
a series of programmes were developed which had an area focus on
poverty. In Britain, this development represented a departure
from previous welfare programmes concerned with poverty.- Past
policies had tended to focus on client groups or on income
maintenance programmes. In America, these developments were
part of the extension of welfare provision which President
Johnson's 'Great Society* achieved. The programmes were concerned
with equality of opportunity and the civil rights of blacks.
These programmes appeared to have some key similarities.
They both contained an area focus on social problems and they
had an experimental aspect. In both countries the programmes
were presented as being concerned with trying new approaches
to combating poverty. However, when these programmes are examined,
it can be seen that in major respects these similarities are not
as great as they would seem. The American programmes' experimental
focus was overtaken by their development on a nationwide basis.
In Britain, there was little indication of the assessment of previous
experiments being used to inform new developments.
This thesis accounts for the development of these programmes
and then explores the differences and similarities in the contexts
within which they were developed. I focus on the institutional
settings of the programmes and their electoral and economic
contexts to draw on some of their major differences. The key
similarities that there were, were not in the content or the
contexts of the programmes but in the way that they have been
presented for public consumption. I argue that this presentation
was one which was influenced by the language of social science, as
social science had become increasingly influential over the period.
In conclusion the ways in which the social science-politics
relationship can be viewed is discussed. I conclude that while
social science is not an equal influence to political considerations,
its role cannot be dismissed as merely, straightforwardly legitimating
the policies themselves.
V
I attempt to assess how this role that social science played
influenced the nature of social science and the view of the
relationship between social policy and social science that is
prevalent. This consideration has an important part to play







Chapter One: Introduction . 1
Methods of investigation 1
Explaining, accounting or prescribing? 5
Using case studies 9
Comparing the United States and Britain 14
Policy Analysis, policy development and public learning 17
Analysing the policy making process 20
Capitalism and welfare 24
Legitimation and social policy 33
Social science and social policy 35
The thesis in outline 37
Chapter Two: The American Programmes 40
The Community Action Program of the War on Poverty 40-
Programme direction and structure in the Poverty Programme 56
The Model Cities Program 64
The Community Development Block Grants 82
Chapter Three: The British Projects 94
Educational Priority Areas 95
The Urban Aid Programme 107
The Community Development Projects 118
The Inner Area Studies 1 31
Area Management Trials 145
Inner City Partnerships 147
Chapter Four: The Context in Britain and America 154
1. The state in Britain and America 155
The electoral system 155
Administrative and institutional arrangements 160
The state apparatus at a local level 169
2. State services in Britain and the United States 179
Developments in service structure in Britain 179
Poverty and welfare services in the United States 182
Welfare provision in the United States 184
The contrasts 188
3. Economic Trends 189
The American economy 191
The British economy 195
Restructuring expenditure and 'the crisis' 199
vii
Chapter Five; Comparing the United. States and, Britain .... 204
The presentation of policy 204
The management of public and private debate 214
Transatlantic social science connections 218
From service provision to service management 221
Central control and democratic legitimacy 230
Chapter Six: Politics, administration and social science . 235
The social sciences come of age 239
The promise of social science 244
Rationality-in-practise? 249
External legitimation of policies 256
External legitimation of policy making 263
Internal mediation 267
Social science as entrepreneur 270
Knowledge and expertise 271
Summary 2 75
Chapter Seven: Conclusion 277
References 289
viii
"Pop, would go one of the six-inch guns; a small flame would
dart and vanish, a little white smoke would disappear, a tiny-
projectile would give a feeble screech - and nothing happened.
Nothing could happen. There was a touch of insanity in the
proceeding, a sense of lugubrious drollery in the sight; and it
was not dissipated by somebody on board assuring me earnestly
that there was a camp of natives - he called them enemiesI -
hidden out of sight somewhere."




This thesis is a comparative study of policy developments
in Britain and the United States, using case studies to
illustrate some general propositions. This thesis contains
three interrelated themes. Firstly, it is an account of area
based approaches to poverty in Britain and the United States
between about 1965 ^975» and- through this account, an
attempt to show how policy has developed and what influence
the American experience had on the British programmes. A
second theme is the relationship between social science and
social policy making. The case studies are used to provide
material to examine this relationship. Thirdly, it investigates
the connections between capitalism, the state and welfare.
All these themes I hope are apparent. In this introduction
I shall comment briefly on these three themes and consider
some of the main issues which they raise.
Methods of Investigation
I have adopted two different methods of investigation in
Britain and the United States. These different methods derive
from the different nature of the policy making process in the
two countries. In Britain, with its much more closed system
of government decision making, it is more difficult to gain
access to source documents. The secrecy of British decision
making prevents those involved in decisions writing accounts
which 'tell the story'.^ The only way open to the researcher
is to interview participants in policy making. This technique
has its drawbacks. I interviewed twenty eight people that I
had identified as knowing about the decisions that were
1 There are some exceptions in this period, notably the Crossman
Diaries (Crossman (1976)). However the issues which are covered
in such accounts tend to be broad and the specific policies in
which I am interested receive only superficial consideration.
This is even more the case in such books as Wilson's account of
the Labour Government 1964-1970 (Wilson (1971 ))•
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made. However since individuals had to be identified before
knowing much about developments, there were clearly misperc-
eptions regarding who would know. One way to overcome this
would have been to adopt a snowballing procedure, beginning
with the most prominent and obvious individuals and attempting,
through them, to discover other important actors. However
this was impossible within the space of a PhD, since by living
in Edinburgh, I was isolated from the center of power in
London. 3y the time requests for interviews were replied to
and a date fixed for the interview, any interview that lead to
another would have taken up a considerable period of time.
A snowball search would have been too long an exercise. I
requested interviews in clusters, which while giving me some
snowballing, didn't aim to exhaust the possibilities of this
procedure.
Another problem in using interviews to investigate policy
developments is that of the credence which can be given to
respondents accounts. Respondents were not always able to
remember events that took place as much as ten years before.
Examples arose in my interviews where, because of my own
knowledge, which was in part derived from documentary evidence,
I would have been better able to recount events than participants.
There was an added problem in that respondents seldom admitted
straightforwardly to having forgotten events. Only in some cases
was I able to check on the validity of respondents' memories,
and that largely through good fortune regarding access to
documents. Respondents were also conscious, in giving accounts,
to present their own actions in the best light which may, with
the passage of time, have meant that they adapted their perception
1 A good example of this is that of a Home Office official who
told me that the early Home Office view of deprivation was not
associated with a 'personal inadequacy' model of deprivation.
I had documentary evidence that this was in fact the model
that was being applied
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of what occured to do this. Most people do not admit that
they held opinions which, with hindsight, were untenable.
However even if the responses could be seen as being
unproblemmatical in this type of interview, the question is
still open regarding the purpose of interviews. I will
discuss later the work of Carrier and Kendall (1973>1977)
but it is sufficient to note here that one of their main
themes is that it is important to understand the meanings that
actors bring to situations. Assessing that meaning is not
only made more difficult by the nature of the 'data' that
contains such meaning and by the complexity of the structure
of meaning. The policy process can be investigated with
different levels of interpretation and participants in the
process also have different 'meanings' for the same events.
Televised meetings, taped meetings, minuted meetings, documented
position statements and interviews with participants - one,
two or five years after the event, would all produce this
complexity.
To overcome what became apparent problems in the use of
interviews, in the British context I mainly used the interviews
to obtain information which I would have been unable to obtain
by any other means. The interviews gave me an insight into
some of the issues involved as well as providing me with dates
and details of particular events. However this sort of information
is not without problems. People do forget and few will admit
to forgetting.
I was fortunate in being able to gain access to two sets
of personal files which contained a great deal of information
about some of the projects. Other respondents sent me documents
that were of interest to me. However this itself presented
another problem, in that some of the most interesting documents
were covered by the Official Secrets Act, and others were of
a personal nature making them inappropriate for quotation. I
have used some of the papers which I have had access to and
quoted from them although they were covered by the Official
Secrets Act. For this reason, I cannot always properly
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reference my sources, by naming persons to whose files I
had access. It is therefore up to the reader to take me in
good faith and assume that I have not invented the references
I make.
Interviews present a similar problem because respondents
are reluctant to be used as a source. Again for this reason
I have not always given full references in my thesis to
respondents. It is an indication of the ludicrous nature
of the Official Secrets Act (and a condemnation of it) that
even in an area where there is no conceivable threat to the
state in public knowledge of these decisions, there is still
secrecy. This is because of the importance of concealing the
, nature of decision making within the British system to make
it appear to be a neutral and rational process. This is an
issue I shall explore fully later.
Because of the quality of the American material, my accounts
of developments in America are much better informed than those
of the British developments. This is a failing which can only
be overcome by the opening of the British government process
to the public eye. It would be interesting to repeat this
study in thirty years, with access to the necessary documents.
I feel confident however that my analysis would be basically
substantiated.
In America, the programmes, being larger both in their
political significance and in the size of their budgets, are
covered in greater detail in personal accounts. Johnson's
account of his presidency (Johnson (1971)) devotes a chapter
to the War on Poverty. However, the American state with its
separation of powers does not require secrecy to the same
extent. The public nature of the debates over policy, provides
legitimacy within the different state structure. In collecting
the American material my main sources were publicly available
personal accounts of some of those involved in drawing up the
proposals for the programmes. The amount of information
available, centrally and publicly, in the US is much greater.
The Government Documents collection in Boston Public Library
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is extensive. Much of my material was found there. I also
made use of the Kennedy Archives in the John F. Kennedy
Library in Boston. Again the quality of the information is
much better than anything to be found in this country.
The Kennedy Library contains the President's papers and the
papers of some of his senior advisers. Memos, personal letters
and drafts of speeches all provided the sort of material
through which some assessment of the thinking of the key
participants is possible. With more resources this study
could have been greatly improved by having done similar work
in the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, Texas and by
looking at the papers of the Nixon presidency. Unfortunately
this was not possible given either the time or the money
involved.
Writing accounts of contemporary events, or events which
have happened in the last ten or fifteen years is a difficult
process. There is a difference between the sort of account
that is produced by a participant and that produced by an
outsider like myself. I would argue that in being an outsider
I can look more critically at events. However I have obvious
gaps in my detailed knowledge of events. In a sense though
these events are history for me, as much as they would be
if they had occured fifty years ago. I can only counter
any criticism by those with first hand knowledge of these
events by arguing that my intention has not been to provide
a straightforward 'as it was' account. I cannot do so, nor
would it be important for me to do so. I am trying to raise
some issues in a critical way which requires a degree of
knowledge about events. I hope that this knowledge is
sufficient to make my account plausible.
Explaining, accounting or prescribing?
There is an extensive literature which considers some of
the different methodological problems which must be overcome
in developing a satisfactory account or explanation of the
decision making process. Indeed, even thinking about whether
an account or explanation is what is sought presents problems.
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Clearly, any account or explanation can be confronted with
a different account or different explanation. An account
does not have to be an explanation, although it may have
explanatory value, whereas an explanation might not even
include an account. Many of the issues raised in considering
this 'explanation/account' problem have their roots in the
continuing tension between views of the relationship of the
base to the superstructure, the objective to the subjective,
the determinate to the accidental. Carrier and Kendall (1973»
1977) try to overcome some of these tensions in developing a
phenomenological approach to accounting for policy changes.
However, I would argue that rather than overcoming these
tensions they avoid them.
They argue that an adequate account has three different
aspects. Firstly, it takes account of the meaningful nature
of social action. Secondly, it explains developments in terms
of the meanings that actors attach to social situations and
attempts to explain how these meanings are generated and
sustained. Thirdly, it reflects the 'multiple realities' of
situations, or takes account of different perceptions of the
nature of social problems. Carrier and Kendall's approach
falls into the trap of relativism while remaining an effective
critique of determinism, whether it takes a 'moral',
'technological', 'political' or 'economic' form. They argue
that it is important to study the processes through which a
body of knowledge becomes established and sustained in reality.
However, I suggest that the differing perceptions and 'meanings'
of actors which are sought in a phenomenological approach can
be contrasted with the actors' operation within a common
ideological frame. This common ideological frame establishes
'meaning' in social situations. An ideological frame creates
both the elements of 'meaning' which is generated from the
perception of the actual, immediate and specific conditions
and a perception whose initiation and structuring is derived
from the fundamental forces and relations of production which
permeate through consciousness. Therefore, where Carrier and
7
Kendall have developed a satisfactory critique of positivist
approaches to social policy explanations in arguing that
their basic failing is that they are
"based on the assumption that action is determined
by external and constraining social and non-social
forces, and that a proper understanding of the
latter can provide a complete explanation of the
former." (Carrier and Kendall, 1973? 211)
The mistake that they make is that by excluding external
constraining forces which do not have to be presented in a
determinist fashion, they produce a relativism which stands
the failings of positivism on its head and is unable to assess
the interplay between meaning and structure.
They go on to comment on the role of the social policy
analyst
"The social policy analyst is therefore most
appropriately described as a 'social pathologist'
whose role in the social construction and
sustaining of the 'world of welfare' may be very
significant, and worthy of qtudy as part of any
attempt to understand the development and
operation of social policies. One can of course
be both 'social pathologist' and 'sociologist
of welfare' although they have quite different
roles in relation to social policy and social
change. The former attempts to engineer social
policy changes, the latter attempts to understand
changes in social policy." (Carrier and Kendall, 1973s 224)
At this stage it is most important to argue quite forcefully
the intimate nature of the connection between the methodological
approach and explanation that the student of social policy
adopts and the nature of the role the student plays in relation
to social policy. The typical social policy analysis in the
British and American tradition has a social engineering approach
which is contained not only within the assumptions of the
social policy analysts, but also within their methodology.
In a Weberian manner, a false dichotomy is constructed between
values and science. A scientific approach is however not
scientific through the exclusion of values. It is not neutral
and adaptable to the value orientation of scientists. A scientific
approach is aware of its own values and attempts to critically
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integrate these values into understanding the world.
Ham (1980) divides the study of' social policy into four
different traditions. His classification is worth outlining
because it leads to a consideration of different approaches.
The first tradition he sees as the descriptive which has
little explanatory value. This is within the established line
of empirical work looking at social service provision or
'need' in Britain. One of the underlying assumptions of such
descriptive studies is the consensual view of the political
process which they reflect. It is only necessary for the
political system to be made aware of existing conditions.
Politicians can or will then make arrangements upon the basis
of this knowledge. Such a view makes an unrealistic assessment
of the role of knowledge in the political process.
The second tradition Ham sees as being analytical but not
theoretical. It aims at analysing why things are as they are
without having a theoretical overview into which these
explanations are fitted. However, despite the aim of an
atheoretical analysis, such analytical views of policy developments
tend to be based on an implicit theoretical perspective, and the
failure to articulate such a perspective leads to an inbuilt
conservatism in analysis. Again this approach has an action
and policy relationship which is not clearly articulated and
tends to see developments as being idiosyncratic.
Ham's third approach is the normative approach which has a
prescriptive nature. I would suggest that this prescriptive
approach has been implicit in almost all of the accounts of
social policy and finds its roots in the Fabian tradition of
policy analysis. Firstly, a traditional prescriptive approach
pays lip service to, and is to an extent influenced by the
Weberian distinction between facts and values in social science.
Therefore the prescriptive approach seeks to either avoid an
interpretation which is 'value laden' or to make explicit the
prescriptive content of policy analysis. Secondly, the
traditional prescriptive approach, in trying to sustain this
fact-value distinction, ignores the normative content of any
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approach.
Ham calls the fourth approach a theoretical approach and
divides it into four different strands where policy is analysed
using sociological theory, economic theory, the application of
statistical methods and technology and lastly the use of
political science and political sociology, what he sees as
being distinctive about the theoretical approach is that it
brings a body of theory to the examination of social policy.
However he does not make it clear how theory relates to the
object of study. There are a number of different questions
about policy which can be raised. For example, is this the
best policy to' achieve the ends articulated? An evaluative
approach would imply a theoretical understanding both of the
nature of the problem and also (and this is often excluded)
an understanding of the policy process from imput to implement¬
ation, in other words, the environment within which policy
formulas are translated into action.
Ham's four approaches are worth considering because they
add complexity to the problem of explaining, accounting or
prescribing. The approach adopted gives substance to the
nature of the outcome. It is not sufficient to decide what
purpose the study of particular policies has, it is also necessary
to consider the relationship between different approaches and
different purposes.
Rather than looking at policy from an evaluative point of
view, the policy process may be taken as an indicator of other
objects of study. This is, in part, my approach and is one form
of case study. The particular policy's formulation and implem¬
entation can be used to expand our knowledge of, for instance,
the administrative process of government. This leads to
different methodological concerns than does the evaluative
approach, although as I have said the evaluative approach,
necessarily should, but usually does not, include some explicit
view of the nature of the policy making process.
Using Case Studies
My work has two methodological aspects which need to be
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examined., the use of case studies and comparison. This work
consists of a series of case studies in the two countries, in
a similar policy area. These case studies are not examined
in a positivistic manner. The cases have been used to illustrate
some general propositions whose validity does not rely solely
upon the material presented.
It is hard to define the case study as a particular method
since the many uses of case studies in social science seem to
be as varied as the uses of other forms of data. In a sense,i 7
the case study is more easily seen as a data source rather than
a method of enquiry. Having said this, it is clear that the
many different uses of case studies complicates attempts to
present the problems of case study data or case study methodology.
I will base my discussion of the use of case studies in
three main areas of uncertainty.
1) Borrowing Carrier and Kendall's (1977) analysis - problems
in the production of plausible accounts.
2) Contrasting conceptions of the purpose of case studies.
3) Contrasting methodologies in policy analysis.
My problem is, though, that attempts to effect this separation
cannot be successful since the methodological positions taken by
researchers predefine their conception of the purposes of
their data and the nature of the account they are trying to
produce.
If, in doing a case study, the intention is to develop an
account of a sequence of events focusing around particular
developments the first major concern is with what Carrier and
Kendall (1977) call accounting problems.
1) The fetish of the single cause
2) History as hagiography and biography
3) Periodisation
4) Grand and a priori theorising
The central problem is that of periodisation and the search
for turning points. In the construction of a case study,
more especially those concerning 'higher level' policy formation,
the construction of a description based upon the division of
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developments into a number of periods may, rather than
increasing an appreciation of the historical factors influencing
developments, isolate actions in one period from those in another.
Explanations become ahistorical, relying upon contemporaneous
factors. Periodising the development of policy may more
clearly indicate the forces at work within decision making
but the explanation of the role of these forces cannot be
assessed without awareness of historical developments. The
uniqueness of a case study takes on a special importance
if case studies become ahistorical. The relative importance
of different forces cannot be assessed if no historical
development is considered. Without this, a case study may
become unique, allowing neither generalisation nor integration
with theory to occur, but merely speculation.
Periodisation also increases the tendency to search for
causes and viewing prior developments as leading to a single
end. Actions and developments are seen as rational towards
the end occuring. The multiplicity of influences and the compl¬
exity of the result cannot be subsumed into a functionalist
and rationalist explanation in terms of end. Policy making is
more haphazard and anarchic than straightforwardly developmental
and the examination of a course of events in the light of the
result overemphasises the role of the result in the determination
of events. This oversimplification ignores other possible
products which could have arisen in similar conditions.
Carrier and Kendall (1977) emphasise the role of comparison
in the avoiding of 'accounting problems'. But this comparative
avoidance of these problems can lead to a return to a positivism
that they begin by rejecting.
These considerations lead to an examination of what sort of
account is desired and what substance is to be given to such an
account. In relation to case studies it would seem that there
are several fairly distinct posiitions here. Unfortunately,
not articulating the epistemological approach using case studies
allows the language of the investigator in conjunction with
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her or his study to conceal the aims of the study. Looking
at a variety of authors, some suggest, on the one hand, that
the aim of the case is to produce generalisations. The
problem of the case study is how to achieve this. Kaufman
(1958) confuses his purpose with his use of language. He
argues that case studies are the raw data needed to stimulate
'theorising'. He sees case studies as being used to set up
propositions and hypotheses which can then be rejected or
confirmed on the basis of further case studies. This is a
clear example of empiricist generalising. For instance,
on the question of the rejection or confirmation of hypotheses
he sees a danger in there always being another case which can
nullify the conclusion arrived at by the researcher. His answer
to this problem is that
"The danger can be kept as small as possible by
entrusting the choices (of cases) to a body as
diverse in outlook, as varied in experience,
and as dedicated to the highest standards of
intellectual integrity as the Executive Board
of the Inter University Case Program."
(Kaufman, 1958: 58)
An interesting and novel methodology is proposed by Kaufman.
Relying upon a committee of the 'sane' and powerful to validate
methodological questions would seem to be more appropriate in
the resolution of theological debates than scientific ones.
Kaufman, along with others concerned with the Inter
University Case Program in the US, sees case studies as basic
data for empirical generalising. The problems therefore are
concerned with how to isolate variables, how to control variables,
how to collect a large enough sample of cases etc etc.. In
other words how to generalise from a variety of observations,
with some certainty, not that the generalisations are 'true',
but that they have not been disproved. However, without some
theoretical conceptions the data lacks form and substance.
Another approach to case studies would be that taken by
Eckstein (i960). He argues in his study of the British
Medical Association that the study is a transition from the
abstract to the concrete. Ecstein states that the data is
not intended as a 'proof' of generalisations but only as
an illustration - evidence of the observed acting as the
theory would suggest, not a validation that the theory is
correct.
"Case studies never 'prove' anything, their purpose
is to illustrate generalisations which are
established otherwise or to direct attention
towards such generalisations." (Eckstein, 1960: 15)
An aspect of Eckstein's work which is important to note
is that he is not disturbed by the uniqueness or unrepresent-
ativeness of his case. Nor does a committee of the 'sane'
and powerful have to validate his conclusions. The essence of
his work would be that there is a consistency between
explanation and observation.
Hall et al. (1975) also would seem to have such a use for
case studies in mind in their analysis of the decision making
process. They point to the danger that superficial and mis¬
leading generalisations can pass as credible and satisfactory.
This leads to the demand for a conceptual orientation within
which case studies are used. (Hall, 1975s 17) As they point
out, case studies may undetmine a hypothesis but they cannot
validate it (Hall, 1975s 15 )•
Their safeguards in the use of case studies seem to relate
to Carrier and Kendall's concerns.
1) There must be a conceptual framework with reference to
which cases are studied.
2) A prior system of classification of cases is necessary,
based upon this framework.
3) Comparison of cases or sets of cases combined with a
conceptual framework aids generalising.
4) There is a risk of simplification in delimiting a case
temporally up to a decision which may not be seen as a dev¬
elopment by actors. Cases must be set in the context of other
events and its history (Hall, 1975; 17).
A remaining question to be discussed is that, having suggested
that case studies allow for theoretical conceptions to be made
more consistent and expanded, how can decision making be studied
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using case studies? The nature of the theoretical concerns
of the researcher are in a sense dictated by how s/he views
his/her method and what status is given to unproblemmatical
observation. I use the case studies as illustrative and
analytical examples of developing theoretical concerns, thus
overcoming the division between theory and data which is
involved in an 'empiricist' or 'theoreticist' methodology.
Comparing the United States and Britain
Some similar epistemological questions are raised by the
use of comparisons between the different countries. As will
be seen the main reason that I chose two countries was not
so much because of the methodological advantages associated
with having an international comparison. The methodological
advantages are associated with a positivism that I am rejecting.
Just as it would be a mistake to see case studies as empirical
data which allow for the introduction of control and subsequent
generalisation, so too it is a mistake to see international
comparison in this light. What an international comparison
does allow, however, is a richer explanation of the processes
which are involved, through the variety of their manifestations
as they occur.
Perhaps the key issue in considering methodological approaches
to the study of social policy is the question which I have already
posed. Why study social policy? The dominant trend is that
in some way the study of social policy making can lead to
'better' policy making. This introduces firmly, the criteria
of relevance into the study of social policy. Firmly rooted in
the tradition of 'relevance', social administration is rarely
critical or reflexive beyond the paradigm within which it is
set. The intimate connections between methodology, epistemology
and political practise are ignored and policy analysis sets
forth as a neutral tool, concealing its own domination and
dominance.
An example of this would be Rodgers' (1977) discussion of
comparative social policy. She exhibits the first sign of the
intellectually conservative by emphasising her wariness of theory
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building. This wariness of theory conceals theories which
are inadequately used.
"our analyses (not theories) of social policy are only
useful so long as they illuminate and in some measure
help to 'explain' facts better than any others. So
too, any generalisations we draw should be stated as
hypotheses to be tested out in further studies."
(Rodgers, 1977s 200)
She appeals for constructive descriptions. However the
question- is answered without being posed. Why analyse social
policy? She answers in terms of its utility - a normative
1
concept connected to a consensual model of policy development.
The method however already determined the result. If policy
analysis is to be 'useful', why examine policy making if
the nature of the process is already known?
"It is commonly agreed that this collective action
(for social welfare) involves the setting of goals,
the choice of instruments and the operation of part¬
icular programmes. Our studies are therefore potent¬
ially concerned with all the social phenomena which
influence decisions taken at the level of policy
formation and legislation at the middle level of
administration and at consumer level where services
are 'delivered'." (Rodgers, 1977: 202)
There is an inbuilt assumption of shared values and rationality
within the policy making process in such a view. It is in
part as a critique of this dominant form of social policy
analysis that my work is presented.
I began by considering the question of why, in both Britain
and the United States, area based approaches with a common
emphasis on 'community' should have occured in the late sixties
and early seventies. I imagined at the time, that what I
was studying was a common phenomenon in two advanced capitalist
societies. I therefore assumed that in looking at these
programmes, some of the common aspects of state welfare prov¬
ision in advanced capitalist societies could be explained
1 I mean here that the model is consensual in the sense that
there is no conflict over the nature of policy development,
not necessarily that policy making is seen as a consensual
process.
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through making this comparison. Such an explanation would,
further our understanding of the nature of the capitalist
state and its relationship to welfare provision. However,
while I hope that to an extent, I have provided some extension
of our understanding, certain features became clear at the
beginning of my work which led my study along different lines.
The similarity between the policies in the two countries was
soon seen as being apparent rather than real. In emphasising
the similarities between the developments in both countries,
students of policy making had constructed an implicit view
of the policy making process which failed to understand why
these policies developed. At the same time an emphasis upon
the similarities increased the appearance of similarity and
led to the legitimation of policy in a particular manner
which I shall explore later on.
Therefore, briefly and crudely, I began to be aware that
these policies and programmes were not as similar as at first
they appeared. This appearance of similarity was the outcome
in part of the relationship of social scientists to these devel¬
opments and to the government, and also the outcome of the
international relationships between social scientists both in
personal terms and through the sharing of a body of knowledge
or paradigm. For these reasons, the similarities were emphasised
and the basic differences ignored. This does tell us, however,
something about the relationship between the provision of welfare
and the capitalist state on a general and theoretical level.
At this point it is sufficient to say that I try and show
how 'welfare' or 'social' policy has been conceptualised as
separate from the basic relations of capitalism. Not only,
is this conceptualisation inadequate, but it also provides a
legitimation which aids in the smooth functioning of capitalist
relations. Social scientists perpetuate this inadequacy and
contribute to this legitimation. The welfare state cannot be
seen as an oasis of non-capitalist relations in an otherwise
capitalist state. Social policy cannot be seperated off as a
'good' part of the state. (London Edinburgh weekend Return
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Group, 1980: 52) It is its appearance as a seperate part
of the state's activity that it seems an extra 'bonus',
different from other parts of the state.
Social scientists have played a positive role in constructing
and maintaining this appearance. There are important implications
for practise here in relation to social research and policy
implementation. When I began my work, I was interested in
discovering why the state had become involved in area based
approaches. This is not merely a question which tells us
more about the state, but is of practical relevance to state
workers in being able to assess how far they can use state
policies to achieve the welfare ends which seem to be the
aim of policy. The contradictions and barriers which are
confronted in working in different practical ways within the
welfare state are time consuming to attempt to circumvent,
merely on the basis of practical experience, of trial and
error. Therefore it is important to consider whether a
policy's lack of 'success' in achieving avowed aims is a
failing of the personnel involved, an institutional failing,
an organisational failing or indeed a success in itself since
the espousal of aims is more important than their achievement.
Moving from seeing the purpose of this study as producing
a comparative analysis of policy developments in the two
countries, the importance of both the flow of ideas and the
place of ideas in the policy making process becomes clear.
This was the shift in emphasis which my work initially took.
Policy analysis, policy development and public learning
There are a variety of different traditions in social
policy writing which deal in different ways with the problems
of accounts and/or explanations. These traditions in part
reflect some of the basic trends and purposes of social policy
analysis which connects closely to many of the questions
which are raised in conclusion by my work. The nature and
intentions of an account or explanation and what approach
is taken can not be separated from the role that the social
policy analyst is playing, is trying to play, or, to enter
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another debate, should play.
There is an intimate connection between the role of ideas
and their ideological content. I have already commented,
above, upon the role of ideas as seen in established studies
of social administration. This is of importance because it
is an 'idea' itself. Sumner (1979) formulates the concept of
ideology
"as elements of consciousness generated within and
integral to social practise, reflecting the structure
of such practise and the appearance of the practical
content." (Sumner, 1979s 6)
It is this ideology that I am interested in and how it
relates to the policy making process. A broader view of
ideology implicit in such a definition includes not only the
everyday commonsense in practise, but also the products of
academic investigation. Particulary in social policy analysis
such investigation while conforming to certain methodological
guidelines, has a basically ideological nature in that it is
determined by (and lacks critical self-awareness of) the
pragmatic political realities within which it operates. This
is instanced in much of the social policy writing and in the
concern of social policy writers to have a relevance to policy
making, while at the same time conforming to a positivism
which is broadly seen as being the scientific method.
Policy making is made to appear, in this connection of ideas,
to be an independant process capable of adaptation on the basis
of understanding, rather than, as it is, a pragmatic adjustment
within a frame of accepted practise.
Heclo (1974) sees learning in a much more adequate manner
than any other of the policy analysts who use the term. He
recognises its pragmatic nature and does not pretend that it is
more than it is. He defines learning as being of two types.
Firstly, classic conditioning
"Much of the time, policy responses have resembled what is
known as classic conditioning (or respondent behaviour); the
repeated coincidence of conditional and -unconditional
stimuli has over time led to highly predictable patterns
of response." (Heclo, 1974: 315)
This is a trial and. error approach to learning, and
contains many of the aspects of what has occured in policy
making. His second type of learning is 'instrumental
conditioning'.
"If classic conditioning has been most relevant to
policy continuity, instrumental conditioning (or
operant behaviour) has been most directly applicable
to policy change. The distinctive feature of this
second type of learning is the addition of environ¬
mental consequences (reinforcement) to the basic
stimulus-response model, so that reinforcement is
not paired with a particular stimulus but is contin¬
gent on the response emitted." (Heclo, 1974: 3^6)
While these two types of learning describe adequately what
has been occuring, he fails either to comment upon why
learning has been seen as being different, as a rational,
linear process, or to understand what a more positive view of
human or public learning would entail.
What would be a more appropriate conception of learning
than conditioning? That conditioning is occuring not only
at an individual level, but also collectively, regarding
the institutions of society is clear. However, this cannot
be confused with learning. If learning is to be rational,
then it must contain more than mere conditioning. It is not
only the reflexive aspect of learning which distinguishes it
from conditioning, since conditioning is almost totally
reflexive. It is the reflection, beyond the immediate and in
terms of the abstract, which distinguishes learning from
conditioning. The ad hoc pragmatic adjustments which undoubtably
do occur cannot be seen as being learning. Hambleton (1978)
in looking at learning as a model of government policies
argues for the need for the reorganisation of the state
apparatus and institutions to allow for learning beyond
this pragmatic adjustment. This approach, I suggest, fails
to appreciate why learning does not occur. The appearance
of learning, concealing pragmatic adjustment, gives substance
to the legitimacy of a particular mode of domination. To
substitute the substance of learning for the form is not
possible within the present system of political and economic
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relations because it is this system of political and economic
relations which determine the pragmatic readjustment. The
context with its pragmatic constraints within which policy is
created is not alternate with another more rational one.
It is not a case of one being as effective as another. The
context is a creation of a system of relations.
Therefore, when considering in what ways the British and
American policies connected, it is necessary to consider how
social science ideas are generated and sustained through this
system of relations. The argument here is that the connection
occurs in preserving and strengthening the appearance of a
rational technical system of policy making. It is not a
sufficient critique to argue that the system is not rational
technical. This is shown by most policy analysts, usually
within the context of suggesting ways in which it could be.
To understand policy making, it is necessary to go beyond this
and consider why it is not, nor can it be, a rational
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technical process. This requires some unederstanding of what
has influenced the development of policy and the way in which
the process has arisen. This returns us to the question
of looking at policy developments and the relationship between
explanation and account and between these and theory. In my
second and third chapters I look at what has occured in Britain
and the United States and implicit in the account is a theoretical
position but before putting this position forward in abstract
terms I shall return to a discussion of some of the issues
relating to how the decision making process can be analysed.
Analysing the policy making process
I have already discussed the methodological questions
raised by a case study and comparative approach. One of
the most important issues in considering methodology is
the way in which the methodological approach cannot be separated
from the theoretical approach with which the object of study
is examined. This connection is made clear in Lukes's discussion
of power and it is worth considering his arguments in explaining
my own approach.
Lukes (1974) looks critically at two approaches to the study
of power: that of Dahl (1961) in his famous study of New Haven
and Bachrach and Baratz's (1970) critique of Lahl in their
study of the poverty program in Baltimore. In looking at the
policy making process, power is a key concept. The issue
raised by Lukes could be rephrased in terms of what is the
exercise of power? This is clearly fundamental to much of my
discussion of a rational technical mode of domination, since
power is an aspect of domination. Crudely the question could
be posed - is power only being exercised when it is observable?
That the rational technical mode of domination is not an active
and observable domination does not deny its existence. An
examination of it relates its appearance as not-domination,
to its reality as domination. It is through its appearance as
not-domination that its reality as domination can be arrived at.
Lukes summarises and criticises Lahl * s approach to the study
of power as being 'one-dimensional'. It has a behavioural
focus which, by looking at decision making on the assumption
that this is an observable process centered on conflicts
arising within the process, sees the important issues as
the subjective interests of the participants in the decision
making process. Bachrach and Baratz's approach which Lukes
calls 'two-dimensional' goes beyond that of Dahl's by introducing
the concept of nondecision making. Nondecision making sees
the act of not making a decision as important a factor in the
study of power as decision making. As Lukes points out, this
is a qualified critique of the behavioural focus of Dahl, in
that Bachrach and Baratz are interested in the important
aspect of inaction. However, the focus of their approach is
still upon the observable conflict even though it may be
covert rather than the overt conflict observed by Dahl.
Lukes attempts to go further in his 'three-dimensional'
view of power, which he sees as being a critique of the
behavioural focus of Dahl, and even if modified, of Bachrach
and Baratz. The focus of his approach embraces decision making,
non-decision making, and control over the political agenda.
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This control over the political agenda goes beyond Bachrach
and Baratz's nondecisions in that the focus is on why certain
decisions should not even be considered. This is different
from Bachrach and Baratz's 'non-decisions' since a non-decision
is
'a decision that results in suppression or thwarting
of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or
interests of the decision maker.' (Lukes, 1974: 44)
Lukes considers ways
'in which potential issues are kept out of politics'
(Lukes, 1974: 24, original emphasis)
In Bachrach and Baratz's case a non-decision is a decision
not to make a decision. Lukes is concerned with potential
decisions and non-decisions which do not even arrive upon the
agenda. An example from my work, upon which I comment later,
would be that whereas the decision not to aim the War on Poverty
in the direction which the Department of Labor wished was a
non-decision in Bachrach and Baratz's terms, an issue such as
guaranteed state employment at prevailing wage rates for the
poor was not even a nondecision since it did not appear on
the political agenda. Lukes concentrates on both subjective
and real interests in considering what issues are at stake
even as potential non-mobilised issues. As well as the observable
conflict of the other dimensional views of power, the concept
of latent conflict is introduced into Lukes's view.
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of Lukes's view of power
to maintain is that of the concept of interest. Clearly,
Lukes means interest in the Marxist sense of interest, although
he does not introduce class, which is essential to sustain
the concept. Individual interests are much more difficult to
define, especially when considering the relationship between
perceived interest and real interest, without reference to a
concept of class interest. Lukes defines power by saying
'that A exercises power over B when A affects B in a
manner contrary to B's interests.' (Lukes, 1974: 34)
This seems to retain an individualised notion of power
even when A may be interpreted as more than 'individual A',
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which would leave open some important questions. The class
nature of interest for instance is crucial to understanding
how real interests may differ from perceived interests.
To avoid becoming involved in a debate upon the nature of
power and the best method of studying it, it would seem that
the questions raised by Lukes need to be placed more firmly
in the context of my work. The problem arises, in particular
in looking at policy making, of how far policy outcomes are
to be seen both in analysis and practise as the result of a
conscious process, in the sense that their determination
arises from actors perceptions and motivations or how far
the determinants of the outcomes are structural forces which
act upon people in a manner which leaves little room for the
exercise of genuine free will and choice. This is to present
the issue at its crudest and to counterpose two extreme views.
Some of the issues involved in such a discussion relate to
Carrier and Kendall's concerns and some to the discussion which
Lukes has on the debate between Poulantzas (1972) and Miliband
(1972). Poulantzas's analysis can be characterised as leading
'straight towards a kind of structural determinism,
or rather a structural super-determinism, which makes
impossible a truly realistic consideration of the
dialectical relationship between the state and 'the
system'. (Miliband, 1972: 259)
Whereas Miliband, according to Poulantzas
'sometimes allows himself to be unduly influenced by the
methodological principles of the adversary Miliband
constantly gives the impression that for him social
classes or 'groups' are in some way reducible to inter¬
personal relations, that the State is reducible to
inter-personal relations of the members of the diverse
'groups' that constitute the State apparatus, and finally
that the relation between social classes and the State
is itself reducible to inter-personal relations of
'individuals' composing social groups and 'individuals'
composing the State apparatus.' (Poulantzas, 1972: 242)
Holloway and Picciotto (1977) argue that there is a false
polarity between Poulantzas and Miliband in this debate in that
'Both authors focus on the political as an autonomous
object of study arguing, at least implicitly, that a
recognition of the specificity of the political is a
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necessary pre-condition for the elaboration of
scientific concepts.' (Holloway and Picciotto, 1977s
81-82)
They go on to argue that this attempt to separate the
'political' from the 'economic' fails to understand the
nature of the political as a form of relationship which must
be understood within the contradiction of the capital relation
(Holloway and Picciotto, 1977s 84). It is not that economic
relationships determine, in the last instance, relatively
autonomous political relationships, but the political and the
economic are forms of capitalist relations of production.
However, this does not entirely clarify the important
question of how what appear as political relationships in
the state apparatus do relate to the capitalist mode of
production. When looking in empirical terms at specific
policy processes and outcomes, it is insufficient to interprete
material in the broad theoretical manner of Holloway and
Picciotto. Equally Poulantzas can criticise, safely, Miliband's
empiricism and hint at 'abstracted empiricism' through his
own avoidance of empirical material in his writing. It may be
possible to develop an internally consistent theoretical view,
if no attempt is made to relate this to how forms actually
appear. The problem which Miliband faces only occurs when
looking at the appearances, and it is necessary to relate these
actual and specific appearances to a theoretical understanding
to advance our analysis.
Capitalism and Welfare
A variety of different general and specific accounts of
approaches to the study of capitalism and welfare are available
eg Gough (1979), Ginsberg (1979)» Mishra (1977). It is necessary
to outline how my material has been theorised and what relation¬
ships are implicitly assumed in my analysis. A failing of
traditional social administration is that it does not recognise
the importance of an adequately articulated conceptualisation
of the context within which policies are developed.
My argument is that in looking at the policies which have
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developed in the two countries, the main direction and purpose
of social policy is consistent with and to a large extent
shaped by the fiscal and economic policies of the state.
At the same time, the details of policies are influenced both
by the electoral political concerns and the administrative
political concerns which they affect. The given institutional
structures provide an independent conservative force in allowing
policy options to develop. All this occurs within the conditions
which private capital 'requires' to continue to accumulate
successfully.
Thus the main area of my work is with the relationship
that I see between on the one hand electoral politics and
on the other state economic and fiscal policies. I agree
with Holloway and Picciotto that to separate the economic from
the political is to confuse the nature of capitalist relations.
However, there is a difference between making this separation in
theoretical terms, as Poulantzas does, and making this separation
in terms of appearance. Electoral politics and state economic
policy are tied into and are part of capitalist relations of
production.
Therefore, although I subsequently argue that particular
policy developments should be seen as being influenced by
electoral concerns, I am not removing these electoral concerns
from the system of relations within which they arise. Through
the electoral system, the state is seen to reflect societal
forces, while actually acting on behalf of a dominant class.
Of course, this appearance is not entirely formal. The need
for legitimacy produces substantive reactions to electoral
pressures that are previously limited through ideological
processes. In this way, different parties are not identical
and reflect the different electoral demands placed upon them.
More importantly, though, the electoral system makes the state
seem, merely, to reflect societal forces and allows governments
to implement policy on the basis of having been 'fairly' and
'democratically' elected.
Edelman (1977) argues that elections have a symbolic purpose
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in making the institutions reinforce beliefs about the reality
of democratic participation. This is one aspect of the importance
of elections, which is independant from the outcome of the
electoral process. The existence of the structures and institut¬
ions provide symbolic reassurance and allow the form of government
to be seen as reflecting some of the basic ideological requirements
of capitalist democracy. While electoral democracy undoubtably
fulfills this function there are also responsive aspects of
it which cannot be ignored. Therefore while accepting the
main thrust of Edelman's argument it must be added that to
achieve this symbolic reassurance, the content of electoral
politics does reflect different strategies.
In America, the pursuit of votes is a much more acceptable
practise than in Britain. Whereas in both countries, the
ideology of 'national interest' is strong, the pluralism
of the American political system allows for the pursuit of
electoral advantage without disrupting the main structural
stability of the system. Therefore, President Johnson in his
autobiography can be much more blatant about the electoral
calculations in his decisions than for example Wilson in his
account of the Labour Government (Johnson (1971) and Wilson
(1971)). These electoral calculations are also made in
Britain. However the only evidence that I can find for this
is circumstantial. In America they are clearly stated and
are part and parcel of electoral politics. Philips (1970)
provided the electoral bible for the Nixon Administration,
'This book does not represent - or purport to represent
- the past or present 'strategy' of the Nixon
Administration. Critics who say it does ignore the
fact that it makes no strategic or policy recommendations.
If its statistics, analyses and projection suggest
courses of action, they merely parallel the role
of market research ' (Philips, 1970: 30)
Philips's book reflects the electoral concerns of American
politicians. The fact that he can do this with no reference
to policy or strategy, reinforces my view of the American
political system as a politically empty attempt to win
electoral advantage. The American political system is much
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more open than the British to being seen in terms of a
Downsian model of governments acting rationally to maximise
1
political support .
However, whether policies are selected to win votes or
votes are used to choose policies does not affect the analysis
of the electoral system that I am putting forward. The electoral
system influences policies, but this influence is limited
by the relations of production within which policies are
developed. The experience of those democracies, such as Chile,
which attempted to change the relations of production shows
clearly the limits of the electoral system. There is, however,
a considerable amount of freedom of choice within the existing
relations of production, but the constraints and responses
of the electoral system reproduce themselves in the selection
of policy options. The search for a consensus in a pluralistic
system such as America, or the pursuit of policies on a party
basis in Britain have different effects upon how far the electorate
is responded to. I examine some of the implications of this later
on.
Electoral politics are clearly connected with state economic
policies. Furthermore, the relationship between state economic
policies and the general maintenance of capitalist relations
of production cannot be separated. As de Brunhoff (1978)
argues, state economic policy is concerned with the production,
circulation and management of a waged labour force and of money
as the general equivalent. I would suggest and will show in
the following pages that social policy or welfare policy can
be related to some of these concerns of state economic policy.
In economic policy, the state acts both as capitalist and as
provider for capitalists. The state provides the social
conditions within which capitals can produce and accumulate.
1 'Cur model is based on the assumption that every government
seeks to maximise political support. We further assume that
the government exists in a democratic society where periodic
elections are held, that its primary goal is reelection and
that election is the goal of those parties now out of power.'
(Downs, 1957s 11)
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The policies I discuss have developed their form according
to some of the overriding 'needs' of state expenditure in
relation to the economy in general. These 'needs' are not
functionally determined however. There is an element of
subjective perception upon the part of policy makers and a
variety of different options which can be developed. 'Needs'
are not independant determinants but are shaped by the
conditions within which they themselves develop.
Considering the 'New Economics' of the Kennedy and Johnson
eras and the attempts at economic stimulation through Keynesian
policies of demand management, it is not merely the intrusion
of the political (the War on Vietnam) into the economic affairs
of the state which led to the overheating of the American
economy. The political and the economic cannot be separated
in this way. Again, the attempts at continual balancing
and fine tuning during the Wilson Government 1964-70 indicate
how the political pressures under which the government operated
(international, natipnal and party) react with a chosen economic
strategy.
To see welfare policy as being only a political pay off to
stabilise class conflict, therefore ignores the connection
between the economic and the political. The one acts upon the
other. The unrest in the ghettoes which some argue was responsible
for the development of the Model Cities program in the USA
was a product of the existing social relations as concretely
manifested in existing political and economic policies. It
is a fine disctinction to make between a deterministic view of
political and economic relations and the view that I am putting
forward. It would be insufficient to argue against an economic
determinism merely on the grounds that it is not solely the
economic which provides this determination but that political-
economic relationships do. This is not my position. These
relationships are both constructed by subjective choices of
policy makers and limit and construct their perceptions of the
choices that exist. The two elements of structure and meaning
cannot be separated.
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Much of the existing examination, from a Marxist perspective,
of the development of welfare policy centers around two questions.
'What is the role of class conflict in explaining the
emergence of welfare policies? And how are the 'funct¬
ional requirements' of the capitalist system mediated
by the state?' (Gough, 1979s 56)
Gough argues that the major determinants of the modern
welfare state are working class struggle, the centralisation
of the state and the influence of the former over the latter,
but as he says these factors are not exhaustive. This comes
back to my earlier discussion of the aim of this inquiry -
to examine the relationship between factors in the development
of social policy, but not in a deterministic fashion. Welfare
policies cannot be isolated from state economic policies in
that they are means to the ends themselves.
Another important Marxist approach to looking at welfare
policies can be derived from O'Connors book on the fiscal
crisis. O'Connor (1973) can be criticised for focusing
exclusively upon the fiscal aspects of the crisis while
ignoring other aspects of capitalist contradictions contained
within the state's expenditure. He argues that contradictions
arise within the size of the state budget and the role that
it performs. Certainly the material which I have collected
here points out some of these contradictions. What needs to
be related, however, is the relationship between fiscal policy
and economic policy. The former concerned with the state's
financial viability, the second the means by which the state
encourages continued accumulation by private capitalists.
O'Connor begins his thesis by arguing that the capitalist
state tries to fulfill two basic and contradictory functions.
The state tries to create and maintain the conditions for
private accumulation while trying to maintain conditions of
social harmony. In other words, the state provides both for
the private accumulation of a socially produced surplus and
provides the conditions under which this can be seen to occur
legitimately.
'The state must involve itself in the accumulation
process, but it must either mystify its policies
by calling them something that they are not, or it
must try to conceal them (eg by making them into
administrative, not political, issues).'
(O'Connor, 1973! 6)
O'Connor goes on to argue that state expenditure can be
classified in the two fold manner which reflects the two
fold nature of the state's role.
'social capital is expenditures required for profitable
private accumulation; it is indirectly productive.'
(O'Connor, 1973s 6)
'social expenses consist of projects and services which
are required to maintain social harmony - to fulfill
the state's 'legitimation' function. They are not even
indirectly productive.' (O'Connor, 1973s 7)
He further divides social capital into social investment
and social consumpion. The former increases the productivity
of a given amount of labour power, the latter lowers the
reproduction costs of labour.
He goes on to argue that nearly every state agency is
involved in both the main functions of the state, of accumulation
and legitimization. These two purposes can be served simult¬
aneously, making the classification of any state outlays
ambigous. The accumulation of social capital and social
expenses is a contributory process which generates crisis
tendencies. Because the social surplus is appropriated privately,
the socialisation of costs produces what O'Connor calls a
'structural gap' between state expenditure and state revenues.
'The result is a tendency for state expenditures to
increase more rapidly than the means of financing
them.' (O'Connor, 1973s 9)
Secondly, he argues that the fiscal crisis is exacerbated by
the 'private appropriation of state power for particularistic
ends'. By this he means that 'specific interests' have a
disproportionate call on state power. These contradictory
processes within the state budget are generating a fiscal
crisis.
Friedland, Piven and Alford (1977) provide an expansion
of O'Connor's view of the fiscal crisis. They argue
'On the one hand, urban governments must be responsive
to the infrastructural and service requirements of capital
accumulation, and to changes generated by economic growth.
On the other hand, they must also manage political
participation among the masses of the urban population
who do not control capital accumulation and may not benefit
from it either.' (Friedland et al., 1977' 449)
They argue that the functions of accumulation and legitimation
are not inherently and continously contradictory. Stability
and prosperity of the economy is a precondition to legitimacy
and it is when the accumulation process begins to break down
that legitimacy is called into question. This is an important
point when considering the nature of the state's crises.
These crises whether of legitimation (Habermas (1976)) or
fiscal cannot be separated from the process of capital accumulation
itself. These contradictions of accumulation and legitimacy
arise from the place of the state in capitalist society.
State economic policies are closely tied with state' fiscal
policies, since through fiscal policies the state provides not
only the material conditions of capital accumulation, as
O'Connor outlines, but also the general monetary framework
and regulation of waged labour which de Brunhoff describes.
The management of overall demand, the stabilisation of the
currency on the world markets, the level of interest rates,
and the supply of labour power are all regulated through state
fiscal policies while providing a general economic setting
for capitalist production.
The links that must be made theoretically are between these
aspects of the position of the state and the arguments that I
am putting forward in relation to the place of legitimacy,
electoral politics, administrative structures, state economic
and fiscal policies and the development of welfare policies
in a capitalist state. These are the essential ingredients
which require integration into a consistent frame.
A key concept that I use is that of 'mode of domination'.
I see state policies as being part of a 'rational-technical
mode of domination'. While the concept of domination has
its roots in Weber, it has more recently been used by Habermas
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(1971) and Marcuse (1972). Weber's concept of domination''
relates to his views of the exercise of power, domination
being the expression of power. Since for Weber such exercise
of power is not seen within a system of power relations which
is derived from and built upon a system of class relations
(specifically the capital-labour relation), his use of domination
differs from mine. Habermas and Marcuse expand upon the
Weberian concept of domination in discussing the rational and
technical nature of domination. However these discussions are
not directly relevant to my use of rational-technical mode of
domination. They enter into a debate upon the nature of techno¬
logy and science which would represent a side track from my
main concern.
The importance within this work of the concept of mode of
domination is at a more immediate level. Beginning with the
basis of an assumption about the class nature of capitalism,
I am arguing that capital maintains and adapts its domination.
It uses different modes to achieve this domination. Looking at the
ways in which capital dominates over labour gives rise to
tautological constructions of the capital-labour relationship
in terms of an a priori assumption of a static dominance of
capital over labour. It is not only that capital oppresses
and exploits labour that is important, it is how it maintains
that oppression and exploitation that is of interest.
A more recent use of the term 'mode of domination' is that
of the London Edinburgh Weekend Return Group (1980). They refer
to a keynesian mode of domination and a monetarist mode of
domination. Their use of the concept is more akin to mine.
By mode of domination they refer to the way in which capital
regulates the capital-labour relationship. 'While my period
falls within the keynesian mode of domination, I do not use
the term 'keynesian' because it has many facets which cannot
1 'Like the political institutions historically preceding it,
the state is a relation of men dominating men, a relation
supported by means of legitimate (i.e. considered to be
legitimate) violence.' (Gerth and Mills, 1970: 78)
be covered or separated analytically. The rational-technical
is one aspect of this mode of domination and I do not mean to
imply that the totality of the mode of domination is expressed
through its rational form. The keynesian mode of domination
is characterised by the use of keynesian management of the
economy, accompanied by a series of social policies whose
direction attempts to build a consensus around the prevailing
balance of class forces. Resolution of conflict occurs through
negotiation-and accomodation rather than overt conflict.
However this resolution and attempt at consensus masks the
inherent inequality of the relationship of class domination.
In this way, keynesianism is not merely a set of economic policies
with which are are associated a set of conciliatory social
policies, the social and economic policies are interdependant
aspects of a keynesian mode of domination.
The conciliatory nature of social policies developed during the
keynesian mode of domination, both in their search for social
peace and consensus, and in congruence with keynesian 'economics'.
Social policies while attempting within this mode, to regulate
and control potential and actual conflict, were constructed
within a process that attempted to avoid the generation of
conflict over means and ends. It was in attempting to remove
this conflict over means (means for preventing other potential
and actual conflict) that the importance of a rational-technical
approach to policy making lay. A rational-technical approach
masks class conflict in a fundamental manner. Not only does it
mask class conflict but also provides a formalised bureacracy
in the Weberian sense, with seemingly external rules of operating
which allow for the resolution of institutional and interest
conflict within the state apparatus to occur without recourse
to obvious power, thus reinforcing the state apparatus's
legitimacy.
Legitimation and Social Policy
The primary and most fundamental place of legitimation in
capitalist electoral democracies is the legitimation of the
private accumulation of a socially produced surplus. This
legitimation has not always been, nor is now entirely, a
function of the state. The state, though, supports directly
and indirectly the ideologies which provide for this legitimation.
While state policies, in general, are consistent with this
appropriation, there are other problems of legitimation that
are concerned with the existence of the state itself.
The very existence of the state requires legitimation. The
increase in the intervention of the state into a multitude of
social relations, which according to the basic rationale of
capitalism are self-regulating relations, creates for the state
a legitimation problem in a sphere where the maintenance of
class relations and forces, having been self-legitimating through
concealed regulation (eg the family, the church etc.) becomes
visibly regulated by the state and so makes visible the contra¬
diction between the state's role and the supposed 'natural'
forces which maintain capitalism. However, this legitimation
of the existence of the state is not a new problem. There has
not been a 'non-statist' capitalism, which has been replaced by
a growth in state functions. What has happened, is that the
state has increasingly intervened in more areas of life to
regulate relationships which had previously been regulated
more discretely, i.e. the church or the ideology of 'economic
realities'. The family is a good example of an area in which
the state has increased this form of intervention.
While the intervention of the state in principle may be seen
as legitimate, particular acts may still require a more specific
legitimation that relates to the act itself. It is difficult
to separate analytically the legitimation of the state itself
and the legitimation of particular state functions, since the
existence of the state is not independant from the relationships
and functions in which it is involved. Rather these relationships
and functions constitute the state. The political system and
its processes legitimate both the state and the system of
private accumulation which underpins it. Acts of the state
that change and adapt the social structure of private accumulation
are often presented as being neutral or technical decisions
meeting the objective demands of the economy or polity. Not
all acts of the state are legitimated through the portrayal
of policies as being rational or neutral. However, I argue
that the state achieves legitimation through the process of
policy making in a broad sense - the structures and institutions
of the state apparatus and their relations to one another and
through building this system of relations entrances for external
validation of particular policies as being rational and technical.
Social Science and Social Policy
This raises the second approach which I argue to begin with
that my thesis is concerned with - the connection between
social science and social policy making. While there are many
methodological questions that are raised in making the argument
that I subsequently develop, I argue that social science can be
seen to have been used to legitimate social policies in both
countries, policies that have been developed to meet different
ends. That the focus of social science has. been consistent with
the more generally perceived fiscal and economic policies of
the state, I argue is conclusive evidence that my argument is
correct. It is not however 'proof'. The consistency of social
policies with the general economic and fiscal policies being
pursued is not surprising. It would be assumed, in many models
of the policy making process that this connection would occur.
What does require explanation is how 'knowledge' is also consistent
with these economic and fiscal policies. Most models would assume
some independance one from the other. The only conclusion
which I think can be drawn is that this synchronisation is
occuring because of the nature of the relationship between the
production of knowledge in capitalist societies and the political
economic 'realities' facing the state. However this argument
cannot be continued and sustained on too specific a level.
Clearly the production of all knowledge at all times does not
show this consistency. The growth in such fields within social
science as ethnomethodology, phenomenology and Marxist political
economy go against this trend. It is in those branches of social
science which are seen as being directly applicable that this
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synchronisation occurs. Even then, there is a limitation to
this. Certain applied sciences have a time span in research
which cannot "be adapted so directly to the economic requirements
of particular years and cannot adapt to economic changes. This
also occurs in spending on large social programmes. The
Beveridgean welfare state was much more consistent with the
public expenditure requirements of the fifties and the sixties
than the seventies, and seemingly, the eighties. However,
there are political and institutional barriers to its dismantling.
Applies science programmes such as the space program in the US
are subject to similar barriers to their adaptability.
Social science, however, does not necessarily have the same
time span and can be adapted (perhaps 'chosen') to suit more
rapidly changing economic demands. In particular, the acceptance
uncritically of one methodological approach, a positivist
empiricism, ignores some of the founding methodological and
epistemological questions which need to be explored in generating
new developments. The social engineering approach of social
science as applied in government gives it an adaptability which
other sciences may not have. Social science then enters
into the policy making process as a technical politics since
its techniques and methods, when applied in political decision
making does not result in a scientisation of politics. I explore
this more fully in Chapter Six.
Considering then how this relates to the question of legitimacy,
it can be seen that I am arguing that social science (positivistic
social science) as a technique conceals some of the more
fundamental forces that influence policy development. I
have already stated what I see these as being and in my study
follow this through using some examples in the field of policy
making in the two countries.
What remains to be put forward is some explanation concerning
the role that legitimation plays. The resolution of conflict
in terms of power cannot be seen to occur within a supposedly
democratic system of government. Such a democratic system is
based upon the twin aspects of rationality, in that the process
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results in a rational resolution of conflict, and of participation,
in that we all have equal power in the choice of objectives. However,
power is exercised by a dominant class in its own interest and
this interest is not rationally compatible with such concepts as
'national interest', especially in times of economic crisis. It
is this aspect of the state that legitimation seeks to conceal.
The Thesis in Outline
This thesis begins by looking at the history of the development
of the policies and programmes in the United States and then in
Britain. I examine the experience in the two countries, separately
and chronologically. This examination concentrates on issues which
give me material which I develop in later chapters. In particular
the aim is to present some of the major differences, not only in
the settings of the programmes and projects, but also in their
organisational features.
Chapter Pour looks at the background to these policies. The
important features which I identify are the structure of the
political institutions, the differences in the provision of welfare
services in the two countries and the changing economic settings.
These provide the context within which these developments can be
understood and analysed. These contexts are important in shaping
the direction of policy. They must be considered to understand the
role of administrative and institutional factors. It is important
not to construct an account of policy development which is straight¬
forwardly derived from 'economic' influences. Equally the political
influences on policy development include the politics of the
administrative structure of the state and these issues go some
way towards explaining differences in the two countries.
Chapter Five focuses on some of the similar issues in policy
development in the two countries. In attempting to recognise the
importance of the meaning that policy makers give to policy develop¬
ments, the way that they construct the debate around policy should
be considered. I argue that the language of this debate is one
which gives an appearance of similarity to the projects and program¬
mes, being derived from a common transatlantic social science
language. I however draw a distinction between this language
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and the operational or theoretical definition of this language
which is the crucial element of transfering language into concepts.
This chapter also considers some of the similar tensions which
the two countries faced that led to a shift from a service delivery
focus to a service management focus in policy. The last issue
discussed is that of the common tension between central control
and democratic legitimacy which influenced the development of
participation and decentralised management strategies in the two
countries.
Chapter Six discusses the relationship between social science,
administration and politics. I focus upon this relationship
because, while politics and administration provided the key
determinants of the nature of the projects, social science provided
a language for the presentation of the policies. A language which
lead to an appearance of continuity and similarity, an appearance
which concealed the reality.
I consider how social science 'came of age' in the nineteen
sixties and discuss what role social science played in government.
I reject a view of social science as being an equal partner in its
relationship with politics, the two developing in a pragmatic manner
policies which accomodated the 'facts' of both. However, I do not
see social science as merely a legitimator for specific policy
developments but argue that social science's legitimation role
is that of legitimating the policy process as a whole. Social
science also plays an important part in mediating conflicts within
the state bureaucracy, which cannot appear to be resolved on the
basis of power. Social scientists have also acted as information
gatherers and as entrepreneurs.
In conclusion, I discuss how more traditional views of the
nature of social science and policy developments have lead to
accounts of policy developments which cannot explain their complexity.
I also consider how these traditional views are part of the
construction of social science that the state has been involved in
in these programmes.
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'Facts are not the only, nor the most important, consideration..
Social history, like history itself, is a combination
of taste, imagination, science and scholarship; it reconciles
incompatibles, it balances probablities; and at last it attains





The Community Action Program of the War on Poverty
' the Great Society programs were promulgated by
federal leaders in order to deal with the political
problems created by a new and unstable electoral
constituency, namely blacks - and to deal with this
new constituency not simply by responding to its
expressed interest, but by shaping and directing its
political future.' (Piven and Cloward, 1971 - 249n)
The Economic Opportunity Act, the legislative instrument
setting up the War on Poverty and containing the Community
Action Program was subtitled
'An Act to mobilize the human and financial resources
of the Nation to combat poverty in the United States.'
(US Congress, 1964)
President Johnson signed the Act on 20th August 19&4, a
surprisingly short time after he had proposed a 'Nationwide
War on the SourcesTf Poverty' in a special message to Congress
on March 16th 1964 (Johnson, 1964e).
The manner in which the legislation was passed through
Congress serves as an indication of its political importance
to the Johnson Administration. The short time between the
assassination of President Kennedy on November 22nd 1963 and
the beginning of the Administration's plans to go ahead with
a war on poverty is significant. Walter Heller, the Chairman
of Kennedy's Council of Economic Advisers (who were responsible
for the initial investigations into the extent of poverty in
the US and for drawing up preliminary proposals for an anti-
poverty program) reports that in a meeting with President
Johnson two days after the assassination, the new President
encouraged the development of the programme with all possible
speed before the approaching Presidential elections in November
1964 (Heller, 1963c). Richard Blumenthal (1967) quotes a speech
by Heller in which he reports that in conversation with Johnson
at this meeting, Johnson said to him 'That's my kind of program.
It will help people. I want you to move full speed ahead.'
Johnson in his account of the meeting with Heller gives
his reaction to the idea of a poverty program.
•Before me now was a call for action, a call for a
revolutionary new program to attack one of the most
stubbornly entrenched social ills in America. Like
most social change, such a revolution would not come
without a struggle. My perceptions of America persuaded
me that three separate conditions were required before
social change could take root ana flourish in our national
life - a recognition of need, a willingness to act,
and someone to lead the effort. In 1963 I saw these three
conditions coming together in historical harmony.'
(Johnson, 1971: 70)
He goes on to report his response to Heller
'The poverty program Heller described was my kind of
undertaking.
"I'm interested", I responded. "I'm sympathetic. Go
ahead. Give it the highest priority. Push ahead full
tilt."' (Johnson, 1971: 71)
At Heller's previous meeting with President Kennedy three
days before the assassination, Heller reports in his notes
from that meeting that Kennedy was modifying his support for
a poverty programme and considering delaying its implementation
until after the election (Heller, 1963d). At a meeting with
Kennedy in October 1963> the notes report Kennedy's clear
commitment to a poverty programme.
'It's perfectly clear that he is aroused about this
(poverty) and if we could produce a program to fill
the bill, he would be inclined to run with it.'
(Keller, 1963c)
At the meeting the following month, the notes show the
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political calculations involved in such a programme for
Kennedy's Administration.
'I (Heller) wondered just what his current feelings
about it was. His (Kennedy) attitude was "IIo, I'm still
very much in favour of doing something on the poverty
theme if we can get a good program, but I also think
its important to make clear that we're doing something
for the middle-income man in the suburbs etc "'
(Heller, 1963d)
1Levitan (1969s 16) reports that the antipoverty proposals
received a set-back in the fall of 1963 because of fear of
a 'white-backlash'.
Kennedy was concerned about the electoral ramifications
in the suburbs of such an inner-city focused approach.
Kennedy's electoral alliance was already strong in the cities
of the north and east and it was the more conservative
suburbs and the Mid-West and South towards which he had to look
for an added margin considering the extremely narrow electoral
victory that he achieved over Nixon in 1960. Johnson, on the
other hand, had to emphasise more liberal policies since his
position on the Kennedy ticket as Vice President had added
a conservative element to allay the fears of southern Democrats.
The lack of progress in Congress which Kennedy's domestic
policies met during his Presidency can be attributed to a
coalition of conservative Democrats and Republicans. Johnson,
to maintain his own, and to inherit Kennedy's constituencies,
emphasised his liberal leanings. In the same first meeting
with Heller, he stressed his liberal record, which, reflecting
the division between the image and the substance of American
politics was more consistently liberal on major issues than
Kennedy's had been. Johnson had Presidential ambitions as
Senate Majority Leader (attempts to nominate him had been made
in 1956 and i960) and with a long record of political involvement
in Washington was in a position without power.Once President,
reelection was as important to him as the stability and continuity
between Administrations that he frequently stressed. Indeed,
the lack of continuity is noticeable. The achievement of many
of Kennedy's aims by Johnson indicated the success which he
achieved in combining some of Kennedy's aims with his own
considerable legislative experience and political power. For
Kennedy, therefore, the poverty program was a desirable end
in terms of an overall political stratgey and direction for
his Administration to pursue. The assassination converted
the proposed programme into an important goal which bore a
distinctive Johnson stamp ( and so gave him credit which could
have electoral benefits) and was identified with the overall
liberal compassion emphasised by Kennedy.
What evidence is there that Johnson pursued the war on
poverty for electoral gain? Three separate types of evidence
can be used. Firstly, the clear account from Heller's notes
show Kennedy's enthusiasm being tempered by political expediency
and Johnson's total commitment to the idea when presented with
an outline of the poverty programme. At the time of Heller's
first meeting with Johnson the content of a poverty programme
had not yet been decided but was still being negotiated between
government agencies by the ad hoc Task Force of the Council
of Economic Advisers and the Bureau of the Budget. The Justice
Department under Robert Kennedy was emphasising a largely
experimental 'brains trust' approach.
'A series of task forces should be assigned the
responsibility of keeping the problems of the poor
before the government....Thus we are proposing that
this study concentrate on developing strategies
of self-help...' (Robert Kennedy, 1963)
On the other hand, the proposal for the poverty programme
eventually put forward by Heller in a memorandum to Sorensen
on 20th December 1963 recommended a Coordinated Community
Action Program which would aim at 'specific local areas of
poverty' and rely on local initiative, action and self-help
(Heller, 1963f). These are two different approaches and their
common theme is a poverty programme without details. President
Johnson's initial support can therefore be seen in terms of
support for a non-specific liberal measure to investigate ways
of combating poverty.
The second sort of evidence is circumstantial in nature.
With Johnson's approval for the idea of such a programme,
the development of a firm proposal occured rapidly. Johnson
recounts
'I told him (Shriver) he would have to work fast. Not
only did I want to propel a program through Congress
immediately but I wanted the plan to produce visible
results...' (Johnson, 1971: 76)
Levitan (1969: 23) reports that the ad hoc CEA-BOB task
force had decided the substance of the Economic Opportunity
Act by 6th January 1964. Johnson in his Annual Message to
Congress on the State of the Union on 8th January 1964
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(Johnson, 1964a) publicly announced, his intentions to set up
a poverty programme. This announcement was expanded in his
Annual Message to Congress: The Economic Report of the President
(Johnson, 1964b) on 20th January 1964• This message was
accompanied by the Annual Report of the Council of Economic
Advisers (1964a) in which the costs of poverty and its incidence
were emphasised.
'Poverty has many faces. It is found in the North
and in the South; in the East and in the West, in the
farm and in the city, among the employed and the unemployed.
Its roots are many and its causes complex. To defeat it
requires a coordinated and comprehensive attack.'
(Council of Economic Advisers, 1964b: 77)
The ease with which it could be defeated is also stressed
but rejected as a course of action.
'Conquest of poverty is well within our power. About
eleven billion dollars a year would bring all poor
families up to the three thousand dollar income level
we have taken to be the minimum for a decent life. The
majority of the Nation would simply tax themselves
enough to provide the necessary income supplements to
their less fortunate citizens. The burden - one fifth
of the annual defense budget, less than 2% of GNP -
would certainly not be intolerable. But this 'solution'
would leave untouched most of the roots of poverty.
Americans want to earn the American standard of living
by their own efforts and contributions.' (Council of
Economic Advisers, 1964b: 77)
Johnson's third major annual message again emphasised the
War on Poverty. In his Budget Message to Congress, he said
'I propose to establish a means of bringing together
these separate programs - Federal, State and Local -
in an effort to achieve a unified and intensified
approach to this complex problem, in which each
element reinforces the other." (Johnson, 1964c)
A one billion dollar programme is a major federal initiative
and it is not remarkable that Johnson should have continually
highlighted the importance of the programme. What is indicative
of its political importance is how much speed went into the
production of legislation so that Johnson could present the
Bill to Congress in March. He also made clear, while emphasising
that the aims of the Bill were consensual and non-partisan,
that it was a Johnson bill, a Democratic bill, and an Administr-
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at ion bill.
The appointment of Sargent Shriver, already full-time
Director of the Peace Corps, to direct the new programme
was again a politically adroit move considering his ident¬
ification, not only as a member of the Kennedy family, but
with the Kennedy liberal-intellectual section of the Democratic
Party. It could be argued that in addition to Shriver's
proven administrative talent and ability to launch a major
programme like the Peace Corps, the appointment of Shriver
allowed Johnson more flexibility in emphasising both the
continuity of his Administration from Kennedy's while retaining
personal credit for an initiative which was his own Administration's
distinct from any of Kennedy's initiatives. Of course, this is
not an entirely accurate portrayal since, as Sundquist points
out,
'The bill was thus a composite of new ideas like
community action and long discussed ideas like
Youth Conservation Corps.' (Sundquist, 1969: 77)
It was however as a Johnson Administration bill that the
Economic Opportunity Bill was introduced to Congress and while
the administrative structures of Presidential government made
the placing of the Office of Economic Opportunity in the
Executive Office of the President (rather than in an existing
agency like Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)) a most suitable
place for an activist and coordinating agency, its recognition
as such an agency reflected the prominence which the President
was keen on giving to his antipoverty strategy. In a memorandum
from a presidential aide (Lee 'White) in the White House to the
Secretaries of major departments involved, different administrative
structures were outlined. The alternative that was adopted
had as its main benefit, according to the memorandum that
it would dramatise the President's and the Administration's
commitment (White, 1964).
The Administration nature of the bill is even clearer when
considering the way the Act was put through Congress. Despite
Sargent Shriver's publicising at the Congressional Hearings of
his consultations with one hundred and thirty seven experts
during January 1964» the proposal put forward earlier in a
memorandum from Heller in December 1963 (Heller, 1963f) was
substantially unchanged as far as the Community Action proposal
was concerned. The bill presented to Congress was put through
the Committees in the House and in the Senate on the basis of
it being a Democratic Administration's proposal which required
little debate since it had the support of the Democratic Party
in Congress and was not open to modificiation by interested
Republicans. In the House Committee on Education and Labor,
the final bill was drafted by the Democratic caucus under the
leadership of Adam Clayton Powell (Democrat - New York), thus
preventing the Republicans from working on the final bill and
the bill was presented to the Republicans as a fait accompli.
Having Representative Phil Landrum (Democrat - Georgia) sponsor
the bill in the House, also strengthened the Democratic coalition
in Congress. He was a conservative southern Democrat who
might have taken part in any Democratic opposition to the
bill. As Johnson remarks
'his sponsorship would render the bill considerably
more palatable to Southerners.' (Johnson, 197^ '• 78)
Donovan expands this
'Landrum was to help line up a sufficient number of
Southern votes to make this a Democratic program. If
ambitious young Republicans wanted to oppose a war on
poverty in a presidential election year so be it.'
(Donovan, 1967: 34)
Johnson thus, in mobilising a Democratic majority in Congress
behind a clearly partisan and presidential bill placed the
Republicans in a difficult position. 3y supporting the bill
they strengthened the President in an election year, by opposing
the bill they faced the accusation that they supported the
existence of poverty. Such a strategy left the Republicans
in a position where their arguments against the bill had to
rest upon the administrative amd fiscal arrangements of the
bill, leaving Johnson the credit for a concern with poverty.
Sundquist reports
'Whatever history may judge to have been its legislative
merits, the political merits of the War on Poverty in
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1964 cannot be denied. It gave the new President
whose legislative agenda consisted otherwise of
left-over Kennedy proposals, a bold and attention-
getting proposal on which he could put his personal
stamp.' (Sundquist, 1969: 28)
Having shown that Johnson wanted the poverty programme
implemented with speed as a Democratic measure identified
with his own Presidency, the argument' that the war on poverty
was intended to have particular electoral benefits needs
more support. Moynihan (1966) adds evidence for Piven and
Cloward's position in arguing that the Task Force under
Shriver which drew up the final Act which was sent to Congress
wanted a programme that would
'pass Congress, help win the Presidential election
and eliminate poverty, perhaps in that order.'
(Moynihan, 1966: 6)
How could, though, the war on poverty be seen as helping
Johnson to win the Presidential election?
I have already indicated the more general liberal intellect¬
ual appeal of the War on Poverty and this, although not of
primary importance is significant. The extent to which the
poverty programme provided employment and research funds
both at a national level and a local level, for a large number
of professionals and academics will be explored later. Much
of this constituency will have been found in the liberal
establishment of the Democratic Party.
Piven and Cloward argue that the distribution of community
action funds reflects electoral pressures within the national
political system.
'Local agencies were established, frequently in storefront
centers. Professional staffs were hired which offered
residents help in finding jobs, or in dealing with public
welfare, or in securing access to a host of other public
services. A neighborhood leadership was cultivated
called 'community workers' (close kin to the old ward
workers) to receive program patronage. The neighborhood
leadership, in turn, became the vehicle for involving
larger numbers of people in the new programs, for
spreading the federal spoils Through both neigh¬
borhood and city-wide structures, in other words, the
national administration revived the traditional processes
of urban politics:.offering jobs and services to build
party loyalty.' (Piven and Cloward, 1971; 261)
In other words the institution of community action programs,
while distributing federal monies to an identifiable part of
the electorate, also constructed the party machine among a
black population which had never previously been integrated
into the electoral system. Friediand (1977)» though, takes
this analysis further and argues that the distribution of
funds reflects both the political system and also class needs.
Friediand argues that
'... local poverty funding levels are a response by
locally situated, but nationally powerful corporations
and labor unions to local political challenge. Local
political challenge is likely to be a singularly
ineffective determinant of poverty funding where a central
city's power structure fails to provide sufficient
interest or power to secure War on Poverty funds. In
cities where corporations and labor unions are powerful,
the extent of political challenge posed by the poor and
non-white populations will be an important determinant
of poverty funding levels. In cities where corporations
and labor unions are not powerful, only national electoral
factors will make a difference. Thus the inter-city
distribution of War on Poverty funds reflects both
political system needs and class needs.' (Friediand,
1977: 419-420)
There are methodological problems in this argument. Friediand
does not succeed in disentangling theoretically the balance
between local and national determinants-of War on Poverty
funding. His empirical hypothesis testing cannot produce
a satisfactory theoretical distinction, leaving doubt as to
the validity of his empirical conclusion. Local pressures
may affect the distribution of funds, but so too could an
intended distributional balance at national level according
to criteria based on 'national' class needs and 'national'
political system needs.
The case therefore cannot rest merely on an empirical examin¬
ation of the electoral distribution of funds. Piven and
Cloward and Friediand show how the rising numbers of blacks
in the northern cities presented social and electoral pressures
to both the national and local power structures. In 19^5 about
33% all blacks lived in America's twenty largest cities
compared with only 13% of whites and even by 19&0, half
of the blacks in each of the six cities with the largest
black populations (New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Detroit,
Los Angeles and Washington D.C.) had been bom elsewhere,
mainly in the South (Piven and Cloward, 1971: 223).
Undoubtably the level of poverty in the Northern cities
was high, but the. main centres of poverty in 1959 were in the
Southern rural states (Congressional Quarterly, 1970)> such
states as Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Lousiana,
Mississippi, North and South Carolina and Tennessee. Para¬
doxically this group of states while containing the only
states that the liberal Stevenson carried against Eisenhower
in 1956 except Missouri (he carried Missouri, Arkansas, Miss¬
issippi, Alabama, Georgia, North and South Carolina) were the
focus of the greatest concern for the Democratic Party as a
national party. Whether the Presidential candidate could be
elected ignoring the southern Democrats and appealing to
northern blacks with a strong civil rights plank was something
that both Stevenson and Kennedy avoided testing. As the
Democratic Party's monopoly of the South was eroded, the Party
turned towards the Northern cities, relying on the black vote
to win key marginal states which carried a large number of
votes in the Electoral College. The states with the largest
number of votes in the Electoral College were amongst the closest
fought in the Nixon-Kennedy race in i960. Although Kennedy won
the election by 332 votes in the Electoral College to Nixon's
1
191 > Nixon had 49.9% of the vote in Illinois with 27 Electoral
College votes, 49% in Michigan with 20 votes, 47.5% in New
York with 45 votes, 48.7% in Pennsylvania with 32 votes (U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1962). At the same time 90% of all
northern blacks were concentrated in ten of the most populous
northern states with the largest number of electors (Piven
1 Presidential elections are fought on the basis of states.
The winner of the most popular votes in any state, wins all
the Electoral College votes of that state. The Electoral
College then (nominally) elects the President.
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and Cloward, 1971: 251). With Kennedy's fairly convincing
margin over Nixon in the southern states with their small
number of electoral college votes - (the total of electoral
college votes in the states that Stevenson carried in 1956
was 73) - the potential benefits of a programme focusing on
urban poverty and civil rights can be seen for Johnson in
a Presidential race. These calculations are however not
entirely clear, since an active Presidency requires not only
election of a President, but also a sufficient number of
amenable Congressmen to support a programme, a situation
which involves a less clear-cut set of calculations.
Analysis of the distribution of Community Action Program
(CAP) funds by the Office of Economic Opportunity (0E0) carried
out by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations
(acir) (1966) in their study of the poverty programme, shows
that in the 200 selected counties studied the poor and especially
rural counties lagged behind the urban and rich counties in
implementation of programmes and in the receipt of GEO dollars
per person (ACIR, 1966: 146).
How much this distribution can be attributed to local
initiative resulting from the political forces examined by
Friedland and how far to the 0E0 at a national level is impossible
to disentangle. The allocation of funds may reflect a federal
government preference, or the ability of local areas to 'play
the game'. It is difficult to assess the importance of this
'grantsmanship' as opposed to federal preference. Greater
initiative on the part of local areas may result in more
funding than equivalent areas without the initiative. But it
is clear that despite the 'nationwide' rhetoric of Johnson,
the community action programme was largely conceived of as an
urban strategy, and it was the urban areas and states which
received the bulk of the funds.
In summary, the evidence that Johnson instituted the war
when he did and in the manner that he did to help his Presidential
election bid in 1964 rests upon three different sorts of
evidence.
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1 ) When and. how the President gave the go ahead for the
poverty programme.
2) The speed and manner in which the Administration put the
hill through Congress.
3) An assessment of the electoral problems facing the Democratic
Party at the time.
This is however not a sufficient explanation of the founding
of the CAP. Other forms of rewards could have been distributed
or indeed other electoral alliances formed by Johnson. It is
necessary to extend this overview into a wider consideration
of the political economy to see why the CAP was an integral
part of this election strategy.
Indicated above is Piven and Cloward's argument that the
CAP funds were used in ci.ties to build what, in retrospect,
is extremely close in form to a party machine. The accepted
version reviewing the CAPs is that they created major political
problems within the cities, but such a view ignores important
aspects of community politics. Undeniably, the CAPs created
problems in many areas for the local power structures by demanding
in a vociferous and organised manner improvements in services
and benefits for the residents of 'poverty neighbourhoods', but
such a course also channels political protest into existing
political structures, removing in many cases the more disruptive
extra-system protest. The national power structure, in the
American political system, is more strongly threatened by
extra system protest at the local level than the inclusion of
1
disruptive groups into the local bargaining structure.
There were other benefits which the CAPs gave which went
beyond the immediate electoral benefits which might be gained.
The inclusion of protest in an organised manner was structured
to coincide with economic and budgetary pressure upon the
federal government from other sources. The ideas behind the CAP
were consistent with some of the developing themes of social
scientists, leading to the creation not only of a programme to
1 See Powledge (1970)
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deal with poverty, but a programme, whose main focus was
upon self-help, community development and the provision of
services to the poor.
The major serious problem of the economy facing President
Kennedy, throughout his time in office, was its stagnation.
An important measure that Kennedy was unable to have Congress
pass was a tax cut which, according to the advice of his
CEA, would have stimulated demand and hence stimulated output.
In the last year of the Eisenhower Administration (FY i960)
tax receipts exceeded budget outlays by three hundred million
dollars. In Kennedy's budget message for fiscal year 1964»
he said
'Our economy has been falling short of its productive
potential for more than five years because total demand
for goods and services by consumers and business firms
has been insufficient to keep the economy operating at
capacity. Yet, in the face of this persistent inadequacy
of overall demand, the purchases of consumers and business
firms have been restrained by tax and other collections -
Federal, State and Local - which now total over one
hundred ana fifty billion dollars a year.'
(John Kennedy, 1963)
The 1964 Budget was designed to include a tax cut to speed
• up the economy and encourage growth. These calculations-were
part of the.calculations made in introducing the poverty and
civil rights legislation. In a memorandum to the President
(JFK) from Walter Heller, Heller (1965a) argued that the updated
poverty data originally collected by Robert Lampman in 1957
'offer one more demonstration of the costs of economic
slack. And they, therefore, also provide another
dimension of what's at stake in the proposed tax cut.'
(Heller, 1963a)
In another memorandum the next month to the President,
Heller argues that structural unemployment is not a problem
in the United States but that high unemployment rates are
created by lack of demand.
'This then is simply to say that it would be tragic if
renewed talk of structural unemployment were to divert
us from our main choice - demand-stimulus - at the very
time that the combined output and employment figures
are proving how correct you have been in your insistence
on expanding demand through tax cuts coupled with rising
budget outlays.' (Heller, 1963b)
A last example of the perceived, connection between the
stagnation in the economy, the demands of minority groups and
the problem of poverty is provided by Heller in another memo¬
randum on the implementation of the Civil Rights Act. This
time to President Johnson, he writes
'Removing discrimination will raise potential GNP in
the US significantly - the study we made in 1962 shows
that
A GNP rise of 2-1-2% (about fifteen billion dollars
today) could be expected from the removal of discrimination
in employment.
If non-whites were able to attain equal education
with whites the GNP rise would be 3.2% or about twenty
billion dollars.' (Heller, 1964a)
These excerpts show how, in this case, policies, which
while being portrayed as serving compassionate goals, may
clearly be explained as producing direct economic benefits
and serving certain economic interests directly. There is an
ambiguity in the CEA's position on the relationship between
unemployment and stagnation. This arises from their view of
the two as interconnected, both acting causally one upon the
other. In the past, the pressure from the unemployed had to
be much greater than it was to solicit government action. The
plight of business in a stagnant economy is more usually a
source of government action and concern.
The CAP of the War on Poverty were consistent with the
views held by the CEA of the needs of the economy. Although
other programmes could, undoubtably, have been introduced and
developed, the CAP contained within it the demand stimulus that
the CEA and the President felt that the economy needed. The
total expenditure on the War on Poverty in its first year being
planned at one billion dollars represented a considerable
commitment in public expenditure. The 1964 Budget estimated
federal expenditure for FYI964 at 300 million dollars for
housing and community development, 5,000 million dollars
for health, labor and welfare and 1,500 million dollars for
education (U.S. Budget, 1964). One billion dollars represented
15% of the existing expenditure on these major social welfare
sectors of the budget. This increase in budget outlays supported
the first prong of Heller's proposed tax-cut/increased outlays
strategy, while providing both the electoral benefits for Johnson
and also, through the nature of the expenditure, providing a
programme which both had social control functions (channelling
political protest) and also a more effective economic role
than other types of expenditure might provide. The emphasis
upon self-help and community development implied the expend¬
iture of a large part of the money in areas where, owing to
poverty, effective demand was at its lowest. Increasing
effective demand should, in the economic reasoning followed
by Heller, stimulate domestic production at a greater rate
than the more expensive attempts to increase demand among
higher income groups. The benefits of a service oriented
approach as opposed to a direct cash transfer can also be
seen to be consistent with this overall economic logic.
One of Johnson's emphases in his attempts to publicise the
programme and gain wider support for it, was on how the intention
of the programme was to turn the 'taxeater' into the 'taxpayer'.
This is a position that would not necessarily have occured
with straight cash transfers. In remarks to members of the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Johnson said
'Unless you attack the causes of poverty itself, you
are going to be shovelling it out to the taxeaters
instead of producing and training taxpayers.'
(Johnson, 19o4f)
Perhaps even more clearly in a Special Message to Congress
on Area and Regional Economic Development, he had this to say
'A growing nation cannot afford to waste those resources,
human and natural, which are now too often neglected
and unused in distressed areas. We cannot afford the
loss of buying power and of national growth which flow
from widespread poverty.' (Johnson, 1965c)
As a final example, in his Special Message to Congress Proposing
a Nationwide War on the Sources of Poverty, he put forward the
CEA's calculations
'Our fight against poverty will be an investment in the
most valulable of our resources - the skills and strengths
of our people
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And in the future, as in the past, this investment
will return its cost many fold to our entire economy.
If we can raise the annual earnings of ten million
among the poor "by a thousand dollars we will have added
fourteen "billion dollars a year to our national output.
In addition we can make important reductions in public
assistance payments, which now cost us four billion dollars
a year and in the large costs of fighting crime and
delinquency, disease and hunger.' (Johnson, 1964e)
This concentration on demand stimulus explains the opposition
of the Department of Labor Secretary Wirz to the form that the
War on Poverty took. In a memorandum to Sorensen, he argued
for a greater employment emphasis in the programme and the
advantage of private employment stimulation rather than public
action (Wirz, 1964). Such an approach was not followed and
would not have presented the advantages of the service focused
approach the 'war' took.
A last thread in this construction of the more general conditions
influencing the specific form the poverty programme took lies
in developing social science themes at the time. This is
something that will be explored in depth later, but it is
sufficient to say here that the CAPs followed in the footsteps
of the established projects like those of the President's
Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime and the
Ford Foundation and could be justified in terms of some of the
ideas about the existence and cause of poverty which were in
currency both within and outside government at the time.
This overview of the reasons for the founding of the War on
Poverty should at least indicate the trap into which analysts
1
of the founding of the war have fallen. Because of the
non-existence of an observable political interest in Washington
for a poverty programme at the time, they assume that the
measures arose within the government on the basis of compassion
or the assessment of past policies by professionals who set
up the program. In this view, Johnson is seen as having
created support for the programme to provide the necessary
1 See Piven and Cloward, 19741 248n
lobby. This argument is however almost the opposite from
mine. The war's origins lay in structural aspects of the
American economy and polity and Johnson justified the war
in terms of compassion to protect himself, not the war.
Programme direction and structure in the Poverty Programme
The formal administrative structure for the Poverty Programme
represented a departure from established practise. Partly
this can be attributed to the fact that much of the poverty
legislation was composed of other programmes which had been
mooted during Kennedy's Administration by federal departments
and agencies. Rather than locating the programme within
existing government departments like HEW, with a coordinating
committee chaired by the Secretary of the Department and
consisting of relevant departments and agencies, the emphasis
on coordination was heightened by establishing the Office of
Economic Opportunity within the Executive Office of the President.
0E0 retained operating responsibility for a number of the programmes
under the Economic Opportunity Act while other programmes were
delegated to other departments or agencies of the federal
government, i.e. Neighborhood Youth Corps in the Department
of Labor and adult basic education and work experience in the
Department of HEW. 0E0 was also given a 'vague mandate'
for coordinating other programmes not part of the EOA which
were designed to deal with poverty (Levitan, 1969s 50).
As Levitan points out
'It is apparent from the legislative history of the EOA
that no overall rational plan dictated either the selection
of programs to be included in the Act or their distribution
between the new 0E0 and federal agencies already in the
poverty business. The distribution was essentially
pragmatic, involving two sets of factors; existing
agencies' expectations that they would get their share
of the new program and the preference of Shriver and
his associates, backed by the President.' (Levitan, 1969: 50)
0E0 when fully developed, became a large government agency,
reflecting the level of finance for the programme and the
diversity of approaches which were under its direction.
In 1968 0E0 had eleven functional offices ranging from the
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Office of Health Affairs to the Office of Congressional
Relations. 0E0 also established seven regional offices to deal
with matters more directly at the local level. These regional
offices, by mid-1968 accounted for 49% of the 3>100 persons
on the OEO's permanent payroll (Levitan, 1969: 59)•
THe main section of the 0E0 to which this study refers
was under Title II of the Act - Urban and Rural Community
Action Programs. 'The local agencies of the 0E0, the Community
Action Agencies (CAAs) were responsible for conducting,
administering or coordinating the CAP grants made to them.
In the words of the Act
'Such component programs shall be focused upon the needs
of low income individuals and families and shall provide
expanded and improved services, assistance, and other
activities, and facilities necessary in connection there¬
with. Such programs shall be conducted in those fields
which fall within the purposes of this part including
employment, job training and counselling, health,
vocational rehabilitation, housing, home management,
welfare and special remedial and other noncurricular
educational assistance for the benefit of low income
families and individuals.' (U.S. Congress, 1964s Sec
205(a))
The Community Action Agencies which conducted the CAPs were
the focus of the now much publicised 'maximum feasible partic¬
ipation' clause of the Economic Opportunity Act. Under Sec 202(a)
the CAP was defined as a program
'1) which mobilizes and utilizes resources, public or
private, of any urban or rural, or combined urban and
rural, geographical area (referred to in this part as
a 'community') including but not limited to a State,
metropolitan area, county, city, town, multicity unit,
or multicounty unit in an attack on poverty;
2) which provides services, assistance, and other activities
of sufficient scope and size to give promise of progress
towards the elimination of poverty or a cause or causes
of poverty through developing employment opportunities,
improving human performance, motivation, and productivity,
or bettering the conditions under which people live,
learn and work;
3) which is developed, conducted and administered with the
maximum feasible participation of residents of the areas
and members of the groups served; and
4) which is conducted, administered or coordinated by a
public or private nonprofit agency (other than a political
party), or combination thereof.' (U.S. Congress, 1964)
Two important observations should be made regarding the
organisational structure of the CAP. Firstly, the Director
of 0E0 was responsible for identifying the CAAs and authorising
monies to be made available to them (although the Act allocated
funds on a state basis in a very general manner according to
three criteria). The 0E0 by-passed for the purpose, not
only local government but also State government. Not until
the Green Amendment to the Act in 1967 did 0E0 have to contend
with any statutory interference between the locality and
Washington. Other writers have commented on the passage of
this Amendment but as I will argue later, the Amendment was
more consistent with later views of the Great Society programmes
than their earlier intentions. The second important observation
relates to the scope of the definition both of the CAA and the
purpose of the CAP. These two aspects of the definition
placed considerable power in the hands of the 0E0 to determine
what kind of programme the CAP was to be. In practise, the
breadth of definition and the discretion of 0E0 were used to
allow a wide variety of different projects to operate relating
in different degrees to local government organisations.
CAP funding came under five sections of the Act
1) Section 204, Financial Assistance for the development of
CAPs.
2) Section 205, Financial Assistance for the conduct and
administration of CAPs.
3) Section 206, Technical Assistance Grants.
4) Section 207, Research, Training and Demonstration Grants.
5) Section 209, Technical Assistance Grants to States to
facilitate effective participation of the States.
From the inception of the programme, through to June 30th
1965, under Section 204, 114 million dollars had been allocated
to 315 projects, under Section 205, 104 million dollars to
313 projects, under Section 206, 723 thousand dollars to eight
projects, under Section 207, 16-J- million dollars to 84 projects
and under Section 209, 4i million to 51 projects. The bulk
of the money was financing the conduct and administration of
CAPs, averaging 332 thousand dollars per project.








New York 9,481 48
Conneticut 9,053 20






(Source: Congressional Quarterly (1970) for poverty population
and Office of Economic Opportunity (1966))
It can be seen that the northern states come out disproport¬
ionately well in this distribution with the top ten states
including Mew York, Conneticut, New Jersey, Illinois and
Massachussets. At the same time, the amount of money spent
per poor person was extremely small. Washinton D.C. with the
highest per poor person expenditure still only was receiving
twenty eight dollars and sixty nine cents per poor person in
the first year of OEO's operation. The money was further
dissipated by the number of projects in each state.
One of the aspects of the direct link between the 0E0 at
Washington level and the CAA on the ground was the fiscal arr¬
angement. Assistance under Sections 204 and 205 were not to
exceed 9C% of the costs incurred. As the CAP developed and both
the States and Local governments began to gain more control
over the programme, the 9CP/o grant from the Federal government
became another of the categorical grants which the Federal
government gave to Local government to increase its financial
ability to maintain services or programmes which the Federal
government mandated.
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The language of the Act allowed a wide variety of functions
to be undertaken under the Act and to be subsumed into 'community
action' as a general term. Community action, within the Act,
had the value of being all things to all people. While parallels
can be drawn to the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency
1
and Youth Crime projects and to the Ford Foundation projects,
community action meant anything from the coordination of
services to community power. One interpretation of community
action which seems to be clear from the Act was that it was
intended not as an exercise in independently politically strength¬
ening deprived groups in the sense that the term has been
used more recently. If there was any political component it
was to incorporate the poor.
In the CAP Guide, published by the OEC, the variety of courses
of attack on poverty were sketched.
'Remedial reading, literacy courses, employment counseling,
homemaker services, job development and training, consumer,
educational, vocational, rehabilitation, and health
services are some of the many activities that can be
supported and coordinated within a community action
program to attack poverty.' (0E0, 1965: 7)
The approach was clearly service oriented and as the Guide
pointed out later, aimed at coordination within a comprehensive
welfare service system.
'Where several agencies are working in the same functional
area, they relate to each other in a 'service system'.
The mobilization of resources for a community action
program should bring these various service systems
together in a concentrated attack on poverty.'
(0E0, 1965: 15)
The effort that the Guide refers to should include the
educational, employment, family welfare, health services,
housing, economic development, consumer information and credit
and legal systems.
'Each of these service systems deals with only part
of the complex and interrelated causes of poverty. The
separate service systems need to be linked in a total
network in order to mount an effective attack on poverty.'
(0E0, 1965: 16)
1 Blumenthal (1967) explores this in detail
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Community action in the sense used here related to and
reflected the federal system of government. The emphasis
was upon the local provision of services rather than federal
provision, and the incorporation of the poor into the benefits
of the programme.
Apart from the many interpretations of the meaning of
'community action' within the CAP, the use of the term 'community'
itself requires some comment. In the British experience,
'community' when used in community development tends to reflect
6
some local area with distinctive social or physical characteristics
as a discrete neighbourhood. In the CAPs, the term 'community'
as defined in Section 202(1) above is a much larger area
without any particular implied social definition. The definition
concentrated on administrative units. The CAP Guide expanded
upon the definition given in the Act and made clear this
identity of the meaning of 'community' with a political or
administrative unit.
'Generally a community should be coterminous with a major
political jurisdiction such as a city or county, or with
a group of political jurisdictions exercising responsibility
for related public programs. In metropolitan areas,
wherever feasible, the community should include all of
the urbanized or urbanizing portions of the area
...... Communities containing very small populations
are encouraged to combine their efforts with adjacent
jurisdictions to ensure the creation of an adequate
resource base
The delineation of a community to be served should be
related to the character and incidence of poverty it
contains and to the type of programs or activities to
be undertaken. For example, an entire State or even
a number of States may constitute a community as a
basis for action...' (GEO, 19^5i 13)
To define a 'community' in such a broad way, apart from
rendering the term fairly meaningless has clear implications
for the concept of participation. The Guide advocated four
sorts of participation; (a) representation in policy making
and advising, (b) using existing neighbourhood organisations
to advise and where appropriate administer neighbourhood
based programmes, (c) provision of opportunities for residents
to protest or propose additions to the CAP and (d) the
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employment of residents of areas. Participation in this sense
adds little to the normal 'participation' of citizens in
electoral democracy. It implies little extra grass roots
participation in the political and decision making system.
In many CAPs, elections were used to engage citizens in the
CAAs, but with the wide definition of community the represent¬
ation on a CAA couldn't have the same effect as local small
area based participation involving public meetings and recognising
a more homogeneous interest on the part cf the residents of
poor neighbourhoods. Community, in the sense implied by the
Act and the Guide, would seem to be a local government unit
parallel to an existing statutory authority. The inevitable
conflict that resulted with the established local authority,
in most cases mayors, can be seen as having been contained
within this conception of community. While 'the poor' were
intended to become a political force within the local areas
through the CAAs, the established power of the mayors and
their power within the Democratic Party at national level
made the 0E0 back off the emphasis on participation at an early
stage.1
A report in the Congressional Quarterly comments on this
'The press reported in early November that the Bureau
of the Budget had recommended that the poor be used
primarily to carry out poverty programs, not to help
design them as was the procedure. This was generally
regarded as reflecting White House support for the Mayors'
position. Shriver denied that any change in orientation
1 Haar comments 'The storm caused by their (OEO's) emphasis
on maximum feasible participation and control, as well as the
direct funding of the cities' poor (rather than city agencies),
caused increasing attacks by the mayors, who now initiated a
counterrevolution against what had turned out, as they saw
it, to be guerilla warfare in their own territory under the
sponsorship of the federal government. Confrontation politics
(whether reality or image) were opposed by the larger white
community, whose power was being challenged and who viewed
disruptions as signs of further deterioration of the community
as a whole; by mayors, whose agencies were being rivaled
and who were not receiving the power to allocate anti-
poverty funds, necessary for patronage.' (Haar, 1975s 25-26)
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was being made; however, indications are that he has
yielded somewhat to political pressure.'
(Congressional Quarterly, 1966a: 256)
0E0 was caught in a bind between the weak and general
participation clause of the Act, the mayors' hostility to
participation, and the intentions of the Administration to
build up the power of the poor regarding existing institutions.
This dilemma was exploited by opponents of 0E0 throughout
the programme. Thus in the 1966 Amendments to the Economic
Opportunity Act
'The bill redefined 'community' so that an area smaller
than an existing political subdivision could form its
own community action agency. It also added the provision
that any person serving on a community action board
must actually live in the geographical area he represented...
The majority, in commenting on the new definition of
'community' written into the community action section
of the Act, listed Watts in Los Angeles, Bedford-Stuyvesant
in New York and the Hough area of Cleveland as examples
of areas that would fall within the new definition.'
(Congressional Quarterly, 1966c: 1226)
In part, this was a more realistic definition of community
and more in line with the social science arguments in favour
of community action, but given that the Act's original definition
created problems (which were not to go away through redefinition)
for the Democratic Party through the mayors, it was the political
pressure to remove parallel authority which provided the changes
and not an awareness that, conceptually, the definition of
community was weak and meaningless.
Political conflict centering around local control by est¬
ablished political institutions (eg State and Local governments)
and the demands for participation were, over the years, modified
by amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act such as the
1
'Green Amendment'.
1 The Green Amendment moved by Representative Edith Green (Dem.-
Oregon) redefined the CAAs.
'This amendment required that CAAs be designated by state
and local governments. The CAA itself might be an agency of
the state or local governments, or a nonprofit (public or
private) agency designated by them. In the event that a state
or local government failed to create or designate a CAA., or
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Folitical conflict was 'managed' into the political system
through formalising procedures and definitions, whose vagueness
can be attributed not to a lack of clarity in the concepts
employed, but because the definition itself was a political
decision which reflected established institutional arrangements.
The Model Cities Program
'It has long been apparent that the health of our nation
can be no better than the health of our cities.
Surely not a single American can doubt this any longer
after the tragic events of this summer.
I called together (shortly after January 1964 - A.E.)
some of the most brilliant minds, the most talented
planners and the most experienced urban experts in the
nation. After exhaustive study they recommended to me
a number of proposals that hold vast promise for the
future of every city in this nation. Chief among these
proposals was the Model Cities Program - the most
coordinated, massive and far-reaching attack on urban
blight ever proposed to Congress. This was not just a
federal program. It was designated to stimulate local
initiative in the private sector, and at the state, county
and local level.' (Johnson, 196?)
Within a relatively short time Johnson's commitment to the
War on Poverty had wavered owing to a combination of different
pressures.
1) The increased spending in Vietnam reduced the proportion
of the budget which could be used to back the President's
rhetoric of a total war against poverty. During the hearings
on the 1966 Amendments to the Act, the Chairman of the Committee,
Representative Adam Clayton Powell announced
'that the amount had been scaled back to the Administration'
original request because of spending on Vietnam.'
(Congressional Quarterly, 1966b: IO63)
2) Democratic mayors in the large cities were financially and
politically pressed. This was, in part, a result of the
failed to submit or support a satisfactory CAA, the 0E0 director
was authorized to select a nonprofit organisation as the CAA.
Whatever the character of the CAA, it was required to have a
governing board not exceeding memebers and divided equally
among three groups; public officials, democratically selected
representatives of the poverty areas, and representatives of
business, labor, civic and charitable groups.' (Levitan, 1969: 66
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activity generated by the use of GAP funds that were outwith
their control.
3) The antecedents of the War on Poverty's CAP came from the
President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime
and the Ford Foundation's projects and their concern with
crime was a more long range concern with social disorganisation
and poverty, that was translated into a focus on lack of
opportunity (vulgarising the opportunity and delinquency
thesis of Cloward and Ohlin (i960)). The Model Cities Program
was developed at a time when both national and local power
structures were being disrupted and threatened by the increased
militancy of blacks and the ghetto riots. Many authors have
discussed the influence of the riots in the major cities in the
United States upon the development of the programme and the
subsequent distribution of funds (Higgins, 1978:35—3^ and Haar,
1975s 5-6). The riots themselves represented both a stick
with which to beat the community action programme (where it
was outwith local power's control) by blaming the unrest on
the unfulfilled expectations generated by the CAP, and also
an incentive to the federal government to deal with the problem
in a more constructive and perhaps less costly manner than the
use of Federal troops and the National Guard.
Another frequently argued impetus for the programme was the
failure of the urban renewal programme to be more than merely
a clearance programme in the interests of local business
(Haar, 1975: 16-21). The tension that was created and exemplified
between, on the one hand, the participation of community
action and on the other hand, the lack of federal direction
over the urban renewal programme was a recurring tension.
That the Federal government was placed, along with the cities,
in a politically dangerous position made the need for federal
government direction over the spending of grants much more
important, while the Local governments also had their own political
problems which may be articulated in different ways from those
of the federal government, making their imput into decision¬
making equally important as far as they were concerned to avoid
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an antagonism between the local and federal interest.
The accepted account of the events leading up to the
establishment of the Model Cities Program concentrates upon
the forming of the Task Force that proposed the Model Cities
Program in its report: Proposed Programs for the department
of Housing and Urban Development (Task Force Report, 19^5)•
Legislation had been passed in 19&5 establishing a Department
of Housing and Urban Development. Kennedy had unsuccessful!;/'
attempted to establish such a department. Johnson, with a
Congress more amenable to Presidential initiatives, succeded
where Kennedy failed. Haar, a member of the Task Force and a
subsequent Assistant Secretary in the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) reports that the initiative for the
setting up of the Task Force came from a memorandum from
Walter Reuther (19^5)» President of the United Auto Workers, to
President Johnson on 15th May 19^5 proposing a demonstration
programme in six selected US cities to show what a coordinated
attack upon their urban problems could achieve. The Task Force,
whose deliberations were confidential, proposed a new approach
to the cities, which was built on three 'principles'.
1) Concentration of resources in sufficient amounts to demonstrate
what could be done.
2) Coordination of available talent and aid.
3) Mobilisation of the local leadership and initiative.
The programme, they proposed would select six cities with
populations over 500,000, ten cities with populations between
250,000 and 500,000 and fifty cities with populations below
250,000.
The approach, besides having a focus upon housing and the
bringing of existing housing up to standard, also included
an attempt-at
'- a change in the total environment of the area affected,
with ample provision of public facilities: schools,
hospitals, parks, playgrounds and community centers,
- concurrent attention to human needs, utilizing concepts
and methods tested in the Community Action Program and
providing for the participation by the people affected
in demonstration areas
- provision to ensure the economic stability and. vitality
of the community by including commercial and industrial
elements that provide jobs and services for central
city residents.' ('Task Force Report, 1965: 296-297)
The Task Force proposed an initial expenditure of 15.2
million dollars in the first year to allow the planning of
programmes and in the next three years project costs ranging
between 754 and 895 dollars.
The political attractions for Johnson in such a programme
lay in the support these financial allocations represented
to the mayors of the big cities. Dissatisfaction stemming
from the conflict generated in the War on Poverty and the
lack of direction by mayors over the CAP provided an impetus
to Johnson to provide benefits directly to the cities.
The Model Cities Program was the other end of a seesaw
upon which Johnson stood. If the CAP were intended to give
the black poor in the cities some influence and rewards within
the political system, then the Model Cities Program compensated
the cities for the disruptions to the political institutions
caused by the CAP. Financial aid from the Federal government
allowed the cities to respond to demands made upon them as a
result of other federal programmes' activities.
The big city mayors' support for the Model Cities Program
was crucial in gaining a constituency within the Congress
for a measure which 'had a reception ranging from cool to
hostile' (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977: 54). Mayors testifying
before the House Committe on Banking and Currency supported
the bill but criticised the low level of funding. The Mayor
of Newark wanted the proposed 2.3 billion dollars budget over
a five year period increased to ten billion dollars and the
Mayor of New York, John Lindsay, argued that New York alone
needed two billion dollars (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977: 56-57).
Farkas (1971 ) points out that the US Conference of Mayors were
initially opposed to the programme because of the inadequate
funding, the emphasis on new communities and because they
wanted a ghetto bill for big cities. Although the funding
remained inadequate support for the bill was forthcoming from
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the mayors because of the funds it provided for the ghettoes.
In his Special Message to Congress on the Demonstration
Cities Program, Johnson defined two of the problems of the
cities as
increasing pressures on municipal budgets, with large
city per capita expenditures rising 36% in the three
years after i960.
- the high human costs: crime, delinquency, welfare loads,
disease and health hazards....' (Johnson, 1966a)
Haar points to the problem of rising city expenditures
combined with a lack of coordination and confusion in federal
aid to cities. Federal aid had increased from 1.6 billion
dollars in 1948 to 25 billion dollars in 1966 and the ACIR
pointed out that there were 95 areas of State and Local activity
for which 379 separate federal grants in aid were available,
219 of which had been added in the years 1961 to 1966 and 109
in the year prior to the Model Cities Program (Haar, 1975: 27
and ACIR, 1967: 140-142). The re-sorting and coordination
of some of these federal programmes was of major concern at a
time, when, there was, combined with growing disenchantment with
the War on Poverty in Washington and the local power structures,
growing pressures on the federal budget from the expenditure on
Vietnam. The influence on the Administration and the Federal
government of the Defense Department and the demands of the
War on Vietnam is shown by Haar
'Toward the end of the deliberations, two of us were
sent to see Secretary (of Defense - A.S.) Robert McNamara,
whose prestige was at an all-time high: the President
was relying on him for advice in domestic matters as well
as those of defense. We met with him for half an hour
at the Pentagon ' (Haar, 1975: 43)
I shall comment later upon the role of current defense and
space programme thinking in the development of the domestic
policies beginning with the Model Cities Program. It is
sufficient to point out that many of the processes through
which government policies became managed and grants distributed
relied a lot on concepts developed in the Defense Department
and in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
The rationale for the Model Cities Program was that through
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increased coordination between and within federal agencies
and the Federal and Local governments, matched with a
concentration of funds upon certain areas, the model cities
could indicate what could be achieved in urban areas through
a comprehensive approach in contrast to the selected physical
approach of urban renewal.
The approach designed by the Task Force involved an initial
competition between cities for funds on the basis of their
own programmes (in the rhetoric - based on local knowledge)
and the provision to the Demonstration Agencies of an initial
planning grant to plan programmes to be implemented with
supplemental funds in the following years. These supplemental
funds were to be used in conjunction with the series of
categorical grants the locality was already receiving from
the Federal government.
While Johnson, with the assistance of Congress could preempt
the demands for more funding for the Model Cities, because of
the pressures of Defense Department expenditure, he was not
able to prevent Congress from expanding the programme to cover
more cities, thus spreading the funds even more thinly than
the Task Force proposed. To attract lukewarm Congressmen and
Congresswomen, the Administration had to be able to indicate
that benefits might accrue to their districts. A report in
the Congressional Quarterly (1967b) on the Model City Grants
indicated that there would seem to have been some substance
to the claim by Republicans that support for the bill from
some Democrats was being bought by funds for their district.
Only nine of the planning grants (14% of eleven million dollars)
out of a total of sixty three were allocated to Republican
districts. Funds also went to two areas represented by House
Democrats who played a major role in salvaging the Administration's
Antipoverty Program, including the Chairman of the House
Education and Labor Committee (Carl Perkins) where Pikevilie,
Kentucky with a population of 5,000 received a planning grant.
It is worth noting as well, the influence on the passage of
the bill of the rioting in Watts in 1965 and. riots in Chicago
and Cleveland in 1J66. While some Congressmen and Congress-
women protested that the programme was rewarding rioters,
others saw the necessity of dealing with some of the perceived
underlying causes of the riots. Senator Pulbright remarked
that the bill
'comes before us in a summer filled with strife and
violence born of despair and frustrations of those who
seek a better life. I do not condone or excuse acts
of violence but I recognise the need to change the
conditions out of which violence is spawned.'
(Quoted in Haar, 1975s 82)
Senator Javits remarked •
'If we let this slide, we are inviting what we will
get - to wit, disorder in the cities, disorders and
riots. If we do not pass it, we leave them no
alternative but to loot and burn as a product of their
despair.' (Quoted in Haar, 1975s 32)
The. organisational structure of the Model Cities Program
exemplified the increase in the importance of process over
substance in federal programmes at the time. The Federal
government began to be increasingly aware of the straight¬
forward organisational and management issues involved in
its programmes. Such an increase in awareness is connected to
the use of management techniques and budgeting procedures
in government.
The Model Cities Administration was organised within the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. The main federal
vehicles for the coordination of the range of programmes
to be coordinated by the Model Cities Program were the Regional
Interagency Coordinating Committees and the Washington
Interagency Coordinating Committee, bringing together various
concerned government departments at regional and national
level. The Washington Committee was concerned with policy
and coordination whereas the Regional Committees received
city submissions and maintained liason with local officials.
The programme was separated into two parts. Firstly, there
was the planning phase which lasted one year. This phase
began with HTJD's approval of the city's application for a
planning grant. From the first planning phase, a Comprehensive
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Demonstration Plan was drawn up, which after acceptance and
approval by HUD, would result in the city receiving a
supplemental entitlement based on a percentage of existing
federal funding directed to the Model Neighbourhood Area.
The supplemental funds were not earmarked for specific projects,
nor did they require matching funds from the city. The
supplemental grant was set at a maximum of 8C% 'of the aggregate
amount of non-federal contributions required for all projects
or activities assisted by Federal grant-in-aid programs which
were carried out in connection with an approved Model City
Program.' (HUD, 1967: 27)
Thus if the city was spending ten thousand dollars as
their contribution to the CAP (9QKj contribution from the
Federal government - ninety thousand dollars), the Model
City Supplemental Grant would be a maximum of eight thousand
dollars. The supplemental funds were to be used, amongst
other things, to provi-de support for new projects and serve
as matching funds for categorical programmes (programmes
receiving categorical grant-in-aid).
The City Demonstration Agencies which were designed to
carry out the programme at the local level were defined as
the city government or a local public agency. Section 112(2)
of the Act read
''City demonstration agency' means the city, the county
or local public agency established or designated by the
local governing body of such city or county to administer
the comprehensive demonstration programs.' (U.S. Congress,
1966)
The city was responsible for drawing together the various
interests in the Model Neighbourhood and focusing their efforts
on a 'problem analysis' prior to the application for a planning
grant. This focusing of efforts was to
'begin to identify their basic underlying causes (the
problems), examine the interrelationships among the
problems, and consider the critical changes which might
be effected in order to overcome the problems.'
(HUD, 1967: 29)
Subsequently the cities were to develop a plan for
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'the organisation and management of the work program
during the planning period.' (HUD, 1967: 29)
This 'planning' which was to precede the application for a
Planning Grant was the sort of emphasis upon process which the
Model Cities Program concentrated on. The Guide went on to
describe activities during the initial planning period.
'THe administrative unit of the CDA will develop its
organisational capability so as to plan and carry out
a well coordinated comprehensive plan and to engage
in continuing planning and evaluation during the
implementation period.' (HUD, 1967:30)
This process seems to be a mishmash of planning, perhaps a
search for an 'on-going planning situation': a) Planning plans
b) Planning c) Plan the plans.
A serious point should be made about the emphasis of the
Model Cities Program upon organisational features. Categorical
grants-in-aid from the federal government contained constraints
for local government in the manner in which they could be spent
on the basis of the intended content of the programme. The
federal review process for the Model City Program became
increasingly concerned, however, not with judging plans against
relevant service or content criteria, but against criteria
that related- to process. 'Organizational capability', 'problem
analysis', 'goals', 'strategies' etc. were abstracted concepts,
meaningless unless related to the substance of the federal
government's aims concerning 'poverty neighborhoods'. The
concern became focused upon the manner in which local government
approached the problem, not the content of such an approach.
After completing the planning period the cities submitted
an application to HUD for supplemental grants. The Guide
indicates that the application is to include
'a Five Year Plan, a First Year Action Program, a
Planning and Evaluation Program, and a statement of
Administrative structure.' (HUD, 1967: 31)
The Guide went on to list the five steps to be taken to prepare
the application. Again these 'steps' focus totally upon the
process and not on the substance.
Organisationally, therefore, the Model Cities Program
differed from the War on Poverty in that it was funded under
an existing Department (albiet, a new one) and the organisational
processes were much more tightly defined.
This organisational concentration of the programme reflected
the major concern of the federal government to increase the
monies going to the cities, while ensuring that through coord¬
ination with other federal programmes pressure on federal
government to do more for the cities would be relieved.
The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development
Act authorised appropriations for planning and technical
assistance of twelve million dollars in each of the first two
years, for supplemental funds and other spending of nine
hundred million dollars over two years, rather than the
Administration's request for 2.3 billion over six years.
As Lee and Dyckman (1970) point out the costs of three weeks
of the Vietnam War covered the entire Model Cities Program
budget for 1967-68. The Administration was faced each year
with the problem of having the authorisations appropriated by
Congress, especially with the increase in Vietnam spending
and as the stimulus of spending on the War began to turn the
problems in the economy of stagnation and unemployment, which
Kennedy and'Johnson had inherited from Eisenhower, into
problems of inflation and lack of manpower, this became more
difficult.
The struggle between the Administration and Congress to have
passed the first appropriations went on until November 1966.
In 1967, the appropriations were not passed until October
and Congress had reduced the appropriation from 662 million-
dollars to 312 million dollars.
The nature and purposes of the programme are laid out in the
Program Guide to Model Neighborhoods in Demonstration Cities
(HUD, 1967).1
1) The programme was to be comprehensive.
1 during the passage of the legislation owing to the unfortunate
connotations of 'Demonstration' the word 'Model' was substituted.
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'The purposes are (1) to rebuild or revitalize large
slum and blighted areas; (2) to expand housing; (3)
to expand job and income opportunities; (4) to reduce
dependency on welfare payments; (5) to improve educ¬
ational facilities - and programs; (6) to combat disease
and ill health; (7) to enhance recreational and
cultural opportunities; (8) to reduce the incidence
of crime and delinquency; (9) to establish better
access between homes and jobs; and (10) in general,
to improve living conditions for the people who live
in these areas.' (HUD, : 3)
2) The programme was to concentrate efforts. It required
the concentration of Federal, State, and local public and
private resources.
3) The programme was to coordinate Federal, State and local
public and private efforts.
4) The programme was to demonstrate new and imaginative proposals.
'Cities should look upon this program as an opportunity
to experiment, to become laboratories for testing and
refining new and better methods for improving the quality
of urban living.' (HUD, 1967: 4)
5) The programme was to make substantial impact. The Guide set
1
out 'Program Achievement Standards'.
1'1) Education: The local program should be designed to make
marked progress in reducing educational disadvantage and to
provide educational services necessary to serve the poor and
disadvantaged in the area
2) Health: The local program should be designed to make marked
progress in reducing ill health and to provide health services
necessary to serve the poor and disadvantaged in the area
3) Housing: The local program should be designed to contribute
to a well-balanced city with a substantial increase in the supply
of low- and moderate-cost housing and with maximum opportunities
in the choice of housing and accomodation for all citizens of
all income levels
4) Income Maintenance and Social Services: The local program
should be designed to make marked progress in reducing social
disadvantage and to provide social services necessary to serve
the poor and disadvantaged in the area
5) Employment and Economic Development: The local program
should be designed to make marked progress in reducing unemploy¬
ment and underemployment and in providing maximum opportunities
for employing residents in all phases of the program and enlarg¬
ing opportunities for work and training
6) Crime and Delinquency: The program should be designed to
make marked progress in reducing the incidence of crime and
delinquency
The Model Cities Program, like the CAP of the War on Poverty,
was concerned with the widest range of social services, reflect¬
ing the comprehensiveness of its aims.
'...the model cities budget had the effect of limiting
local programs to what has been termed 'the service
strategy' which was typical of most of the Great Society
programs aimed at the poor.' (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977:
224)
The service strategy, as indicated above, distributed
rewards to particular groups. Whereas the CAP had been an
attempt to by-pass the local governments and provide directly
federal benefits to the black poor, the Model Cities Program
attempted this strategy in conjunction with city hall.
'The basic consequences of Model Cities in all cities
was to expand the scope of non-white public employment
without disrupting patterns of patronage, public employee
unions or civil service restrictions on job allocation.
Like the War on Poverty, Model Cities provided thousands
of jobs for blacks, creating one of the first black
dominated bureacracies, and avenues of mobility for non-
white public employees in other city agencies.'
(Friedland, 1979s 511)
Such a service strategy, while providing these political
benefits for the Democratic Party contained contradictions
within city government which, when the Democratic Party was
no longer in power, nationally, led to a change of emphasis.
7) Transportation: The program should be designed to contribute
to a well-balanced city with adequate public transportation
facilities and should provide for ease of access between the
residential areas and centers of employment
8) Physical Environment: The program should be designed to
remove or arrest blight and decay in the Model Neighborhood and
provide adequate public facilities (including those needed for
education, health, social services, and recreation) and commercial
facilities necessary to serve the Model Neighborhood
9) Design, Historic Preservation and New Technology: Cities are
encouraged to enhance the Model Neighborhood area by applying
a high standard of design, to maintain as appropriate, natural
and historic sites and distinctive neighborhood characteristics,
and to make maximum possible use of new and improved technology
and design, including cost reduction techniques
10) Relocation: The local program should be designed to relocate
satisfactorly all individuals, families, business concerns, and
nonprofit organizations displaced in the carrying out of the program
(HUD, 1967: 7-16)
The Model Cities Program became, after a short period,
part of the Federal grant-in-aid fiscal support to the localities
which it was supposed to be coordinating. While the shift
from what I will call a service delivery focus to a programme
and planning focus did not arise solely within the Model
Cities Program, it was at the time of the institution of the
programme and increasingly through its development that this
shift took place in Great Society programmes. The initial
Task Force Report, while making clear the service concerns
of the Task Force was an example of the programme and planning
approach. The concepts of coordination etc are founded in a
planning view of the nature of problem management. Hubert
Humphrey, the Vice President, made such an approach clear
when he spoke in Boston
'The Act does for the cities what the National
Aeronautics and Space Act did for the Space Program.'
(Humphrey, 1967)
GEO, along with other Federal agencies was also beginning to
focus on a process oriented approach to problems. An example
was the grant procedures laid down by CEO (0E0, 1968) in
August 1968. In Appendix H to the instructions, the Planning
Cycle for a CAA was set out for a year. This, in diagrammatic
form, with a key, involved one hundred and nineteen steps and
was replete with abbreviations such as CP (Chief Planner),
TAG (Target Area Groups), AW (Application Writer), CA (Other
Agencies) and as an illustration of the detail into which it
went, it described activities such as
* 13—14 CP completes revision and production of studies
for authorized distribution
14-15 CP develops planning recommendations based on
study findings and other information
13-15 CP reviews overall CAA program structure in light of
new study findings.' (0E0, 1968: vii-17)
The 0E0 also produced such documents as a three hundred page
long Grantee Reporting Manual called Management Information
Reporting by CAAs (GEO, 1967)• The CAP Management Information
System was described as a method of reporting progress in carrying
out plans.
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'To understand this purpose fully, this reporting system
should be viewed as the final step in a series of related
CAP management processes that must be accomplished at
all levels to achieve the basic mission of CAP and its
grantees. These steps are:
1) Define the needs of poor people,
2) Set program objectives for meeting these needs,
3) Analyze and select alternative courses of action
for achieving these objectives,'
4) Allocate resources among alternatives,
5) Assign individual responsibilities for carrying out
the agreed - on courses of action,
6) Monitor progress against plans both to improve individual
- performance and to strengthen plans in each recycling of
the planning process' (CEO, 1967s 7)
Although some may reject this as merely an example of
bureacratic capability to expand its functions (and hence
power), this type of microlevel control over details of process
allowed the Federal government much greater flexibility in
dealing with projects and their policies, while exercising
greater control over them than would be the case if the sub¬
stantive aims were set but the processes unstated.
Such an approach attempted to overcome the contradictions fac¬
ed by the government. As Robert Wood (Under Secretary at HUD under
Nixon) pointed out in a speech to the Annual Symposium of the
American Society for Cybernetics
'If we are to govern urban America I believe we need a
greater consolidation of authority at the metropolitan
level ana a decentralization of authority at the neighbor¬
hood level. These arrangements are not as contradictory
as they may at first appear.' (Wood, 1968)
Before returning to the Model Cities Program, another
example of this trend is worth focusing on. The Vice President's
Handbook for Local Officials: a guide to federal assistance
for local government (Office of the Vice President, 1967)
was produced as part of Vice President Humphrey's overlordship
of domestic programmes for the cities. In the Handbook the
proliferation, both of local government and federal finance in
the postwar years was commented upon. The average number of
government units for a metropolitan area was quoted at 87, yet
several areas had over 1,000 local units. This combined
with the growth in personnel and finance presented a different
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quality to the 'crisis of the cities.'. State and local
government employment had increased in the years 1958-68
by 7C%. Federal aid payments in urban areas had increased
from an actual 1961 level of 5*893 billion dollars to an
estimated level of 10*329 billion dollars in 1968 (165%)*
The major increases had taken place in the fields of housing
and community development (32'3%» 238 million dollars in 1961
to 1,006 million dollars in 1968), health, labor and welfare
(203%, 1*419 billion dollars in 1961 to 4*299 billion dollars
in 1968) and education (513%> 0*258 billion dollars in 1961
to 1*710 billion dollars in 1968) (Office of the Vice President,
1967: 259). The aim of the Model Cities Program as presented
in the Handbook was to rationalise and direct in a more compr¬
ehensive manner this diversity of government. To anticipate
President Nixon's view, the crisis of the cities was a crisis
of government and not necessarily a crisis of inadequate or
insufficient programmes delivering services and distributing
goods. The preface to the Community Development Evaluation
Series began
'In recent years observers of the 'urban crisis' have
identified 'governmental fragmentation' as one source
of the nation's inability to deal effectively with
domestic problems.' (HUD, 1972)
The Vice President was quoted in his Handbook as having said
'The Model Cities Program is not so much a new program
as it is a new approach. It asks participating cities
frequently for the very first time, to make a searching
self-examination of the basic problems and conditions
that promote and permit ghettoes and which keep its people
living in a perpetual state of depression and frustration,
alienated from and resentful of the rest of society. It
asks the cities to devise comprehensive solutions that
are more than a band-aid or a hand-out - solutions that
can produce new jobs and housing, new educational and health
services, and most of all a new opportunity for the
disadvantaged and discouraged to participate in the
mainstream of American life.' (Office of the Vice President,
1967: 19)
The Handbook was intended to make local officials more
aware of the programmes available and their interrelations.
The Model Cities Program contained from the beginning
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this concentration upon federal review of process, but it
was the Planned Variations introduced by President Nixon's
Administration in 1971 which made clear the degree to which
the shift from service delivery to process orientation had
taken place.
President Nixon announced the selection of twenty cities
for the Planned Variations in June 1971, as a forerunner to
the proposed community development revenue sharing and general
revenue sharing schemes which his Administration was committed
to introducing. These approaches, which I shall discuss in
more detail below, were the Bepublican attempt to solve the
dilemma of local control and federal direction. Whereas the
Democratic Party's strength was at the Federal level (both
in the bureacracy and the 'national intelligensia' ) and in
the urban areas, the Republican strength lay in the States and
business.
'.... the inner city was not a promising source of strength
for Nixon no matter what he did. Although the conception
of the program did indeed have more in common with the
New Federalism, the flow of resources through the newly
decentralized mechanisms ended up in the hands of Democratic
voters.' (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977s 212)
The Planned Variations were a two year demonstration programme
in sixteen selected cities. Their main objective was to allow
cities to improve their coordination of federal funds, to
reduce bureacracy and to overcome delay (HUD, 1972b). Three
basic variations were introduced into the Model Cities Program
in the selected cities.
1) Cities were given additional Model Cities supplemental
grant funds to expand the program to cover all the areas in
need in the city.
2) Local chief executives who represented local general purpose
government were given stronger coordinating powers through the
right to review and comment on all applications for Federal
assistance that affected the community.
3) Federal agencies took steps to waive or minimise the
administrative requirements for funds.
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Planned Yariations did not focus upon realigning, at Federal
level, priorities and goals. Rather, it was concerned to
allow cities greater discretion over the expenditure of federal
funds. Planned Variations represented the beginning of the
retreat of the Federal government from overtly setting priorities
for local and state governments as the Great Society programmes
had.
Nixon's New Federalism can be explained in terms both specific
to his Republican Administration (as I attempted to do for
Johnson and the War on Poverty) and in broader terms of national
economic pressures which had effected both Administrations.
Looking at the distribution of funds by the cities in the
Planned Variations, the major shift was from a Model Cities
emphasis on social programmes to a Planned Variations emphasis
on physical programmes. Economic programmes remained largely
stable at 14*1% of funds under Model Cities (three year average)
to 15*3% under the first year of the Planned Variations.
Administrative expenditure decreased from 22*2% of funds
(Model Cities three year average) to 13*9% in the first year
of the Planned Variations. Social programmes expenditure
decreased dramatically from 42^2% under the Model Cities to
27*8% under the Planned Variations, while expenditure on
physical programmes increased from 21*1% to 42*7%« (HUD, 1972b)
Accepting that 'the problem' as presented by HUD remained
the same (although this thesis does not subscribe to the
reified notion of problem which is implied in government
policy statements) then this shift in emphasis from social
to physical programmes in the search for a 'solution' indicated
two things.
1) The different form the 'problem' took for national and local
government.
2) The importance of the process of federal distribution of
funds in directing programme aims.
The change in programme process by the Nixon Administration
produced different programme aims and a different articulation
of the nature and causes of the problem to be faced.
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The change in governmental thinking and in the structure
of the War on Poverty and the Model Cities Program is illum¬
inated by considering the links between the CAP and the Model
Cities Program. One of the debates in the CAP referred to
above, related to the place assigned for resident participation.
The inclusion of a demand for resident participation and the
lack of local government control over the CAP lead to conflict
and escalating demands upon local government. Frieden and
Kaplan state that a community development letter was issued
by HUD, clarifying the participation question to the Community
Development Agencies (of the Model Cities Program). This
letter established performance standards rather than prescriptive
requirements.
'Cities would have to provide an organizational structure
that brought neighborhood residents into the process of
planning and implementation; positions of leadership
would have to be held by persons whom residents accepted
as representatives of their interests and the structure
of citizen participation would be required to give them
direct access to the decision making process of the CDA
with sufficient time to consider and initiate proposals
and some form of acceptable technical assistance.'
(Frieden and Kaplan, 1977: 76)
As Frieden and Kaplan go on to point out, a problem for
HUD, 0E0 and the local government units was 'whose citizens
were to be dominant - OEO's or HUD's?' The 0E0 concept of
participation was in conflict with local government, while
that of HUD was aimed at strengthening local government's
capability.
'By 1967» some of the militance was gone, but Community
Action Agencies still understood that they were to org¬
anize the poor and serve as their advocate, perhaps in
cooperation rather than in conflict with the establish¬
ment. The Model Cities Program, however, was intended
to create agreement and partnership between residents
and city government.' (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977: 76)
Frieden and Kaplan show clearly how the Model Cities
Program strengthened local government units and to an extent,
especially after the passage of the Green Amendment to the
Economic Opportunity Act in 1967» provided the mayors with
a programme under their control and direction. Participation
in programme development in the sense used in the Model Cities
Program had a sense much more closely connected to local
government practise. If participation tended to be antagonistic
to local government in the CAP, the participation content of
the Model Cities Program was intended to legitimate existing
practise.
'An important factor in the ultimate success of the
Model Cities Program is the acceptance of the program
by the residents of the various Model Neighborhoods.
To help ensure such acceptance more complete inform¬
ation is needed to be provided to the residents and
local administrators who are wrestling with the day-
to-day problems of the Model Cities Program.'
(HUD, 1972a)
The Community Development Block Grants
While the Community Development Block Grants were not
designed as an antipoverty strategy, inclusion of the Model
City grants into them and the substance of the guidelines
for the CDBG makes it an interesting programme to discuss in
conclusion. The CDBG's emphasis on the reorganisation of the
fiscal relationship between federal and local government
provides a parallel with some of the later British projects
such as the CCPs. The reorganised relationship in Britain
was, almost exclusively, concerned with organisational rel¬
ationships within the local authority. The parallel lies in
the move away from an exclusively 'urban poverty' focus to
a more general concern with the functioning of the local state
as a whole.
The idea of revenue sharing had been mooted by both the
Republicans and Democrats near the end of the Johnson Admin¬
istration. The purpose of revenue sharing was to reduce
federal discretion over categorical grants, to simplify the
number of grants and to allow local governments more say in
the allocation of funds. Community Development Grants were
instituted under the Housing and Community Development Act
1974. Title I of this Act provided for block grants for
community development. During Nixon's campaign in 1968 and
during his subsequent Administrations he criticised the growth
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of the federal government's involvement in domestic programmes.
He concentrated his early criticisms on the inefficiency
of federal government directing local strategies.
'I have established both the Urban Affairs Council and
the Office of Intergovernmental Relations in part so
that the Government could be better advised on additional
improvements in service systems. Further systemmatic
restructuring is on the way. Each reform, I believe,
will have a major impact on the quality of American
government - an impact which will benefit all our
citizens in all parts of the country
By rationalizing, coordinating and decentralizing
the systems through which government provides important
social and economic services, we can begin at last to
realize the hopes and dreams of those who created them.'
(Nixon, 1969b)
In an address to the Nation on Domestic Programs (Nixon, 1969c),
Nixon made clear the movement that I mentioned earlier from
a service strategy to a management strategy when viewing the
problems of the cities.
'We face an urban crisis, a social crisis - and at the
same time, a crisis of confidence in the capacity of
government to do its job.
A third of a century of centralizing power and resp¬
onsibility in Washington has produced a bureacratic
monstrosity cumbersome, unresponsive, ineffective.
A third of a century of social experiment has left
us a legacy of entrenched programs that have outlived
their time or outgrown their purposes.
A third of a century of unprecedented growth and change
has strained our institutions, and raised serious questions
about whether they are still adequate to the times.'
(Nixon, 1969c)
In the same speech, he announced his New Federalism, to
return power to the States and 'the people'. The Model
Cities Program came under attack within the Administration
but despite the hostility of the Administration towards it,
it was continued partly for the lack of a substitute.
Revenue sharing was an approach which was consistent with
the concept of a New Federalism. Revenue sharing (both 'general'
and 'special') transfered federal government tax receipts to
local government institutions to be spent either, as in the case
of general revenue sharing, in general local government support
or, as in the case of special revenue sharing, on ^particular
sets of problems. General revenue sharing, which can be
compared with the rate support grant in Britain, was intro¬
duced under the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act 1972.
It was a five year programme designed to spend 5*5 billion
dollars in the first year and 30*2 billion dollars over a
five year period. Frieden and Kaplan point out that the first
year entitlements to general revenue sharing for calendar
year 1972 were mostly more than first year model cities grants
but that
'...even where revenue sharing exceeded model cities
grants by a factor of two or three, local political
pressures make far less available for spending in the
model neighborhoods, which usually represent no more
than a tenth of the city's population.' (Frieden and
Kaplan, 1977: 226-227)
The special revenue sharing approach was designed to over¬
come some of these problems of general revenue sharing. The
Model Cities Program was, comparatively politically relatively
unimportant, both because of the amount of money being spent
on it in relation to the amount involved in the revenue sharing
programme and because the Model Cities Program would not have
been the only programme to be affected by the withdrawal of
federal direction over local disembursement of funds.
The special revenue sharing approach had five main parts:
1) Consolidation of urban renewal, model cities and neighbor¬
hood facilities programmes;
2) Replacement of categorical grant application procedures
with a formula allocation for qualifying communities;
3) Reduction in administration and procedural requirements
associated with categorical grants;
4) Assignment of all funds and decision making to general
purpose local governments instead of special quasi-autonomous
bodies (such as the CDA for model cities);
5) Elimination of requirements for matching funds. (Nathan, 1977)
The revenue sharing for community development was designed
to collect a number of categorical grants, including model
cities together. As Nixon announced in his Special Message
to the Congress on the subject.
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'Cities could thus use their allocation to acquire,
clear and renew blighted areas, to construct public
works such as water and sewer facilities, to build
streets and malls, to enforce housing codes in
deteriorating areas, to rehabilitate residential
properties, to aid demolition projects, and to help
relocate those who have been displaced from their
homes or businesses by any authorities which drew
on these urban community development special revenue
sharing funds. They could also fund a range of
human resource activities including those now funded
by the Model Cities and Community Action programs.'
(Nixon, 1971)
The problem of federal direction in relation to the aims
of programmes financed under revenue sharing will be discussed
later, but it was, in part, through the opposition of Congress
to federal abdication in this area that the proposals took
until 1974 to be enacted.
The 1971 proposal was reintroduced to Congress in 1973 as
the 'Better Communities Act', proposing to include open spaces,
water and sewer facilities and the public facilities loan
programme with other urban renewal, model cities and neighbourhood
facilities programmes in the grant. It also extended the sharing
to urban counties, not just cities and contained a 'hold-harmless'
provision, whereby local governments receiving less money under
the block grant formula would have their entitlement made up
for a period of years.
The Senate restricted local government's freedom to spend the
money as they wished under the programme. It included national
objectives in the bill. It imposed limitations on the use of
funds and it also imposed an application from recipients, outlin¬
ing the uses of the block grant funds. In the House-Senate
Conference, the application procedure was reduced to a veto
only power on the part of HUD. The Conference also agreed
to authorize 8»45 billion dollars for three years under the Act.
The returning of discretion from the federal government to
the localities was, in the rhetoric of New Federalism, giving
power back to the people. In reality, of course, the Federal
government was returning power from the federal bureacracy
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to the local power structures within the States and localities.
This insulated the Republican Administration from the demands
of local groups collected powerfully at national level and
provided both a confusion for Democratic local administrations
(which groups to offend in competition for funds now under
the localities' control) and also increased income to Republ¬
ican suburban areas. The balance of federal spending was
tipped away from the central cities.
'From the analysis of the first-year allocations under
the CDBG program, three significant shifts of funds
were found to have occured:
1) A regional redistribution, with the advantages enjoyed
in the past by the New England and Middle Atlantic regions
under the programs folded into the block grant system
shifting to other regions under formula system, particularly
to the southern regions.
2) A substantial decrease in the advantage to central
cities.......
3) A concommitant gain by small communities, both metro¬
politan and non-metropolitan, under the formula system. '
(Nathan, 1977: 133-134)
These political considerations are essentially mirror image
of the Democratic Party's concerns leading up to the founding
of the War on Poverty in 1964• Nixon was rewarding his voters
in the way Johnson rewarded his potential voters. At the most
basic level, a service delivery approach was electorally
favourable to the Democratic Party, whereas a physical prog¬
ramme which both the CDBG and the Planned Variations emphasised,
rewarded business and local capital without necessarily
providing rewards for those people whom the projects were
supposed to aid.
This, however, is not a sufficient explanation. Just as the
War on Poverty was congruent with both the electoral concerns
of the Party and the economic concerns of government, so
too was the Community Development Block Grant approach consistent
with the economic pressures government faced at the time.
Two major changes in the pressures on the American economy
occured during the Johnson years. Firstly, the War on Vietnam
took up an increasing amount of the federal budget and high
defense spending, which entered the domestic economy through
fuller employment and industrial activity relating to the
armaments and defense servicing, created inflationary pre¬
ssures in the domestic economy. Secondly, the Johnson years
had seen an expansion of the federal government unparalleled
since Roosevelt. The Great Society programmes had increased
both the absolute number of dollars federal government gave
to localities and also the amount of federal involvement in
the affairs of localities (which demanded an increase in
the federal bureacracy).
I have already commented in general terms on the growth
in local government employment and federal government
expenditure in urban areas. It is of importance to relate
this growth to the overall budgeting and economic pressures
upon the federal government. Referring back to the founding
of the War on Poverty, the American economy faced, as has
already been stated, different problems. The parallel growth
of domestic expenditure and defense spending created tensions
which were beginning to have their full effect in the late sixties.
This parallel growth arose from Johnson's attempt to build and
retain a consensus based on the one hand on the War on Vietnam
and on the other, the Great Society. This consensus disintegrated
in the last years of the Administration leaving Nixon with a
more visibly divided society and one where Nixon's politics
had a clearer base than those of Johnson. Gross and Marien
(1968) argue that the balancing of interests by Johnson in
his two 'wars' helped to achieve the consensus he sought.
'This is one of the many reasons for the 'relative
consensus' achieved by President Johnson during the
early years of his Administration. But with little
visible success on either battlefront dissensus has
firmly gained the upper hand. The graceful balancing
act of limited commitment on all fronts has been
submerged under the cries for decisive action on
one front at the exclusion of the other.'
(Gross and Marien, 1968: 28)
In fiscal year 1961, the administrative budget expenditure
on defense was 45*7 billion dollars, by 19&9 the expenditure on
defense had risen to 79*1 billion dollars of which 28*8 billion
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dollars was reported being spent on South-East Asia (U.S.
Budget, 1969), an overall increase in defense spending of
73*1% in the eight year period (excluding the Vietnam War
the increase was 9*9%)* In the same period the GNP had risen
from 520*1 billion dollars in 1961 to 930*3 billion dollars
in 1969» an increase of 78*9%. The amount of the GNP received
by the federal government had risen from 18*6% of the GNP
to 20*9% or an increase of 12*4% (U.S. Budget, 1975). Outlays
by the federal government increased from 19*3% of the GNP
to 20*5% in 1969> an increase of 6?2%. The 1968 outlay (21*6%)
represented the highest percentage of the GNP received during
the 1960s.
Looking at state and local expenditures between 1955 and
1969 the overall increase had been 244*1% with the major
increases in dollars being in. general expenditure (Schultze
et al., 1971). Federal outlays to states and local governments
rose from 7*112 billion dollars in 1961 to 20*255 billion dollars
in 1969» a 184*8% increase. This represented an increase from
7*3% of total federal outlays to 11%, an increase of 50*7%
(excluding defense, space and international programs, this rise
was from 15*4% to 21*5%, a 38*3% increase) and was as- a percentage
of state and local revenue increased from 12% in 1961 to 17*4%
in 1969» a 45% increase. (U.S. Budget, 1977)
This sketch of budget expenditures indicates two main
points. Firstly, defense expenditure had risen rapidly in
the 1960s. Secondly, the increase in federal government aid
to state and local governments both in absolute terms and
in relation to the total revenue of the states and local
governments was dramatic.
One argument in support of the CLBG which relates to this
overall picture, is that the CBBG by rationalising grant
giving procedures and giving a greater role to coordination
at a local level should, in the long run, have reduced, if not
the absolute amount given from the federal government to states
and local governments, at least the increase in federal government
expenditure. General revenue sharing and block grants were seen
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as reducing administrative inefficiencies and overlaps.
Another way in which expenditure under the CDBG was to be
reduced was in the shift from 'software' to 'hardware' projects.
'According to law, public services may be funded only
if they are related to a physical development activity
in the same area and only if the community has been
unable to get support for them under other federal
programs.' (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977s 260)
In the first year, cities concentrated 42% of CDBG funds on
urban renewal, 4*3% for public services and 7*7% for service
related facilities and equipment (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977s
260). This is a similar picture to the shift that took place
under the Planned Variations.
Frieden and Kaplan comment on the attraction of 'hardware'
projects,
'Hardware projects are attractive locally because they
are one-shot investments followed only by maintenance
costs. Service programs may create clientele that
demand high budgets for years into the future. Further,
hardware projects are tangible and visible and, therefore,
traditionally good politics.' (Frieden and Kaplan, 1977s
260-261)
Regarding the shift from the cities to the suburbs in
expenditure by the federal government, it can be seen that the
reduction in expenditure in central cities, apart from having
clear political benefits for the Republicans, effected a
shift from a 'social problem' oriented concern to a 'resource
management' concern. Comparing the folded-in grant allocations
with the CDBG allocations, (see page 90)the shift that was
most pronounced was the shift from the central cities to other
parts of the metropolitan areas.
Organisationally, the CDBG represented a departure from the
collection at federal level of responsibility and discretion.
Despite the inclusion by Congress of a greater overview by HUD
in the programme, the lack of close federal control was an
important element of the new programme (reflecting the New
Federalism). The main distinction, however between general
revenue sharing and block grants (special revenue sharing)
was that the latter retained some federal control over the

















































general direction of local government priorities.
Nathan (1977: 54) reports on the application procedure.
A single application from a jurisdiction had to contain a three
year community development plan summary, a one-year action pro¬
gramme, a housing assistance plan and a budget. The application
had to be accompanied by assurances and certificates that
the local government had;
•1) given maximum feasible priority to activities which
will benefit low and moderate income families or add
in the prevention or elimination of slums and blight;
2) provided information about the program to citizens,
held at least two public hearings, and provided for
•adequate' citizen participation;
5) complied with the non-discrimination provisions of the
act and all other applicable federal laws and regulations;
4) complied with the David-Bacon 'prevailing wage'
requirement;
5) submitted the application to state and area wide
clearing houses for review and comment; and
6) assumed responsibility for meeting environmental
review requirements under the act and agreed to accept
the jurisdiction of federal courts with respect to enforce¬
ment of those responsibilities.' (Nathan, 1977: 54)
Through these requirements, HUD was able to exercise control
over the direction of funding in particular, the first require¬
ment that activities benefit low and moderate-income families.
The definition of 'benefit' was vague.
HUD, under the Act, was given 75 days to approve applications
unless they did not meet three requirements.
'1) the needs and objectives described in the application
are 'plainly inconsistent' with available facts and data;
2) the activities that the jurisdiction proposes are
'clearly not permissible' under the act; and
3) the planned activities are 'plainly inappropriate'
to meeting the identified needs and objectives.'
(Nathan, 1977: 55)
Funding of the CDBG through a formula allocation to cities,
removed the competition between cities for funds. Allocation
on a 'rational' basis - a funding formula - created a different
political struggle over funds. On the one hand, with allocation
within localities being decided upon at a local level, the
local government unit became the location for more conflict
over funding allocations, being unable to point to federal
direction of priorities in funding. On the other hand, the
federal bureacracy, in this case HUD, lost its discretion over
allocation of funds. The conflict at a national level over
the allocation of (TDBG funds became centered around the formula
for allocation and the level of appropriations which are
matters that take place in the arena of Congress and the
Administration.
The distribution formula at the introduction of the programme
was divided between a formula entitlement allocation and a
'hold-harmless* allocation. The formula entitlement was a
sum earmarked on the basis of the objective formula criteria
e.g. population, overcrowded housing and poverty. The hold-
harmless allocation guaranteed communities the same level of
funding during the first three years as the annual average
under the folded-in grant programmes during the five year
period 1968-72. There were two exceptions one of which related
to the Model Cities Program. The model cities hold-harmless
meant that
•in some cases a city's hold-harmless amount under CDBG
can begin to decline before the end of the third year
of the program ..... Funding to sixty three model cities
began to be phased down in the second year of the CDBG
program.' (Nathan, 1977s 79-60)
The allocation formula's effect upon funding in different areas
has already been indicated. The most important observation
to make is that the CDBG represents the withdrawal of federal
direction in the field and time period in which I am interested.
I have already mentioned in brief the problems of political
control and management which this withdrawal was confronting.
Since this is a problem similar in both Britain and the United
States, this is something that I shall discuss at greater
length elsewhere.
The objectives of the Housing and Community Development Act
the Act under which CDBG funds were distributed, were, in 1974
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'1) Elimination of slums and blight;
2) The provision of activities giving maximum feasible
priority to benefiting low and moderate income families;
3) The elimination of conditions which axe detrimental
to health, public safety and public welfare;
4) The conservation and expansion of the nation's housing
stock;
5) The expansion and improvement of the quality and
quantity of community services; .
6) A more rational utilization of land and other natural
resources;
7) The reduction of the isolation of income groups within
communities and geographical areas and the promotion of
an increase in the diversity and vitality of neighborhoods;
and
8) The restoration and preservation of properties of special
value for historic, architectural or esthetic reasons.'
(Boston, 1979: 2)
The provision of services in the cities which had experienced
a growth of federal funding was a priority for cities. The
withdrawal of services was a politically perilous act and the
CD3G allowed the federal government to do just that without
seeming to. The Model Cities Program and the CAP had instit¬
utionalised a service function in city governments. However,
Nathan concludes
'Far and away the predominate approach to community
development under the block grant proposal in its first
year of operation involved a neighborhood conservation
and growth strategy designed primarly to prevent urban
blight.' (Nathan, 1977: 327)
Chapter Three
The British Projects
With the background that I have given on the American
programmes, the difficulty of comparing them with the British
projects should be apparent. The examples in Britain which
were most nearly equivalent to the American experience were the
Educational Priority Areas which designated certain areas for
increased teacher pay and extra school buildings, Section 11
payments and the Urban Programme's distribution to local
authorities of extra money for 'deprived areas'. Even here,
the similarity lies, not in the content of the programmes
but in that they were supplemental funds to local authorities.
A different set of political and economic forces from those
in the United States were at work, which gave rise to the
setting up of a different set of programmes. Considering
that it is a main contention of this thesis that it is these
forces which shape the most important aspects of policy, it
is not surprising that they are fundamentally different.
Within central government and in some accounts of these
programmes and projects (Higgins, 1978; Marris and Rein, 1972)
a comparison is made between the Community Action Program and
the Community Development Projects in Britain and the Kodel
Cities Program and the Inner Area Studies. In all important
aspects this comparison fails, except in as far as it tells
us how social science ideas and general ideas in government
are transmitted and what autonomy they have from the political
and economic forces which create a demand both for such ideas
and the programmes which are seen as being based upon them.
It is important to emphasise that at the time of the intro¬
duction of these projects Britain had an universalist system
of welfare provision. Despite the apparent fallings of the
system, its avowed purposes were clear - to provide a support
for all people in Britain in the most important areas of health,
housing, education and income maintenance. No such system
existed in the U.S.A. in the early 1960s. Not only did
Britain have such a welfare system, but it had been built up
since the end of the war and indeed the history of progressive
social policies was a much longer one than in America. The
Wilson Government in 1964 was not faced, as Johnson was in the
same year, with the task of attempting to ameliorate conditions
which had arisen over centuries of exploitation and whose
consequences the capitalist state was becoming unable to
contain.
Allied to this basic difference, was that, whereas American
imperialism and attempts at world hegemony were still a major
force in American politics and economics, Britain had long since
lost its position as the major imperialist power. The social
policies of the two governments can be contrasted as being symptoms
of, among other things, their relative world positions.
To begin with then, the American programmes, at least the
CAP and the Model Cities Program, were part of the expansion
of basic social welfare provision in a society whose wealth
was being derived, and whose economy was booming, on the basis
of its world power. The British projects were adjuncts to a
supposedly comprehensive welfare system that was increasingly
being constrained because of the rapidly decreasing economic
prosperity of Britain. Throughout the period discussed, the
major perceived problem of Britain was its poor economic record,
its balance of payments deficit and its lack of growth. These
conditions are very different from the problems that American
politicians faced.
Educational Priority Areas
For simplicity, and because of their interconnected origins,
I shall discuss the Educational Priority Area Action-Research
Projects in conjunction with the Educational Priority Area
Programme while making clear to which I am referring when only
referring to one.
Any account of the development of the EPAs begins with the
Plowden Report (Central Advisory Council for Education, 1967).
While the Plowden Report endorsed the idea and sketched the
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criteria for EPAs, the concept had already been current in
educational thinking, and while not necessarily being seen
as a need for area based compensatory educational programmes,
compensatory education had been seen as an important aspect
of policies concerned to promote equality. In the field of
education, the importance for the state of giving substance
to the ideology of equality of opportunity lay in the need
for the more effective use of manpower, if Britain was to regain
(or even maintain) its world economic position. Wasted manpower
had even more direct threats to the state as was clearly ident¬
ified in an article in the Times (1968) by the Education
Correspondent. Reporting on a report by Sir Alec CIegg, Chief
Education Officer for the West Riding of Yorkshire, under a
headline 'Unemployed child is danger to society', the report
reads, in part
'.... there are schools serving poor social areas where
there are many children from large families and where
many families are unemployed or receiving social security
benefits and much truancy and the schools have more
than their fair share of children who are retarded,
disturbed, handicapped or deprived ' (Times, 1968)
The correspondent went on to quote the report
'As simple machines consume unskilled work and more
sophisticated machines consume skilled work, the work
left for men and women to perform will all be skilled.
Unless education can provide men and women with the
ability to master skills, we may, in the not too
distant future have to face the prospect of educating
for unemployment. It is unlikely that such a situation
could arise without bringing about grave social unrest.'
(Times, 1968)
Sir Alec Clegg was rather farsighted, compared with other
policymakers.
Politicians of both parties had emphasised their concern
with a more positive achievement of the equality of opportunity
which was supposed to be part of British society.
'The essential point is that all children should have
equal opportunity of acquiring intelligence and devel¬
oping their talents and abilities to the full.' Intro¬
duction to the Newsom Report by Sir Edward Boyle,
Conservative Education Minister. (Central Advisory Council
for Education, 1963)
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granted, the differences in heredity and infantile
experience, every child should have the same opportunity
for acquiring measured intelligence, so far as this can
be controlled by social action.' (Crosland, 1962)
Looking for a more pertinent answer than that provided in
seeing an apparent consensus,to the question of why policy
makers should be concerned with the question of educational
opportunity, the Plowden Report provides some clues:
'Comparisons with other countries - all of them more
recently industrialised than Britain but all now at
a similar stage of economic development - suggest that
we have not done enough to provide the educational
background necessary to support an economy, which needs
fewer and fewer unskilled workers and increasing numbers
of skilled and adaptable people.' (C.A.C.E., 19&7? para 143)
' from the earliest stages of education, the schools
enlarge or restrict the contribution their pupils can
make to the life of the nation. Money spent on education
is an investment which helps to determine the scope
for future economic and social development.'
(C.A.C.E., 1967: para 145)
Apart from this concern with the investment aspect of education
and the wastes incurred in poor educational attainment, there was
the more covert racial element.
The racial element in British politics has been completely
different from the American experience. The 'immigrant' vote,
traditionally, has been taken for granted as being a Labour
vote. The element of race in British politics has been underplayed
by both major parties-to prevent the issue being established
upon the political agenda because of the dangers inherent in
different ways to both major parties.
The racial element was however thinly disguised in the
deliberations over the Plowden Report and in the Plowden
Report itself. Previously Section 11 payments had been made
to schools that had to accomodate 'immigrant' populations
and provide extra funds for areas with high 'immigrant'
populations.
The Report argued for the designation of EPAs by the Department
of Education and Science based upon information from local
authorities supported by HMIs' reports, considering six
criteria.
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1) The proportion of unskilled and semi-skilled workers;
2) The proportion of large families;
3) The proportion of those on social security and receiving
free school meals;
4) The proportion of overcrowded households;
5) Truancy rates;
6) The proportion of retarded, handicapped and non-English
speaking pupils.
This recommendation, however, was not accepted and local
authorities were invited to make bids for EPA funds under
Circular 11/67. A system of bids had two different implications.
Firstly, the government could ration resources in a more
effective way by first stating the total sum of money available
and then making allocations among a number of authorities.
Designation of EPAs would set the number of EPAs and have to
be financed from a sum which would be difficult to predetermine.
Secondly, the government was not open to examination of the
criteria of selection when receiving bids from local authorities.
Without a set of criteria for allocation of funds, central
government could allocate according to both demographic and
financial data concerning a proposed EPA and also according
to preferred service criteria. More power remained with central
government than under a system of designation by criteria.
Returning to the issue of race, the 'non-English speaking'
criterion for designation is stressed in other comments and
discussions. Michael Young, a member of the Plowden Committee,
at a teach-in of the Advisory Council for Education concerning
the Plowden Report said;
'Unless a change is made we may end up with a permanent
underclass consisting partly of native born people,
partly of immigrants, but all living in the same high
delinquency districts...' (Young, 1967)
And, as if portraying the problems of these 'high delinquency
districts', a Whitechapel school headmaster, quoted in the
Times Educational Supplement makes clear his moral and racial
prejudices.
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'There are a lot of broken families, children living
with grandparents or a mother alone. Some families of
four or more have been abandoned by their mothers. There
are mixed marriages, illegitimacy, mothers who associate
with coloured men ' (Times Educational Supplement, 1967)
Plowden specifically recognised the problem of 'immigrant'
children in primary schools in chapter six of the Report;
'The concentration of immigrant families in the
crumbling areas of industrial cities and boroughs
has greatly complicated the tasks of their teachers.'
(C.A.C.E., 1967: 180)
As has been said before and will be repeated again, the
mere existence of a 'social problem' has never been sufficient
reason for government to act. Government constructs a
'problem'. 'Immigrants' become an educational 'problem'.
Racist and sexist headmasters are not.
This is well illustrated by the case of the Plowden Report.
The Report was delivered to the Secretary of State who was
already aware of many of its conclusions,on 18th October 1966.
It was not released until January 1967, debated in Parliament
until March 1967 and the first government response in terms
of action was not until April 1967 when the government announced
that £54 million had been set aside for school building in the
year 1968-69 and £3 million would be spent in thirty one
local education authorities with EPAs. In July a special
allocation of £16 million for school building in priority
areas over the subsequent two years was announced. By April
1968 £43*3 million worth of bids had been received from 92
local authorities, the £16 million was eventually shared
between fifty one authorities. January 1968 also saw
massive cuts in public expenditure by the Labour Government.
The 1969-70 school building allocation was reduced to £48
million and £33 million had been saved for 1968 by postponing
the raising of the school leaving age.
It is within this context that the EPA programme must be
placed. I argue that it was the other side of spending cuts.
The EPAs contained the essence of a selective social service
policy which could reduce expenditure. For the Labour Government
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putting money into EPAs maintained its caring face, while
cuts in education were taking place. Labour educationalists
could point to the progressive aspects of its education policy,
while maintaining that the cuts were a response to economic
forces beyond the control of the government.
April 1968 also saw the implementation of the Plowden rec¬
ommendations regarding allowances for teachers in EPAs. Teachers
in EPA schools received an extra £75 per annum. The schools
were recognised by the Secretary of State on criteria similar
to those proposed by Plowden. These two aspects of Plowden
were administratively and financially among the least challeng¬
ing of the Report's recommendations. For instance the rec¬
ommendation concerning experimenting with 'community schools'
would have required institutional, administrative, political
and financial changes. The EPA Action-Research projects attempted
to explore some of these recommendations.
Despite Government inaction, the Plowden Report was well
received by all interested parties. The debate in the House
of Lords on 14th March 1967 was opened by Lord Newton. With
regard to the educational priority areas, he suggested that the
positive discrimination approach 'puts on trial the Socialism'
of the government. He also called these proposals the most
controversial of the Report and while he welcomed them, he
suggested;
'I do not think that the policy should be pushed too
far,....' (Hansard, 1967a: Col 1177)
Lord Plowden in his contribution stated some of the links
between educational opportunity and economic growth to which
I have already referred;
'Our economic progress, which will determine our power
to reach almost all our national objectives, depends
on our success in making the most of the inherent
potential of all our population. The overriding priority
in an educational system designed to make the maximum
contribution to national objectives is, therefore, exactly
the same as that required to give all children equality
of opportunity.' (Hansard, 1967b: Col 206)
His speech also makes clear the importance of positive
discrimination (and its links to administrative discretion)
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in social policy in a Britain facing economic problems.
'Equality must give way to discrimination But
to do this requires political courage because the
electorate continues to identify discrimination with a
means test and the mass unemployment of the 'thirties...'
(Hansard, 1967b: Col 208)
'But as I have already suggested, a different approach
to this problem of need by discrimination within the
welfare state as a whole in favour of those least
privileged would, I believe, give much more positive
results for the money we spend.' (Hansard, 1967b: Col 209)
This is the basis of EPAs and the government's use of the
concept. Throughout the history of the projects examined
in Britain, the reduction of, or delaying the increases in,
public expenditure has been seen, to greater or lesser extents,
as a main economic priority. For a Labour Government, however,
the reduction of public expenditure carries a very high price.
The positive discrimination approach on an area base may have
had the same intended effects, but a different appearance
from means tested benefits. This theme of positive discrimination
in a climate of economic restraint is one that was restated
by other speakers both in the Lords and the Commons debates.
Lord Eccles argued;
'It would be much better If he (Secretary of State for
Education) had the courage to cut back some of the
existing programmes in order to give the recommendation
the priority for which the Council makes so strong a
case.' (Hansard, 196701 Col 212)
Charles Morrison MP (Cons) argued in the Commons;
'.... it would seem that the concept of the EPA emphasises
once again that in yet another sphere the day of the
blanket benefit is over, that flat-rate Government aid
for whatever purposes is outdated both by post war
achievement and by the more specific problems which
today face a British Government. If in education, we
are to endeavour to provide more equality of opportunity
for all children, we should have to discriminate pos¬
itively in favour of the less fortunate areas.' (Hansard,
1967c. Col 824)
The other aspect of positive discrimination, apart from
long term savings on expenditure relates to the issue of
equality of opportunity and the indirect threat posed by
violence. Lord Ritchie Calder commented in the Lords upon
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this and brings into consideration some of the American
experience.
'This (drop-outs) is something which ought to concern
us deeply, not merely because of the wastage of these
people themselves, but because here we have an inherent
problem of greater magnitude for the future. I would
remind your Lordships that this was the inflammable
cause of the Watts riots in Los Angeles I
would commend (the Government) a close look
at what has been done in America A great many
lessons - lessons which will be very valulable - can
be learnt from them.' (Hansard, 1967ds Col 240)
This is an example of the way in which reference to the
American experience focused upon two aspects of that experience.
On the one hand, the violence, which was linked to race in
American cities, particularly the riots of the late 1960s,
and on the other, the programmes which America was implementing.
Given that the programmes preceded the violence (in the case
of the Community Action Program), the programme would not
necessarily be seen, taking a superficial view such as Lord
Ritchie Calder took, as being a model from which to learn.
Again the problems of American education and American race
relations are rather different from those of Britain. The
black population of America were not fairly recent arrivals.
Regarding programme structure and relating that to the British
situation, the American educational system did not have the
same central direction as was the case in Britain. On a large
number of variables, the situation was entirely different,
however, the point was made that America was experiencing
violent racial upheavals which, it was argued, were going
to occur in Britain if nothing was done to prevent them.
Both Young and Lonnison, who were among the members of
the Plowden Committee that went to the USA to look at primary
education there have acknowledged the influence of positive
discrimination in American education (Young, 1970» Donnison
Interview). The existence though of the American experience
and its transferability (about which there is some doubt)
was not sufficient to implement an EPA policy.
As I have indicated above, although the response to the
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idea of EPAs from the Government was sympathetic, their action
was lukewarm and could hardly be seen to constitute a major
departure from existing policy. From this evidence I conclude
that, whereas the EPA school building and extra teachers
allowance were a minor adjustment in educational expenditure,
they represent a shift towards the principle of positive
discrimination along the lines argued for by Charles Morrison
and Lord Plowden. For the Labour Government it represented a
small shift in principle, small because of the money involved,
but in principle because of its institution at a time of
education expenditure cuts.
The EPA Action-Research however illustrates a different appr¬
oach. The main actors involved in launching the action research
projects were all Labour establishment intellectuals. It
represented an experimental approach derived basically not
from the immediate economic or political demands that faced
the state but from ideas based on an analysis of what was being
defined as a problem. This would seem to be contrary to the
whole basis of my thesis, but it is not. It illustrates the
space within policy making in which ideas can relate to policy
making, but only within the constraints of the political
economy being faced at the time. An EPA approach that proved
a success in meeting the aims of the programme would reduce
costs and reduce potential conflict. The aims were:
•a) to raise the educational performance of children;
b) to improve the morale of teachers;
c) to increase the involvement of parents in their
children's education;
d) to increase the 'sense of responsibility' for their
communities of the people living in them.' (Halsey, 1972:
57)
The programme was not tackling a problem that needed an early
solution.
In a letter to Patrick Gordon-Walker, the new Secretary of
State for Education, Halsey and Young proposed an action
research programme costing £5 million but commented
'if however this is not possible we are still convinced
something useful can be done with a very much smaller
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sum, perhaps as little as £100,000 per annum divided
between five projects.' (Halsey and Young, 1967)
In a later letter to Shirley Williams (Minister of State
at the Education Department), a reference was made to the
'hopeless discussion' with Gordon-Walker. Clearly the
proposal was not seen to be a matter of urgency by the government.
At a time of cuts in public expenditure and in the bleak post-
devaluation climate, low priority was given to a programme
whose benefits were not easily identifiable.
The EPA action research project was financed by funds
both from the Department of Education and Science and the
Social Science Research Council. By any account, the project
was got off the ground through Michael Young and A.H. Halsey's
perseverance and influence. A comprehensive account of the
launching of the project is to be found in Dodds (1975) • The
official invitations to the local education authorities were
sent out in May 1968.
The action-research projects main distinction from all other
projects that I am discussing was that it was external to
government. Although, particularly in the case of Halsey and
Young, it is very difficult to draw precise definitions of
status and role, they could be seen as academic entrepreneurs,
who worked closely with the state bureacracy and politicians.
Their roles were concerned with all three functions of administr¬
ation, decision making and developing ideas. Ideas developed
by those closely connected with government cannot be formulated
in a vacuum but are developed by people who have the most acute
awareness of the various factors and forces limiting action.
Positive discrimination on an area base combined with experiment¬
al action research was being developed as an idea, with which
Halsey was connected, into what would eventually be the
Community Development Projects.
The reports of the Educational Priority Projects (Barnes, 1975;
Halsey, 1972; Payne, 1974; Smith, 1974; Morrison, 1974) provide
an extensive account of significant aspects of the projects.
Regarding the projects though in relation to other projects
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and. programmes under discussion, _ certain differences can be
indicated.
The grants from the SSRC and the DES were administered
through the Oxford University research unit set up under
Dr Halsey. As the National Director, he was responsible
for the projects as a whole. Each of the individual action
research projects had a research team connected to it but
based in a university. Projects were established in Birmingham,
Liverpool, London, West Riding and Dundee.
In terms of funding, the amounts of money involved were
minute compared to the American programmes. £175»000 in all
over the different projects to evaluate the action in the
EPAs was only a small gesture towards Plowden's appeal for
research. The lack of major amounts of money going to the
local education authority or the EPA project differentiated
this initiative from any of the American programmes, but
also emphasised the experimental nature of the projects.
The projects were within the tradition of social engineering
and assumed that, given sufficient resources and a demonstrable
success in achieving their aims, government would be persuaded
to engage in further action. The history of the British
projects has shown the fallacy of such assumptions.
The EPA action research projects differed in another major
way from subsequent developments. They attempted with an entry
into one social service - education - to achieve a change in
a wide range of related fields. The single service approach
had its failings which the projects were aware of, but given
the institutional arrangements of education, the lack of funds,
the newness of action research and the evidence of the problems
in the American compensatory educational programmes, the
overall design of the projects seemed to offer benefits beyond
those they could feasibly hope to attain. Indeed Volume One
of the Report pointed to some of the dilemmas and concluded;
'Our own view in undertaking the EPA action research
was cautiously open-minded on the capacity of the
educational system to reform itself, dubious about an
educational approach to the abolition of poverty, but
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at least as optimistic as Plowden about the primary school
and pre-schooling as points of entry for action-research
aimed at inducing changes in the relation between school
and community.' (Halsey, 1972: 5)
Perhaps the key importance of the EPA action research projects
was not what it managed to achieve in relation to its limited
goals, but the model of select demonstrations that it pioneered
and the influence of that model on the Community Development
Projects, the Inner Area Studies and other subsequent projects.
The EPA action research projects were demonstration projects
in the American tradition, but they were demonstration projects
with much more extensive research elements built in from
the beginning of the project. In American programmes, def¬
initions of success or failure were openly supplied by the
relative political power of interests backing the programme.
The British experience has tended to conceal the overtly
electoral and economic goals that can be achieved through the
projects and the projects are gauged successes or failures
through the nature and format of their reports, irrespective
of the subsequent use of their conclusions or their relevance
to the electoral and economic forces giving rise to them.
This is in a sense a reflection of both the size of the projects,
in absolute terms, and their relation to existing service
provision. In the American example, the sums of money involved
built up electoral constituencies and provided irreversible
sources of funds to the cities. The amount of money involved
for example in the EPA action research projects neither created
sufficient beneficiaries for them to become nationally powerful,
nor a different balance of local education authority funds
which would have been difficult to reverse. Whereas in America
politically attractive policies could be implemented and look
to the academic community to provide some rationale for these
policies (the academic community gaining funds in return) in
Britain and in particular in the EPA action research, the social
scientists actively sought the money, persuading government to
pay and justifying their projects to government in terms of
politically desirable ends. Whereas the former relationship
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lead to the perpetuation of policies after their initial
attractions had faded, the latter left the projects, despite
positive results, in terms of their avowed aims, to vanish without
trace (not in the sense that nothing was left in the areas
of the projects but in the sense that the issue was removed
from the political agenda).
The EPA action research projects were dependant on the
political climate in which they were developed and linked to
the two other main projects developed at this time, the Urban
Aid Programme and the Community Development Projects, which
were financed under the Urban Programme. It is important to
look at some of the main events at the time when discussing
these three developments together.
The Urban Aid Programme
I have already commented on the American programmes and it
should be remembered that the beginning of 1968 was an important
time both for Britain and with events occuring in the United
States. The CAP had been going for three years and the Model
Cities Program had been launched. Ideas from America were
filtering towards Britain. But it is not primarily the existence
of these ideas that is important, but the political and economic
climate in Britain at the time.
The devaluation of the pound in November 19^7 was in a sense
the turning point for the Labour Government of 1964-70.
Looking back at the history of the government's economic
policy, it would with hindsight seem that if, as some within
the Labour movement and government at the time argued, the
pound had been devalued in 19&4* "then some of the government's
subsequent problems would not have occured. The economic phil¬
osophy of the Labour Government was a developed form of managed
capitalism. The use of planning and rational techniques to
overcome the anarchy of the market was a key part of the
Government's approach. The establishment of the Department of
Economic Affairs, the National Economic Development Council and
the Department of Employment and Productivity were all part of
this technocratic approach to the economy. Devaluation
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represented the failure of this strategy and brought about
the reintroduction of more directly oppressive management
of the economy. Cuts in public expenditure, prices and
incomes control and attempts at controlling the trade unions
became the new strategy.
Politically, the main issue apart from the political repercus¬
sions of devaluation and public expenditure cutbacks was the
question of immigration. Immigration presented a peculiar
electoral problem for the Labour Party. It was a completely
different one from that which Johnson faced. Labour's strategy
since the 19&4 election had been based upon an attempt at
maintaining a balance between the 'immigration control' element
of the party and the 'integrative' strategy to prevent the
alienation of the large principled Labour vote.
The early months of 1968 were dominated by different 'racial'
debates. In February, five Tory ex-ministers sponsored a motion
to restrict immigration during the expulsion of Asians from Kenya.
The Race Relations Bill was being debated in the House of Commons.
In April 1968, Powell made his famous racialist speech and was
sacked from the Shadow Cabinet. London dockers marched to the
Commons in support of him. In the United States, the assass¬
ination of Martin Luther King in April was followed by riots
in many major cities. Wilson in his speech replying to Powell
in May announced the Urban Programme. The electoral concerns
of the Labour Party over the issue of race were centered on
the solid Labour constituencies in run-down areas of Britain's
cities which were vulnerable to racialist candidates attracting
the anti-immigration working class voter as had occured in
Smethwick. Whereas Johnson's programme aimed at providing
benefits for blacks in the hope of electoral gain from black
votes, the British programmes sought to ameliorate the conditions
which were being exacerbated by the influx of high proportions
of immigrants. The Labour Party sought to retain their trad¬
itional voters by a mixture of immigration controls and the
improvement of local conditions.
Wilson's speech in Birmingham announcing the Urban Programme
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was totally concerned with immigration.
'It was Birmingham's annual May Day celebration and
I devoted the whole of my fifty five minute speech to
immigration and to Mr Powell.' (Wilson, 1971: 525)
Subsequently the immigration focus of the Urban Programme
was down played because of the possible politically unfavourable
response which could have occured if the programme was seen as
being an immigrants' programme (Edwards and Batley, 1978: 46).
Rather the emphasis was on 'areas of special social need',
whether they contained high immigrant populations or not.
There seems to be some doubt as to whether or not the idea of
an Urban Programme was something which Wilson announced unknown
to the Home Office or whether it had been planned in advance.
According to Crossman;
'... the so called urban programme, for improving community
relations especially on race. The truth is that when the
PM needed to make his great speech at Birmingham on
immigration he thought up the idea of a new urban
programme which was going to help the areas of social
need without being a burden on their budget. The
difficulty since then has been to make any practical
sense of this idea.' (Crossman, 1976: Vol 3> 129)
Crossman was not, however, in a position where he would
necessarily have been aware of discussions which might
previously have been taking place in the Home Office or seen
the brief Wilson had been supplied with before making his
announcement, but he reinforced this account in a report on
an Immigration Committee meeting on 23rd July 1969*
'First we had a report on the urban programme and the
£25 million which was to be concentrated in the areas
of greatest social need. This is absolutely first-
rate. It all arose out of a speech which Harold made
a year or so ago at Birmingham, promising special
arrangements there. He said it without knowing
exactly what he meant but he has made good sense of it
since. It is a really good example of a political
initiative of Harold's working out really well. It
isn't costing too much and we are getting kudos for
it.' (Crossman, 1976: Vol 3> 589)
After the Birmingham speech a working party was brought
together on the 7th May to
'consider implementation of the new and expanded Urban
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Programme mentioned in the PM'g speech.... but it would
in addition serve the interdepartmental committee of
officers who were to meet for the first time on 9th May
to consider a wide range of subjects affecting areas
of immigrant population.1 (Edwards and Batley, 1978:
43-44)
The Working Party contained representatives at Assistant
Secretary level from the Ministry of Health and Social Security,
the Department of Education and Science, the Department of
Employment and Productivity, the Ministry of Housing and Local
Government, the Treasury and the Home Office.
Whether or not the Urban Programme had already been envisaged
by civil servants within the Home Office, the immigration
slant of the programme was concealed from the public for fear
of unfavourable political repercussions. Edwards and Batley
report that the remit of the Working Party was broken into
three categories.
'1) Information on immigrants especially in the field of
employment;
2) Information on existing programmes of help;
3) An assessment of the correspondence of areas of need
and areas of immigration '(Edwards and Batley, 1978:
44)
They also report that there was a growing awareness that a
programme to deal with immigrants contained political problems
but as is pointed out in the Runnymede Trust Briefing Paper
by Clare Demuth,
'The Urban Programme was not intended as a race programme,
although it was hoped that the black population living
in deprived inner city areas would, like the other
inhabitants, benefit from its provisions.' (Demuth,
1977: 5)
The Interdepartmental Working Party developed the Programme
on the basis of Wilson's outline of the intentions of the
programme. Their main negotiations centered around the inter¬
departmental arrangements rather than concerns with the nature
of areas of special social need. Areas of special social need
can be defined either in terms that create the context of the
programme i.e. a reverse procedure concerning budgeting and
administrative criteria, or on a basis of 'what is social need?'
i.e. a critical examination of the problems facing inner city
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areas. It is not surprising that the question of definition
was a process of adjustment between the two.
For example, regarding the focus on immigrants, Edwards
and Batley discuss the issue of disguising the programme's
immigrant focus.
'The starting point (for the Working Party) then was that
the Programme was indeed designed to help immigrants
though the fact might have to be disguised. The next
step was to question the case for a simple focus on im¬
migrant areas and problems. It was noted that the Prime
Minister had emphasised that the Programme would apply to
all the deprived urban areas
The Race Relations Division of the Home Office supported
this view by arguing against suggestions, in early drafts
of the Working Party's report, that the presence of im¬
migrants was somehow itself a measure of deprivation.
They were victims rather than the cause of the depriv¬
ation of the areas they might live in. Arguments like
these supported the political case for overriding a
programme strictly devoted to immigrants, and ministers
agreed in their meeting of 30th May that the Programme
should deal with needs in general as well as with the
particular problems presented by immigration.'
(Edwards and Batley, 1978: 46)
Another example which Edwards and Batley commented upon
was the selection of criteria for areas of special social
need. The Working Party, using as a starting point county
boroughs and London boroughs, and after comparing them with
their selection on the criteria of Plowden's EPAs, Section
11 grants, and Ministry of Housing and Local Government
'housing priority areas', ended up with a list which excluded
only thirteen of the 114 boroughs. Eventually, the decision
was made to get local authorities to measure their own needs
on a stated basis and let central government make a final
selection. This, of course, had clear political and administr¬
ative advantages. If selection was on the basis of publicly
available criteria, e.g. census data, then the allocation would
be largely predetermined by 'objective' factors, not allowing
for central government discretion. A system of bids maintained
administrative and political control with the central government.
The Home Secretary, James Callaghan, announced the Urban
Programme in the House of Commons on 22nd July 1968. The
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programme was to involve £20-£25 million over four years.
The emphasis of the first year's expenditure was on capital
projects relating largely to education - nursery schools,
day nurseries and children's homes. In response to the announce¬
ment, the Conservative spokesperson who, welcoming it, obliquely
reasserted the racial element.
'I welcome the fact that the statement contains, not
a direct relationship to race, but to an equal opport¬
unity in life for all our citizens.
Will the Right Honourable Gentleman also accept that
if this is to have its optimum effect which we hope it
will, he will have to satisfy the country that he has
adequate control over inflow into the country....'
'Hansard, 1968b)
The first Urban Programme circular was issued in October
1968 jointly by the Home Office, Department of Education and
Science and the Ministry of Health and in this circular, the
broad tentative definition of areas of special social need
was made;
'They aire districts which bear the marks of multiple
deprivation which may show itself, for example, by way
of notable deficiencies in the physical environment,
particularly in housing; overcrowding of houses; family
sizes above the average; persistent unemployment; a
high proportion of children in trouble or in need of
care; or a combination of these. A substantial degree
of immigrant settlement would also be an important
factor, though not the only factor, in determining the
existence of special social need.' (Home Office, 1968d)
However for the purposes of the first phase only thirty
four authorities were asked to submit bids to begin the
programme at once. The criteria for selection as maintained
by the circular was that areas either
'1) had more than 2% of households with more than 1-j-r
persons per room (on 1966 census data), or
2) had an exceptionally high immigrant population, that
is more than 6% of immigrants on the school roll (figures
relating to January 1967)' (Home Office, 1968d)
Such broad criteria are a good example of the use of indic¬
ators to increase central government control over the direction
and use of funds. As Edwards and Batley point out;
'.... within the Home Office there was no illusions
about the depth of thinking which -underlay either the
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criteria or the projects. The main aim was to get the
Programme launched as quickly as possible within the
budget allowed by ministers.' (Edwards and Batley, 1978:
63)
Callaghan's announcement referred to a 'study';
'The Government have now completed the first stage of
their study of urban areas facing acute social problems
in the field of education, housing, health and welfare.
Many of these areas include concentrations of immigrants.'
(Hansard, 1968a)
This is not consistent with Edwards and Batley's account of
the working party's deliberations and emphasises the role of
research in legitimating political, administrative or economic
decisions.
The Bill was passed unamended and was entitled
'a Bill to authorise the payment to local authorities
in Great Britain of grants towards expenditure incurred
by reason of special social need in urban areas.'
(Local Government Grants (Special Needs) Bill, 1968)
It allowed the Home Secretary to pay grants to local auth¬
orities who in his opinion were required
'in the exercise of any of their functions to incur
expenditure by reason of the existence in any urban
area of special social need.' (Local Government Grants
(Special Needs) Bill, 1968)
Debate on the Bill showed again the 'immigration' slant
of the concern with areas of special social need. The majority
of speakers concentrated on the issue, despite the denial by
the Government that the Bill was a Bill to deal with areas of
high immigrant concentrations. However, there was no opposition
to the Bill by the Conservatives and it passed into law in
January 1969.
Organisationally, although the Urban Programme was admin¬
istered in a division of the Home Office, reflecting its
immigration roots, the first three circulars were issued
jointly, the fourth was issued solely by the Home Office in
agreement with other departments concerned (Department of the
Environment, DES and the DHSS). The first circular restricted
the eligibility for funding to the thirty four named authorities,
subsequent circulars were open to all local authorities. The
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field of approval was also expanded to include projects
which were ineligble under the defined areas of help named
in the first circular, although housing related projects
were not included. Subsequent circulars began to be issued
on a regular, twice yearly, basis requesting bids from local
authorities.
The system of bids and funding to local authorities meant
that the administration of the Urban Programme at central
government level was not a major task. The local authorities
or voluntary organisations were responsible for the conduct
and administration of local projects.
Considering the level of funding, the Programme was also
very small. Both the absolute level and the share to any
particular authority were marginal. The first circular allocated
£3.5 million which provided for 191 nursery classes, 35 day
nursery schemes and 20 homes for children. The £5 million in
the second circular was divided between authorities and
provided 225 nursery classes, 29 day nursery schemes and just
under £1 million for children's homes and hostels. (Home Office,
1970a)
Comparing the first seven phases of expenditure under the Urban
Programme with total local authority expenditure and grants from
central government to local authorities, the small scale of
the programme is apparent.
Urban Programme Funding 1968 to 1973
Year 68/69 69/70 70/71 71/72 72/73
Phase 1 2 3 4,5,6 7
Authorised
expenditure 3.8 4.9 5.1 6.9 5.9
on UP (£m)
Total Local
income from 1798.6 2048.8 2395.3 2776.6 3265.3
grants (£m)
Local Gov.
Act Grants 1404.6 1610.9 1877.4 2175.5 2556.6
(RSG) (source: Hansard, 1973a and Central Statistical Office,
1979: 411)
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In 1972, while £3,505 million was received by local
authorities as government grants, the total income of local
authorities was £8,872 million. Only 39*5% was coming from
central government and the Urban Programme allocation represented
only 0*08% of local government income that year (Central Statistical
Office, 1975).
Apart from the amount of money involved in the different
phases, the Urban Programme at times was used by both central
and local government to finance projects which were in need of
finance, but because of the restrictions at the time were unable
to get funded. In this way, the aim of the Urban Programme
was subverted to provide extra money for local authorities to
spend not on innovatory projects which would never have been
established but on projects they would liked to have financed
if they had the money. For example,
'in Phase 7 the Department of Education and Science gave
100% of its grant to providing some 20,000 nursery places,
since there was no other way of financing this development.'
(Bird, 1972)
Local authorities also used the Urban Programme to finance
projects which could have been financed under other expenditure.
This is clear when examining the sort of projects that were
financed. This was another advantage of the lack of definition
of what constituted special social need, and the lack of an
examination by the Home Office of what forces were responsible
for (and-therefore action was needed upon ) 'multiple
deprivation'.
I have already indicated the sorts of projects approved in the
first phases of the programme. Edwards and Batley provide an
analysis of the types of projects financed under the programme
for Phases 1 to 9.
As they point out, the overwhelming emphasis was on children's
projects with 52.7% of projects being child-oriented. This
emphasis on child oriented projects indicates the connection
between the Urban Programme and the concern with the 'cycle of
poverty' which was prevalent in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
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Child oriented projects could be expected to break the cycle
of poverty. This view of a cycle of poverty is however rather
different from the avowed aims of the Urban Programme in terms
of areas of special social need.
Distribution of Project Types: Phases 1 to 9
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(Source; Edwards and Batley, 1978; 146)
The costs of individual projects in these phases were also
calculated by Edwards and Batley.




























(Source; Edwards and Batley, 1978: 157)
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The majority of the expenditure on a single project being
less than £4,000 was also balanced heavily towards capital
expenditure.
'In terms of the original allocation of funds to projects,
the balance has been heavily in favour of capital. (Acc¬
umulatively a ratio of about 6:1 for phases up to phase
9, though the ratio has fluctuated over the phases)'
(Edwards and Batley, 1978: 79)
While this was the case, the programme met five year's
running costs on capital projects which Edwards and Batley
estimate average implied costs per year of one third of the
original capital expenditure. This is an interesting contrast
to the service orientation of the CAP in the United States.
Clearly, of course, the provision of capital projects by the
Home Office to local authorities provided an adjunct to the
already existing service structure of British social policy.
It also was an effective rationing mechanism for capital exp¬
enditure at a time of cut backs in public expenditure in
general. The innovative 'project' style of the programme did
not either establish firm constituencies from whom service
withdrawal would create problems, or create concentrated levels
of expenditure which would through bureaucratic interests or
political pressure, be hard to reduce.
Adjustment to the needs element of the Rate Support Grant
which it could be argued would have been an alternative way
for central government to influence local authority expend¬
iture, would not have allowed for the same degree of control
over local authorities as was possible with the Urban Programme.
Hot until the Urban Programme's allocation under the Partnership
Schemes were announced on 1st December 1977 was the amount of
funding increased to a significant level.
Under the allocation to the seven inner city partnerships











This allocation as well as representing a considerable
increase from the previous allocations represented a shift in
government strategy which had occured through the seventies
and particularly after the Urban Programme was moved to the
Department of the Environment and towards more general suppl¬
ementation to meet local authority needs.
'It is intended that the urban programme should supplement
the main programmes of central and local government by
providing, in the most deprived areas of our towns and
cities, facilities which
(a) encourage local authorities to tackle special problems
requiring the coordinated efforts of several local auth¬
ority departments and/or other agencies;
(b) encourage innovation leading to the adaptation of the
main programmes;
(c) unlock community initiatives.' (Environment, 1977g)
As was the case with the Model Cities expenditure in American
cities this sort of income for local government in the UK became,
over the decade, an established part of local government's
income from central government. The increase in funds under the
Partnership scheme will be something I shall consider later.
The Community Development Projects
The Community Development Projects (CDPs) which, in terms of
publicity and their repercussions were the second major initiative
by central government prior to the setting up of the Partner¬
ships. Their establishment was almost entirely a departmental
initiative and they were financed through the Urban Programme.
In fact, they were portrayed by central government as being
the research and experimental side of the Urban Programme.
A Home Office memorandum to the Official Cabinet Sub-Committee
discussing the Community Development Areas Projects (as they
were called at the time) discouraged early publicity of the
projects, because
'It is likely that Ministers will wish to refer to the
project in connection with the Urban Programme as a whole
which will contain provision for research and development
expenditure on CDAs.' (Home Office, 1968f)
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Although the projects were connected with the Urban Programme
since they were the responsibility of the same central govern¬
ment department, their connections apart from finance with the
rest of the Urban Programme were not close.
It would seem, from the evidence of participants in the setting
up of the projects and in reviewing the minutes of the Inter¬
departmental Working Party which formulated them, that they
were largely the creation of Derek Morrell, who was at the
time in the Children's Department of the Home Office. The
idea of a new approach to community development was put forward
in the course of working out proposals for changes in the law
relating to children and young persons. It was agreed to set
up an Interdepartmental Working Party to look into possible
new approaches to community development. The working party
was set up at the end of 1967 drew upon an interdepartmental
network of civil servants. Represented on the Working Party
at its first meeting in January 1968 were seven representatives
of the Home Office (one of whom was secretary and Morrell was
chairman), two representatives of the Ministry of Health, and
two from the Ministry of Social Security, and one each from the
Office of the First Secretary of State, the Department of Education
and Science, the Ministry of Labour, the Treasury and the Ministry
of Housing and Local Government.
At the same time the EPA (a/r) projects were being set up
with funding from the Department of Education and Science.
Prior to the first meeting of the working party, Morrell had
been in contact with Halsey and Young to discuss his proposal
and see what connections could be made between the two projects.
Morrell indicated to Young that he did not want the proposed
CDAs to preempt or to subsume the EPA projects. He also indicated
that he would support the Department of Education and Science
in arguing that EPAs could provide a path which CDAs could follow
(Morrell, 1968a). On the other hand, it seems that the DES
representative at the first meeting of the working party argued
that the SSRC were
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'ready to allow their operation to be subsumed under
the community development area scheme, if this were
under way soon enough.' (Home Office, 1968a)
Another parallel development which was occuring was the
deliberations of the Seebohm Committee. It would seem clear
from the evidence that
1) The Home Office did not wish to lose the Children's Department
to a social services ministry;
2) That they were aware of some of the deliberations of the
Seebohm Committee (although a member of the Children's
Department denied that this was this case in an interview);
3) That the Working Party was aware of the implications of the
CDAs in relation to Seebohm (they might be seen as trial runs
for Seebohm).
Whether or not the CDAs can be seen as an attempt to preempt
the establishment of a unified social service ministry outwith
the Home Office remains unproven, but I suggest that it is highly
likely that this was the Home Office's intention. Hall (1976: 67)
reports that Seebohm met Worrell several times to discuss
possible conflicts and overlaps. The Report of the Working Party
(Home Office, 1968c) suggested that it might be put to ministers
that they wouldn't want to make a decision on Seebohm until
after the Royal Commission on Local Government and the Review
of the National Health Service had been completed and hence
the CDAs could be announced as an early response to Seebohm or
a feasibility study of their proposals based on pilot projects.
Indeed the minutes of the first meeting of the Interdepartmental
Working Party presented CLAs as
'The idea of community development areas involved feasibility
of a coordinated approach to the needs of the community
as a whole in a number of areas.' (Home Office, 1968a)
Comparing the early conception of the CLAs with both the
proposals of the Seebohm Committee and their analysis in
the chapter on 'The Community' (Chapter 16 of the Seebohm
Report) the similarities to those of the CDA idea are striking.
'(The object of CDAs is) to discover whether it was
possible to demonstrate a methodology which offered
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such support in a manner which was productive of increased
individual, family and community autonomy, thus progr¬
essively diminishing the need for special forms of
external support.' (Home Office, 1968b)
'The notion of a community implies the existence of rec¬
iprocal social relationships which among other things
ensure mutual aid and give those who experience it a
sense of well-being.' (Seebohm, 1969s Para 476)
Two recurring themes in the Working Party's discussions
and report was the existence of 'need' which, given the already
well developed system of social services, seemed .to be limitless
if approached through an increase in resources alone, and
secondly an emphasis upon the importance of 'community functioning'
in 'approaching this problem.
' the problem was how to reach these people whose
need for external support was virtually limitless while
the conditions which gave rise to such need remained
unmodified.' (Home Office, 1968b)
The conditions that gave rise to this situation were seen
to be the fragmentation of 'community' support systems both
statutory and interpersonal.
' The aim of the new approach is to find ways of meeting
more effectively the needs of individuals, families and
communities, whether native or immigrant suffering from
multiple forms of deprivation. Typically such people
have many inter-related problems. Frequently, they have
a limited awareness of the true nature of the problems
which they face. Frequently, they do not know how to gain
access to, or to use constructively, the services which
exist to help people tackle personal and family problems
as they arise. As a result, many of them suffer from an
accumulation of unrecognised and unresolved problems
which eventually demand difficult and costly social
interventions, such as the removal of children from their
families into some form of residential care.' (Home Office,
1968c)
The report went on to discuss various aspects of the proposed
projects. It is clear that it was hoped that finance could be
found through the Urban Programme and it was decided to wait
for the recommendations of the Working Party on Immigration
and Community Relations which was discussing the proposed progr¬
amme. It was proposed to include two or three areas of high
immigrant population in the experiment and to integrate a
description of the entire experiment, and a before and after
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measurement of the effects of intervention into the projects.
The American experience, which was reviewed in an Appendix
written by a Home Office member of the Working Party, commented
upon the Ford FouncLation,Mobilization for Youth and PCJDYC
projects. The lessons that were derived from the American
experience at this stage and indeed at later stages centered
on the organisational problems and possible structures of the
projects, rather than an assessment of what American experience
in attempting to deal with similar problems could teach the
Home Office. Given the different bureacratic structures in
the two countries, it is not surprising that 'lessons' were
not 'learnt' and whereas the conflict generated in the CAP
in the United States was seen as something which the CDPs
should carefully try and avoid, conflict in CDP was not
eliminated, although it arose through different structures.
In a paper dated 28th October 1968, a Home Office official
stated some of the lessons that might be learnt from the US
experience on the basis of a talk with Professor Alfred Kahn,
head of the Columbia School of Social Work.
The lessons were seen as
'(a) Their failure to recognise that successful intervention
will produce leaders among the underprivileged and unless
these can have legitimate status roles and some access
to and control of community resources they are forced
into anarchical postures.
(b) Discriminating intervention produces a middle class
hostility and an overreaction from the dispossessed
because even though their way of life improves they
recognise their deprivation and demand overcompensation.
At this point middle class sympathy turns to hostility
and can cause an abrupt end to any programme.
(c) The bureacratic structures involved must themselves
be prepared to back innovatory techniques but also to
change their own structure eg. their decision making
must be more politically accountable. Their representative
power structures must be supplemented by a sharing with
leaders of the dispossessed and new lines of communication
effectively established.' (Home Office, 19&8g)
Other points raised in relating the American experience
show a similar lack of analytical assessment, or close definition
of the problem; Head Start is claimed to be 'the best bet',
reserach is not seen as having the necessary tools to evaluate
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such a long term programme and most significantly in that
it has little to do with the stated concerns of the Home
Office in developing CDAs, the report concluded with the
warning;
•8) Probably the most potent danger is among middle class
affluent youth. In the US, atomic science and the Space
Programme is attractive to graduates. Medicine and social
science are failing to recruit adequate personnel of good
quality. The danger for us is that while we have adequate
numbers reading Modern Humanities we are failing to modify
our bureacratic structures to accomodate them eg Columbia
University one third of Committees, except those awarding
degree results and appointing staff, allow student repres¬
entation, democratically elected. There is a lesson in
this for our CDA programme.' (Home Office, 1968g)
The American experience was not selected as being relevant to
what would appear to be the most basic questions. 'What can
the US's War on Poverty tell us about the nature and causes of
poverty in the modern industrialised world?' or even 'What can
we 'learn from the US in terms both of how important community
regeneration is in dealing with poverty and how can a programme
with these aims be approached?'. This raises the issue of the
lack of an attempt within the Home Office to question and verify
the largely metaphysical view of community which seemed to be
leading Morrell towards the programmes. Although the theme of
'community' was widespread (witness Seebohm) the inclusion
of it in the CDPs formation would seem to have required more
justification than was forthcoming. For instance Morrell
wrote;
'We live in a society which exhibits a diminishing sense
of community, oases of community remain but more
and more such cohesion as our national society possesses
has come to be a function of a vast complex of instrument¬
al relationships and most of these relationships are fragm¬
entary, highly differentiated and impersonal.' (Morrell,
1967)
What concerned the Home Office were lessons of organisational
control over the projects. It is however clear that the
question of cooption was not only recognised but articulated.
Community involvement was intended to coopt.
'Devolution of power and the creation of new statutory
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roles is vital for success, otherwise illegitimate new
powerful pressure groups threaten the legitimate local
government power structure Militant local new
groups and militant demands for additional services and
resources are inevitable. The only way of controlling
these is to devolve real responsibility on to them '
(my emphasis) (Home Office, 1968g)
After the Interdepartmental Working Party had reported,
the proposals for the Community Development Areas Project
were referred to a Sub-Committee of the Official Cabinet
Committee on Social Services for final development. This
sub-committee was chaired by a civil servant from the Lord-
President's Office and included representatives from the
Treasury, the Department of Employment and Productivity, Home
Office, Department of Education and Science, Ministry of
Housing and Local Government, Ministry of Health, Ministry of
Social Security and the Cabinet Office. The Scottish, Welsh
and General Register's Offices were to receive papers and to
be invited to meetings 'as necessary'. The secretariat was
provided by the Cabinet Office and the terms of reference were
'to advise the Ministerial Sub-Committee on CDA on
questions of policy arising on the establishment,
execution and evaluation of the project.' (Cabinet
Office, 1968a)
Morrell wrote to the Chairman of the Committee (of which
Morrell was a member) laying out the objectives of CDPs.
' The key Home Office objective is to produce a situation
in which individuals, families and larger social groups
display greater awareness of their interdependence leading
to greater mutual acceptance of their different needs
and finctions In pursuit of this overall obj¬
ective the focal social group is the family, the indiv¬
idual depends on the family for his primary experience
of social relationships, which are in the sense described
above accepting, communicative and cooperative .... It
contributes directly by enriching the individual's
primary experience of creative social relationships. It
contributes indirectly by providing a firmer base of
primary experience upon which to build a superstructure
od broader social relationships, leading to a more creative
use of social services as opposed to chronic dependance
eg on social security benefits ....' (Morrell, 1968b)
This would seem to be a clear statement of the philosophical
direction which Morrell was taking. Examining the relationship
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between his view and the announced nature of the programme
and between this and the eventual course of the programme,
the motivating force in the development of policy cannot be
found in Morrell's ideas. This shows how the forces which
largely dictate the projects existence and direction are
related to the initial ideas which led to the concern of
Morrell to develop such a programme. As Mayo (1975) pointed
out, the view of poverty that was contained within the CDA
proposals was one of the individual of a marginal minority
who had slipped through the net. The solution was seen as
being administrative reform combined with some community
development to stimulate self-help. Community development
stimulating self-help is an attractive notion at a time of
cuts in public expenditure especially when (as Johnson observed)
the solution of increased welfare benefits and services seemed
to be a bottomless pit. In a letter to the Chairman of the
County Council's Association from the Office of the Secretary
of State for Social Services, this view is put clearly;
'The prime aim will not only be to get people in
these areas back onto their feet, but to enable
them to stand more on their own in future by their
own efforts.' (Office of the Secretary of State for
Social Services, 1968)
This provides a contrast with the more philosophical and
idealistic aim as put forward by Morrell. The aims as presented
to the Town Clerks, inviting them to participate were a balance
between the aims of Morrell and the more basic aims presented
by the Office of the Secretary of State.
The Cabinet Sub-Committee's task was to formulate a heirachy
of detailed objectives. One of the lessons that the Sub-Comm¬
ittee claimed to have learnt from the American experience was
this need for a heirachy of objectives.
'The more general the objective, the less it is likely
that a single project, even on a large scale will
produce anything which could properly be described as
a solution to problems of community development. Indeed
the project as a whole is best thought of as a means of
producing ameliorative change rather than solutions.'
(Cabinet Office, 1968b)
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The Sub-Committee was also responsible for suggesting
which areas should be selected for pilot projects. The
criteria which were to be used to designate the first three
areas included:
1) At least one with an EPA action research project;
2) They were to be well distributed geographically;
3) They were to be strongly motivated;
4) They were to be capable of being associated with a suitable
university department;
5) Between them they were to give rise to the kinds of problems
likely to be encountered in the next phase without exhibiting
problems in their most severe forms.
With regard to the question of selecting an area with a
high proportion of immigrants in the population, the Home
Office memorandum to the Sub-Committee suggested;
'It is for consideration whether the problem of colour
should be tackled in the first or second phase. Political
and presentational considerations suggest the former,
whereas common prudence suggests that it would be preferabl
to gain experience in areas with less intractable problems.
(Home Office, 1968f)
Invitations were issued in February 1969 to three local auth¬
orities to establish the first projects and the announcement
of the projects was made in the House of Commons by the Home
Secretary on 16th July 1969• Liverpool, Coventry and Southwark
were chosen to have the first pilot projects. The initial
emphasis in the invitation to the local authorities was upon
the coordination of services, experimentally at local level,
to try and meet what were seen as being the interrelated
needs of the residents of these areas.
' the experiment will be aimed at finding new ways
of helping, through the social services, and a variety
of forms of social action the needs of individuals,
families and communities suffering from many forms of
social deprivation. The experiment will be designed
to bring together in a fully coordinated way all the
different services, both central and local which are
concerned to remedy the various forms of deprivation
which tend to exist together, but the prime aim will
not only be to get people in these areas back on their
feet but to enable them to stand all on their own in
the future, by their own efforts.' (Crossman, 1969)
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The Home Office's initial emphasis was on these three
aspects:
1) Coordination of local services;
2) Self-help
3) An innovative approach to regenerate these areas through
concentrating on the people in an attempt to achieve permanent
improvements.
The remaining nine projects were announced over the next
two years with projects in Cumberland and Newcastle upon Tyne
being announced in August 1971 as the last of the twelve.
The approach which was put forward in the first Home Office
Press Release (Home Office, 1969b) announcing projects in
Coventry, Liverpool and Southwark suggested that inter-service
teams were to be set up in the neighbourhoods and the teams
were to be built up by the part-time secondment of workers
from services in the area.
'In this way all relevant services will be brought together;
child care, education, employment, health, housing, police,
probation, social security, and welfare, as well as the
help available from voluntary organisations. Each team
will try in particular to overcome the separate
organisation of the social services by concentrating
upon the total situation and needs of families, and
individuals living in the neighbourhood and initiating
a strategy of community work to bring them and the
neighbourhood more effective help.' (Home Office, 1969b)
The research aspect of what was being described as an action-
research project was to
' throw light on how to make the social services
more accessible and intelligble to the poor and severely
deprived; how to develop better communication, and hence
cooperation, between services; and how to use our limited
resources to greater effect in dealing with the complex
social problems in our cities.' (Home Office, 1969b)
The project which was to be financed under the Urban Programme,
was the responsibility of the Home Office and included a
central steering group at national level and a central research
team which was to interrelate the research findings of the
local research teams and coordinate the research in a similar
way to the EPA action research, research directorate.
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In January 1971» the Children's Department was moved from
the Home Office to the newly established Department of Health
and Social Security. It became increasingly anachronistic for
the projects to be controlled from the Home Office and yet,
as the Urban Programme as a whole developed, the Home Office
retained the CDPs and resisted all attempts to have these con¬
cerns removed either to the Department of Health and Social
Security or the Department of the Environment. Looking at
this, it can be seen that without a service concern within the
area covered by the CDPs, the only role that the Home Office
could have played, if the experiment was to provide a basis
for central government action at a local level on a broader
scale, was that of giving information to other departments
within central government. The structure of central government
is not, however, conducive to this sort of interdepartmental
cooperation and interchange as I will show with regard to the
Department of the Environment and the Home Office during the
Inner Area Studies. Another anomaly of the CDPs which already
existed as they were being launched was that, with the accept¬
ance of the Seebohm proposals and their implementation, the
new social services departments created in the local authorities
were already undergoing changes and any subsequent social
service improvements which could have been assessed as having
arisen from the CDP experience could not have been implemented
at the local authority level, if that were to mean another
reorganisation, without considerable cost in terms of disruption
to the services.
A parallel can be drawn between the Office of Economic
Opportunity and the central CDP administration's position in
relation to their programmes and projects. However, it would
be an inaccurate parallel because although they were both
within major, powerful central government departments (0E0 in
the Executive Office of the President and CDP in the UP division
in the Home Office), 0E0 was, in its own right, a maj:or spending
department building up services and with its own political
constituency. The CDPs, on the other hand, if they had followed
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their initial remit, would have been attempting to coordinate
under direct Home Office control and guidance, services which
were financed by, and supervised by other central government
departments (eg Department of Health and Social Security and
the Department of the Environment).
This anachronistic organisational structure, which was a
product of central government departmental politics, was a
sufficient reason in itself for some of the later problems
faced by CDPs. The Home Office .was left with twelve projects
whose results could not be fed (even if under proper administrative
arrangements they could have been) into action by other government
departments outwith the control of the Home Office.
As it was, the projects developed an independence from the
Home Office's control which led, at an early stage to a dram¬
atically different set of projects than those intended by the
creators of the CDPs. The way in which the projects did develop
is not of major concern here except in as far as it relates to
the subsequent establishment of the Inner Area Studies in the
Department of the Environment and the Comprehensive Community
Programmes in the Home Office. The directions taken by the
projects can be seen in their final reports and in the reports
of the CDP Intelligence and Information Unit.
The twelve projects and their relatively low level of funding
make a sharp contrast with the American poverty programmes.
The projects were entirely different from those in America both
in their initial remit and their eventual histories. Parallels
were drawn in the Home Office between the CDPs and the Model
Cities Program and suggestions were made to try and make links
between the American programmes and the British projects, but
the reasons which were put forward in a memorandum in the
Home Office related more to the strengthening of CDP than to
learning. It was suggested that such a link would;
'enhance the prestige of CDP as a research enterprise and
therefore facilitate the recruitment of good research
personnel.' (Home Office, 1970b)
Subsequently nothing came of this.
Another attempt to combine the British and American experience
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was the conference at Ditchley Park on October 29th - 31st,
1969. This was part of the effort to achieve common discussion
of domestic policies between the two countries that Nixon and
Wilson were planning.
'You and I recognise, Mr President, that sharing exper¬
ience, sharing thinking, spelling out more clearly our
social ideals for the 1970s is not a task for governments
alone, for Parliament and Congress only, but for our
social administrators and social workers.' (Wilson, 1970)
The Report of the Ditchley Park conference commented that
the conference;.
'reflected a desire on the part of the American and
British governments to learn from each other's experience
in social policy, and both Governments' concern with
the problems presented by 'high need areas'.' (Home
Office, 1969a; i)
I shall comment in more detail at a later stage on this
conference but it is sufficient to note here that- there was
little indication that in any specific way the Ditchley Park
conference affected the subsequent content of the CDPs or the
approaches taken to the problems of 'urban deprivation'.
Rather it can be seen as having contributed to the general
knowledge of Home Office participants and CDP workers.
Whereas in America the building of services in an area was
seen as being of importance from the beginning of the CAP and
only gradually through the Model Cities Program did this emph¬
asis shift to the coordination of federal and local services,
in Britain, this concern with coordination was of prime import¬
ance from the beginning of the projects. The British emphasis on
personal inadequacy reflected the fact that services had been
developed to a greater extent in Britain than in America.
If, as was seen as being the case in Britain, services to provide
for all sorts of need already existed, then the twin focus on
personal inadequacy in making use of existing opportunities and
the need to coordinate these services to make the clients
task easier was a logical conclusion. In America, however,
the emphasis of the programmes on personal inadequacy had
different service implications and developed out of different
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sets of influences giving its emphasis a different stress.
While the British Welfare services were facing increasing and
seemingly endless demands at a time of public expenditure cuts,
the American federal government however was not placed in the
same position. Rather it was hoped that through the introduction
of services which did not already exist, the federal government
would be able to increase the productivity of the poor and so
aid the regeneration of the stagnant US economy.
The CDPs, like the American CAP, do reflect perceived
economic and political demands upon central government. Thus
the major factors that in my view account for the implementation
of the Home Office's CDP proposals were:
(1) The CDP being an action-research project could be presented
as research investigation connected to the development of the
Urban Programme, which concealed the direct political factors
in developing the Urban Programme;
(2) CDP could hope to produce new ways which would lead to the
reduction in the need for and demands on social services, both
in cash arid kind;
(3) CDP at a small cost and even without favourable results
could be presented by the government as an indication of its
intention to deal with seemingly intractable problems of
'multiple deprivation'.
The issue of positive discrimination and area based projects
were ones which raised other questions about the projects and
relate closely to broader trends effecting the context in which
the government was operating. I shall examine this and questions
raised by the research aspect of CDP and EPAs in a later section.
The Inner Area Studies
The launching of the Inner Area Studies was announced in
reply to a question in the House of Commons on 26th July 1972
by Peter Walker, Secretary of State for the Environment. He
had earlier intimated that they were under consideration in
a speech during the debate on the Budget. In the Budget speech
he announced;
' I intend in the next few weeks, with, the coop-
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eration of local authorities, to designate six towns
and inner city areas where a group from my Department
and local government will examine the total resources
needed completely to transform such areas. The working
group in each of these six towns will he headed by one
of the Ministers from my Department, including myself.
In this way we can bring to the attention of local
government and my department the need for a much more
total approach to make really remarkable progress in
the areas concerned.' (Hansard, 1972a: Col 1698)
The Six Towns studies became divided between three Urban
Guidelines Studies in Oldham, Rotherham, and Sunderland and
three Inner Area Studies in Lambeth, Birmingham and Liverpool.
In this announcement the Secretary of State defined the
purposes of the two sets of studies. The Urban Guidelines
purpose was;
'to help local authorities develop a total approach
to the improvement of the urban environment, looking
at their towns as a whole. They will be related primarily
to the functions for which the new district councils
will be responsible from April 1974. We hope to produce
guidance of practical value on the interrelationship
between activities and on using available resources
to the best effect.' (Hansard, 1972b: Col 319)
The Inner Area Studies were, concerned with;
'.... the environmental problems of inner city areas...
In these studies we shall be looking for possible courses
of action on the environmental problems of inner city areas.
This will involve practical work on the ground, of which
my Department will bear the major part of the cost. We
shall try to look at the needs of the study areas as a
whole from the point of view of the people living in
them and to derive lessons on powers, resources and
techniques.' (Hansard, 1972b: Col 320)
The Inner Area Studies, which I will concentrate upon at
the moment, were given as their brief:
1) To discover by study a better definition of inner areas and
their problems;
2) To investigate by experiments on the ground the actions affecting
the physical environment of these areas which could usefully
be undertaken for social and environmental purposes;
3) To examine whether the concept of 'area management' can
usefully be developed and what the practical implications
would be to the local authority.
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4) To provide the basis for general conclusions on statutory-
powers, finance and resource questions, and techniques. (Env¬
ironment, 1977b)
The Inner Area Studies were each controlled by a local
steering group chaired by a Minister and the reports were
written by consultants to the studies. The establishment,
within the Department of the Environment, of an urban deprivation
focus had implications for the Home Office's control over this
area.
McConaghy (1978) reports that, upon the establishment of the
Department of the Environment in 1970, an Urban Policy Review
was set up to look for some form of total approach to the
problems of the worst areas. The Urban Policy Review became;
'.... a shambles and noise of it leaked through Whitehall
and beyond. Meetings between Junior Ministers and
outside experts, well known private consultants, academics
and the like were arranged; nobody knew what to do, but
something had to happen. Peter Walker had come to the
conclusion that outside contractors were essential.'
(McConaghy, 1978: 188)
The importance for the Secretary of State in setting up
the Studies as soon as possible arose both because of the imminent
reorganisation of local government and also because of the
increased disorganisation of the Urban Programme which the
DOE's establishment created. The DOE's approach emphasised
their own departmental concerns but it is clear that with the
basic problems in sight a more comprehensive approach had
implications for other government departments and in particular
for the Home Office.
The account in the Liverpool Report of the setting up of
the Studies is inadequate, reflecting the most prevalent
style of accounts for social policy developments.
'By 1972 there was growing anxiety in government about
the conditions in which many people were living in inner
city areas; about the persistence of pockets of poverty
and social stress; about increasing crime rates and racial
tension; about high levels of unemployment irrespective
of changes in the national economy. It was becoming
clear, too, that local authorities despite strenous
efforts, particularly in slum clearance, had not succeeded
in eradicating urban deprivation.
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So .... the Secretary of State for the Environment
announced, the commissioning of two groups of studies.'
(Environment, 1977a: 5-6)
Comparing the initial remit of the CDPs with that of the
IAS and the Urban Guidelines, the emphasis was quite different.
Despite the concern of both the CDPs and the IAS with similar
manifestations of deprivation in run-down areas, the IAS were
concerned with the physical environment and management, plan¬
ning and budgeting questions. It is not easy to attribute
this shift from the coordination of services to a management
approach in the same way as happened in the US to the political
and economic forces affecting the government. Two major
factors, I would suggest, led to this emphasis. On the one
hand, the DOE, in developing the programme as a departmental
initiative, had to remain within the departmental concerns
with the rundown areas of the cities, this is reflected in the
remit. For instance, major concerns with industrial and
economic policy which could be seen as being of crucial importance
are outwith the responsibilities of the DOE. The other import¬
ant factor was the management oriented approach of the Conservat¬
ive government, which reflected the wider economic picture of
the country at the time.
'Prime Minister Edward Heath was dedicated to going about
government in a 'business-like' way and graduates from
Harvard School of Business Studies seemed to be everywhere.
The new functional re-grouping of ministries into 'super-
departments' suggested that each had to devise clear policy
objectives.' (McConaghy, 1978? 186)
The establishment of the DOE as one of these 'super-departments
reflected this trend itself. The use and influence of American
budget and management concepts gained importance in British
government at this time and the IAS, and more particularly the
Urban Guidelines, were part of this movement. The report of
the management consultants Mckinsey and Company on the management
and organisation of Liverpool is credited with being important
not only in the thinking around the IAS but also in the Baines
Report on the management of local authorities (Environment, 1977a)
The Inner Area Studies were created out of these different
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pressures; the movement towards and concern with the
management, planning and budgetary techniques used by gov¬
ernment (with an eye on the possible savings that could be made
through rationalisation and simplification) and the attempt
by the DOE to enter into the urban policy field to overcome
problems with which it was confronted.
Influential in alerting Peter Walker to the problems of Inner
Areas was Des McConaghy who had been the Director of the
Shelter Neighbourhood Action Project in Liverpool and was
invited to be a special adviser to the DCE by Walker. McConaghy.
indicates the differences between his approach and the approach
of the DOE in his article (McConaghy, 1978).
'The way they (lAS) were launched goes a long way to
show why governments continually fail to adopt policies
for the needs of deprived areas, whether or not they
are inner city areas. My own thesis has been that the
worst urban areas are only the most visible and distress¬
ing manifestations of fundamental weakness in national,
regional and local economies and in the institutions
charged with managing them. It is a politically convenient
fantasy to pretend that inefficient bureacracy fragmented
action and piecemeal measures are confined to those areas
where they are most apparent.' (McConaghy, 1978: 184)
The institutional difficulties in developing the approach are
also indicated by him. The place of SNAP in formulating the
initiatives that were developed by the DOE is another example
of the role of ideas in policy making and how they, while
providing the initial articulation of an approach are modified
beyond recognition by the more influential political, administr¬
ative and economic concerns facing policy makers.
If the Inner Area Studies are accurately portrayed as a
departmental initiative which provided the promise both of
the strengthening of the Department through the consolidation
of a comprehensive concern with urban problems within the
Department and prominence to the Secretary of State with a
new initiative, it is not surprising that the IAS failed
to develop in the ways in which their mentors had planned.
The Home Office managed to maintain their control over the
Urban Programme and the resources and concerns that went with it.
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'Peter Walker and the late Tony Crosland, as Shadow
Minister, both wanted to take over the Urban Programme,
directly bringing into play the wide range of powers
ostensibly enjoyed by the DOE.' (McConaghy, 1978s 185)
The approach of the DOE, centering on such issues as finance
and management of run-down urban areas promised a more success¬
ful result than the Home Office's small-scale projects. The
Home Office however managed to retain control over CDP and the
Urban Programme at this stage. The removal of Peter Walker
from the DOE and his replacement with the less dynamic Geoffrey
Rippon in 1972 heralded the failure of the DOE's attempt.
The Home Secretary was given overall responsibility for urban
policy.
Even before the Home Office reasserted its control over
urban policy, the Inner Area Studies began to lose significance.
As McConaghy reports;
'With Mr Geoffrey Rippon's arrival as Secretary of State
for the Environment these all seemed esoteric matters;
he did not want to change much. Because the Studies were
not directed around funding principles, the dedicated
interest of local government was lost. The six projects
concentrated on too widely varying aspects of the 'urban
problem', partly because of differences in approach by
private consultants, partly because the concerns of
members and officers differed and partly because of diff¬
erences in the situation of the six areas chosen. All
the projects were kept away from central policy issues
and were largely forgotten as an item of DOE business ....'
(McConaghy, 1978s 192)
It is interesting to note that a similar course seems to
have been followed by CDP. After being the much heralded
experimental approach both the projects and studies vanished
into relative obscurity (although they were both being highly
productive and challenging to government in different ways)
until they were resurrected; in the case of GDPs owing to
the ability of the projects to make themselves heard nation¬
ally when the government attempted to close them down and,
in the case of the IAS because the Labour Government could
use their results to justify their new urban strategy of inner
city partnerships.
A striking difference between the IAS and the CDPs was the use
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of outside professional consultants to produce reports.
The government could either have relied upon specially
employed teams, as in the case of CDP, or regular local auth¬
ority or central government personnel. However, they hired
1
six different firms of consultants. The use of outside
consultants had certain interesting features.
1) Established consultants of this type were less likely
than teams recruited in the manner of the CLP teams to
produce results which did not embody the necessary agreement
about the nature and purposes of government.
2) The use of established consultants gave greater legitimacy
to their findings - as outside consultants without a vested
interest either within central government or the local authority.
The Inner Area Studies produced nearly forty reports on
separate policy aspects as well as a summary of the three final
reports. Each project was a discrete study without an overall
joint research assessment as occured with CDP, consequently
certain of their recommendations and findings tended to
conflict.
The major departure of the IAS was, however, in their
broader scope and more comprehensive approach in their search
for solutions. The questions that were being raised (and
largely dismissed by central government) were being investigated
in a rigorous empirical manner. Issues such as the relation¬
ship between employment and housing or the possible management
restructuring at local authority level were raised in a way
which could help to alleviate conditions and prioritise issues.
These questions posed a much wider view of the problems of
'multiply deprived' areas than had other formulations by the
central government whose previous approach had been primarily
1 In the case of the Inner Area. Studies, Liverpool's IAS
consultants were Hugh Wilson and Lewis Womersley, Chartered
Architects and Town Planners, Roger Tym and Associates, Urban
and Land Economists and Jamieson Mackey and Partners, Consulting
Civil and Transportation Engineers, Birmingham's were LLewelyn-
Davies, Weeks, Forestier-Walker and Bor and Lambeth's was in con¬
junction with Shankland Cox Partnership and the Institute of Com¬
munity Studies.
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focused on an individual and community pathology. It is
perhaps ironic that the Conservative Government was respon¬
sible for an approach which moved away from a 'blame the poor'
approach. As I have suggested above, however, this earlier
approach reflected a lack of available funds to implement its
service implications. By concentrating upon the processes
of government, the DOE was moving in a similar direction to
that taken by President Nixon in his assessment of there being
a crisis of government. To attribute part of the problem to
an institutional failing had few repercussions since most
run-down areas were represented by Labour MPs and councillors
and although the lack of institutional power in these areas
was a result of the power of the more affluent areas of the
cities, it did not pose the same electoral problems to them
as was the case with Labour. For Labour, with councillors
in a city where they had a marginal majority or were a large
minority (until the revival of the Liberal Party at a local
level through community politics (especially in Liverpool))
their safe seats were in the run-down areas and to maintain or win
control over the local council, benefits had to be seen to
be accruing to the more affluent marginal wards which might
be under threat from other parties, especially if Labour
was seen as spending too much money rewarding their established
constituents or minority groups at the expense of others.
The action research component of the IAS had definite
differences from that of the initial CDP idea of action
research. It will be remembered that the original Home Office
idea of action research was that of documenting the course
of the projects and then assessing their results. In the
action research projects of the Inner Area Studies, the report
of the Lambeth project lays out three approaches to action
research;
1) Classical
'The classical approach would analyse basic research and
known facts, propose a topic for a new policy investigation,
set up a scheme to try it out and subsequently evaluate it.'
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2) Liverpool
"The approach of our colleagues in Liverpool, on the
other hand, was to embark on a large number of action
projects. These were either identified by the local
authority at the outset or by the team*, early in its work,
in the expectation that the experience gained would
lead itself to generalisation later.•
3) Lambeth
•We did not propose any action project which did not
have a prospect of generalised conclusions in view at
the outset.' (Environment, 1977c)
The overwhelming difference between the IAS and previous
conceptions of action research was that the studies were
clearly research studies using action to aid research. Previous
action research had tended either to emphasise research as an
aid to action as in the Home Office's conception of action
research in the CDP, or as in EPA where the nature of the
research was action oriented, being experimental. The IAS
action research conception was nearer to that of the later
CDP research.
As indicated above, the Inner Area Studies were largely
ignored until the launching of Labour's Partnership schemes
in the White Paper - Policy for the Inner Cities (Environment,
1977d).
The White Paper is described as being drawn up on
'the experience of earlier initiatives ... above all the
Inner Area Studies for which the full reports are about
to be published. The White Paper may be regarded as
the Government's response to the Inner Area Studies for
which summary reports were published in January of this
year.* (Environment, 1977<i)
The link between the IAS and the White Paper is more apparent
than real. Interviews with consultants suggest that the
government 'rediscovered' the studies and urged the consultants
to prepare and publish their Final Reports as soon as possible
to allow this claim to be made. But I shall return to the issue
of the White Paper later because two other developments should
be mentioned before discussing it.
Comprehensive Community Programmes
The Comprehensive Community Programmes were announced in
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1974 in the House of Commons by Roy Jenkins, the Home
Secretary in answer to a question from David Steel. The
CCPs were formulated in the Home Office following a review of
urban deprivation policy which had been instigated by the
Treasury, following concern over the open endedness of the
commitment which the Urban Programme implied and the plethora
of projects developing without coordination in the Home Office
and the DOE.
Previously questions had been asked in the House concerning
coordination between the Home Office and the DOE regarding urban
policy and the Prime Minister (Heath) had given the Home Secret¬
ary (Carr) the responsibility to overview these intiatives.
The responsibility
'to undertake coordinating action to help areas of
urban deprivation involves close consultation between
all the Departments concerned with different aspects
of this problem.' (Hansard, 197Jb* Col 95-96)
CCPs could be seen as the Home Office's attempt to regain
the initiative on urban deprivation policy. The CCP rather than
referring to a project in the sense of CDP or IAS was a programme
to be drawn up at local authority level considering the needs of
the area as a whole and making recommendations to the local
authority. Their purpose as announced in a Home Office Press
Notice (Home Office, 1974) was,
'to bring about, through the coordinated efforts of
central government, regional water and health authorities,
local authorities, voluntary bodies and residents a re¬
ordering of priorities in favour of those living in the
most acutley deprived areas.' (Home Office, 1974)
The programmes were to be developed through trial runs
in selected local authorities. The CCPs' subsequent history
are of interest since nothing really came of them. Having been
announced as the new strategy produced through a review of Urban
Policy after an interdepartmental study by the Urban Deprivation
Unit, the CCP changed its form between announcement and implem¬
entation and then was gradually ignored until no more mention
of anything but trial runs was made by the government. The
Inner City Partnerships which were subsequently announced in the
141
White Paper in 1977 contained some of the features of the
'CCPs rhetoric but superseded them. The pilot programmes begun
were left to continue their work on their own and with little
encouragement that they would be used by central government.
The CCPs were a product of the Urban Deprivation Unit which
was set up after the Home Secretary was given responsibility of
coordinating the government's urban deprivation strategy. The
Unit in 1974 consisted of ten staff costing £65,000 per annum.
In answer to a question in the House of Commons, Alex Lyon,
the Home Office Minister responsible stated
'.... the unit's task is to help us in the development
of Government policy directed to combating urban depr¬
ivation. In collaboration with other .Government Departments
it is making a wide ranging review of the nature and extent
of urban deprivation, the problems underlying it and the
policies brought to bear on it by central and local
government.' (Hansard, 1974a: Col 1462)
The CCPs' foundations can be seen to embody the twin emphases
of improved management and positive discrimination. They were
intended to place an urban deprivation strategy within the
corporate planning structure of local government and encourage
local authorities to tackle the problems of urban deprivation
but without necessarily spending more. The strategy was, more
clearly than any other of the projects, an example of positive
discrimination used as a means of distributing cuts in public
expenditure and services. The reordering of priorities in favour
of acutely deprived areas at a time of cuts effectively meant
cutting less than elsewhere.
The UDU's proposals for CCPs met with some opposition,
especially regarding the small area size of CCPs, which was
originally envisaged in their announcement.
'The areas affected would each be of about 10,000
population, and would be identified from an analysis
of indices of deprivation and from discussion with
local authorities.' (Hansard, 1974b: Col 651)
The UDU later justified the shift towards the whole authority
for the CCPs in terms of research findings.
'Urban deprivation ... is commonly used to refer to the
condition's experienced by those who live in the so
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called worst areas of our towns and cities. Areas
characterised by the poorest physical and environmental
conditions and by a whole tangle of social problems.
Research has shown however that the concept of the worst
area can be misleading recently completed
analysis of the 1971 census of population undertaken by
the DOE at the request of the Home Office Urban Deprivation
Unit has shown that the areas identified as multiply
deprived depend upon the definition of multiple deprivation .
employed.' (Home Office, 1975)
While this was the rationale, it is clear that unless the
Home Office's review of urban deprivation was extremely sketchy
they would have been aware of this in 1974 when the CCPs were
announced. As early as the EPA research this point was being
emphasised in relation to an area approach. The Home Office
changed the CCPs from a small area based approach not on the
basis of research but because of the political problems which
local authorities found in the small area approach. Local
authorities resisted yet another small area approach because
within the authority, and particularly within the ruling
group - which was often Labour in these cities - tensions
were created between councillors whose wards also contained
'deprived areas' and the councillors whose wards were within
a project area. A continuing problem of positive discrimination
on a local level, especially acute when resources were short,
was that certain areas were seen to receive more than they deserve.
Local authorities, especially when there was little promise of
much extra funds were reluctant to create these problems for
themselves.
The management orientation of the approach, while stressing
the comprehensive nature of the strategy, had few implications
for central government funding. After the CDPs and the Inner
Area Studies it is perhaps surprising that the organisation
of government services should yet again be seen as the key to
the problem, although CCP could be seen as being supposed to
do what CDP failed to do. EPAs, though being the first of the
projects to which others referred in tracing the roots of the
concern, was based upon the premise that not only were more
resources through a positive discrimination approach required
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but also that the educational service itself needed some
changes made to it, to become successful in meeting the
requirements of poor areas. Changes in the institutional
relationships of, or content of services had expenditure
implications which particularly in 1974 were not in keeping
with the overall economic picture as perceived by the govern¬
ment. The note to local authorities from the Home Office
rationalised these considerations on the basis of previous
experience.
'It must take account also of the experience of past
initiatives and research both in this country and abroad
which indicate that the problems of urban deprivation
are such that they cannot be tackled effectively by
means of special compensatory programmes of the self-
help or community development type or by particular
innovative or experimental projects such as those
financed under the urban programme or even by pumping
large amounts of money in to small areas through environ¬
mental or physical improvements schemes but require the
use of a wide range of policies and programmes from
both central and local government which have been
developed to help those most in need.' (Home Office,
1975)
This is a clear rationalisation. What else is a wide
range of policies and programmes, if not money and new
approaches? According to the note the aim was the restructur¬
ing and redirecting of major central government programmes to
areas of high need.
' what is required is to direct the major progr¬
ammes and policies of government to those most in
need. Decisions about the allocation of scarce
resources must obviously be settled through the pol¬
itical process but new administrative arrangements
can help to ensure the political commitments are
translated into effective action.' (Home Office, 1975)
The CCP was designed in three parts. Part I was to contain
a description of the form and incidence of deprivation in the
local authority area. This part of the CCP would provide local
authorities with information upon which to select key issues
for Part II. Part II was to consist of the analysis of these
issues. The issues analysed were to be those upon which
some action could be expected and the analysis was to develop
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practical proposals. Part III was to be a programme of action
for tackling urban deprivation in the local authority area
in the next financial year* This format has echoes of the
American planning models. It would seem at first sight to be
obviously superfluous. No council maintaining that planning
was carried out in a rational manner should start at stage three
without having the necessary basic information or being aware
of the issues, but government does not work in a linear and
rational fashion and the 'planning' approach in both countries
is simultaneously an admission of this and an attempt to conceal
it. Another major characteristic of such an approach is the
cold and rational technocratic model implied. If such processes
were followed through councils would be essentially redundant
since local planning authorities would merely have to respond
'neutrally' to the priorities which central government had
determined.
CCPs were set up in Bradford, Wandsworth, Gateshead and
Motherwell in Scotland. The Motherwell CCP differed significantly
from the three English ones, being set up in the original small
area manner which the Home Secretary had announced. The other
three were authority wide CCPs. The Gateshead CCP was the first
in England and the whole CCP proposal was overtaken by the
Inner City Partnerships early in the CCPs' history.
The CCP attempted to link together the various local and
central government agencies and departments involved. In
Gateshead and Bradford there were three CCP groups - the Members
Group which brought together local elected councillors and was
chaired by a DOE minister to give political guidance to the CCP
and make a political link between the Metropolitan Council,
County Council and central government. The CCP working/steering
group (in Gateshead there were two separate groups) responsible
for the working arrangements and the coordination of the CCP
respectively and the the CCP team which in the case of Gateshead
was of four members and in Bradford seven. The Gateshead CCP
team eventually became responsible for the Gateshead part of
the Newcastle/Gateshead Inner Areas Programme set up under the
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partnership arrangements.
The CCPs can be assessed as having been a failure. From
the beginning they were greeted without enthusiasm. The time
taken to begin to implement them, the change in their character
and their lack of support from central government effectively
destroyed them before they were begun. The initiative had been
regained by the DOE and the responsibility for the CCPs were
removed from the Home Office Urban Deprivation Unit in June
1977 to the DOE. The background to this transfer of respons¬
ibility is outlined below.
Area Management Trials
After the first general election of 1974 in February, the
Prime Minister appointed Charles Morris as Minister for Urban
Affairs within the Department of the Environment. This appoint¬
ment was instantly and forcefully objected to by the Home
Secretary, Roy Jenkins, who maintained that the DOE was encroaching
on Home Office concerns. The political power of Jenkins led
to Wilson backing down and no Minister was appointed after the
October 1974 general election. A truce between the departments
was called until Peter Shore managed in 1977 to have urban
deprivation transferred from the Home Office to the DOE.
The Area Management Trials were set up by the DOE at the
same time as the CCPs were being set up by the Home Office.
The idea of area management was one of the briefs that the
Inner Area Studies were given-to look at. Liverpool set up
a trial for two years in District D in April 1974 with the obj¬
ectives of examining the ways in which area management would
meet the needs of people living in the inner areas and whether
it was worth implementing elsewhere. The functions of the
Liverpool experiment were:
1) The identification of corporate objectives and advice on
the allocation of budgetary resources for the area;
2) Control over a contingency budget and a special projects
budget for the area;
3) Coordination of advice and information services for the area;
4) Advice on the implications of developmental programmes and
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policies. (Environment, 1974)
The DOE sent out a Consultation Paper to Metropolitan
District Councils in England, with a population over 200,000
in 1974 to invite local authorities to report their experience
and ask whether they would like to take part in a scheme of
trials to explore area management's potential.
These trials were monitored by INLCG0V at the University
of Birmingham under a project which began in June 1976. Eight
schemes received support from the DOE - Dudley, Haringey,
Kirklees, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Islington, Middlesborough,
Liverpool and Stockport. The aim if the schemes was
'to explore the potential of area management for adapting
local government organisation so that it can respond
more sensitively and effectively to the particular
needs of areas.' (Mason et ad, 1977s v)
Area management was not a strategy only concerned with
alleviating deprivation, but a strategy to improve the effect¬
iveness of local authorities in fulfilling their functions in
a local area. The local authorities' concern with urban
deprivation was just one of the functions of local government that
the trials involved.
The area management trials, in the same way as the CBBG
programme in the United States reflected how far the concern
with urban deprivation and poverty in both countries had
shifted over the course of these programmes. Like CDBG, the
Area Management Trials had urban deprivation as part of their
remit, but it was seen in the former case through a change in
fiscal relationships between federal and local government, and
in the latter case a change in the organisational and admin¬
istrative arrangements of local government operation would
achieve an improvement in urban conditions.
Area management is an example of the dilemma of govern¬
ment. Its move towards a more rationalist and corporate approach
on the one hand requires more participation for legitimacy cn the
other hand. Area management carried to its most logical
1 As Cockburn puts it. 'Corporate management had concentrated
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conclusion would have reorganised local government in a similar
way to prior to reorganisation.
Inner City Partnerships
The importance of the end of my period in Britain is that
it indicates another shift in the perception by government
of the nature of the problems of what by now had come to be
called 'inner city areas'. Whereas at the beginning of the period
the concern was with individual manifestations of the effects
of urban poverty - in educational performance, family break¬
down etc., the end of the period is characterised by a govern¬
ment emphasis on the totality of the problem and its relation¬
ship to economic and political forces at work in the area,
the region and the nation.
'We cannot tackle the problems of the inner city areas
in isolation, John Silkin, Minister of Local Government
and Planning, said today. The problems are part of a
general framework ' (Environment, 1976a)
The emphasis became upon employment and industry as well
'.... despite the very important differences between
the major city areas of the country there is no doubt
that they share common problems of a most daunting kind,
arising above all from a declining economic and industrial
base, in part caused by, and in part contributing to a
major and unbalanced loss of population over the last
decade and a half.
The extent and depth of these changes has led many
people to seek urgent shifts in policy by central and
local government to avert this crisis.' (Environment,
1976b)
Paradoxically, just as the Home Office's concern with
service delivery for which they were not responsible divided
the will to act from the ability to act, so the DOE's concern
with industrial and employment policy suffered from this separ¬
ation. The DOE could only change the location of industry
or attract industry to the central city through changes in
on the internal management structure of councils. The central
state's 'community package' was to make good its shortcomings
- first by reviving, renewing, reproducing the relations of
authority; second by concentrating on implementing policies;
third by providing sources of information about the working
class needed by management.' (Cockbum, 1977! 131)
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the planning procedures and regulations and offering carrots
to industry. It would have required a much more interventionist
strategy to have succeeded and this would only have been
achieved through the Department of Industry and the expend¬
iture of public funds. The functional separation within
central government has clear benefits for the state, in that
the ability of the state to act appears to be limited. The
limitations are self-imposed through departmental fragmentation.
Friedland et al make a similar point when discussing the separation
of the accumulation and legitimation functions of the state.
•First, authority over policies that impinge upon the
profitability of economic processes are often located
in one agency, while authority over policies that are
designed to absorb political discontents generated by
economic processes are located in other agencies
By such a separation, agencies which have some auth¬
ority to determine the structure of employment opp¬
ortunities are insulated from those agencies that deal
with people who cannot find work because of lack of
employment opportunities.' (Friedland, Piven and Alford,
1977: 457-458)
Departmental responsibility for the urban programme ana
urban deprivation was transferred from the Home Office to the
Department ofEnvironment on April 6th 1977 following an
answer by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons to a
written question (Hansard, 1977a). On the same day, the
Secretary of State for the Environment put forward preliminary
government proposals which were to be incorporated in the
White Paper in June and the Inner Urban Areas Bill in December.
The Secretary of State's focus at the time centered upon
two issues. Firstly, the increasing outmigration from the
central cities resulting in decay.
'We cannot simply turn our faces away from the ancient
fabric of the cities and leave them like some wild west
ghost towns to moulder away ... because the consequences
of turning our backs on the inner areas would, in my
judgement, be likely to be mounting social bitterness,
an increasing sense of alienation, worsening crime and
vandalism and, in some areas, racial tension as well.'
(Environment, 1977f)
He argued that the policies that had resulted in this out¬
migration must be changed.
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The second focus was upon the costs of ignoring the problems
of the inner cities, both in terms of social disorder (as
mentioned above) but also in terms of capital investment that
the inner cities contained.
'Even on a purely practical level there is a great deal
of existing infrastructure - roads, mains services, schools,
housing, commercial buildings - hot all in good condition,
some actually requiring replacement, but some quite new.
It would be costly to stop using it prematurely and make
alternative provision elsewhere.' (Environment, 1977f)
On the one hand, especially following the two close elections
of 1974 and the rise of third parties, the loss of population
in inner areas would have had parliamentary repercussions for
the Labour Party with any redrawing of constituency boundaries
to take account of these decreases in population, either by
eliminating safe seats or by amalgamating wards into Conservative
constituencies. Secondly, the capital investment represented
by the inner cities, both private and state, is considerable.
Ignoring the plight of the inner cities, at a time when there
was a slowdown in finding new outlets for profitable investment
for capital in expanding and new towns would have incurred
considerable costs to private and state capital. For the state
to invest in new houses in expanding areas, when it still had
not repaid debts on older buildings in the inner cities was
impossible at a time of economic restraint. For private capital
the search for new areas of profitable investment had been
increasingly unsuccessful with the completion of much of the
expansion that had occured in the 1960s. Government subsidies
to firms and other capital investment in the cities could have
promised to be a means by which new outlets for accumulation
could be found.
Shore made six proposals in his statement in the Commons:
'First we shall give priority in the main policies and
programmes of Government so that they contribute to a
better life in these inner areas.'
'Secondly we need a more unified approach.'
'Thirdly our immediate priority must be to strengthen
the economies of these areas.'
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'Fourthly our policies on population movement, nationally
as well as locally, need review and change.'
'Fifthly the Government have decided to recast the Urban
Programme to cover economic and environmental as well as
social projects and to increase it.'
Sixthly the Government proposes to offer special partnerships
to the local authorities - both districts and counties -
of certain cities.' (Hansard, 1977b: 1227-1228)
This increase in the Urban Programme was planned to be from
£30 million a year to £125 million in 1979-80 and would represent
a commitment to spend £1000 million over the next decade. Sign¬
ificantly the expenditure did not represent a new demand on the
Treasury but was to be found within existing ceilings, thus,
it could be argued largely negating its effects and making it as with
the CCPs part of a policy of redistributing cuts.
Following Shore's announcement in the Commons, the government's
proposals were put forward in a White Paper which was published
in June. This White Paper, while being portrayed as drawing
upon the experience of past initiatives, reflected the changing
political and economic conditions in the ten years preceding,
since the EPAs and the CDPs were being proposed. Not only
had the political and economic conditions changed, however, bpt
also the Government's concern (both its stated concern and the
problems which these policies were designed to confront). The White
Paper was more closely allied to the history of regional economic
policies, the growth of the New Towns, and economic decline
than to the previous concerns of the EPAs and the CDPs. It was
concerned with population changes and regional growth. In 1977
poverty was no longer on the political agenda in the same form,
although the publicity given to it made it a continuing problem for
the state. The White Paper, unlike the EPAs, could not have been
countered with discussions of income maintenance policies or more
comprehensive service provision in the areas of deprivation.
The focus had shifted to investment, employment and population
movement, not because these were seen through a more enlightened
assessment as being the root causes of the problems that previous
programmes and projects had tried to tackle, but because it was
these different aspects of the general problem of poverty which
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had, for the state, become the problem, despite having existed
earlier.
The White Paper defined the nature of the problem as being one
of economic decline, social disadvantage and physical decay.
'The decline in the economic fortunes of the inner areas
often lies at the heart of the problem. Compared with
their own conurbations, the inner areas of the big cities
suffer from higher unemployment at all stages of the
economic cycle. In inner areas generally there has developed
a mismatch between the skills of the people and the kind
of jobs available.' (Environment, 1977ds para 7)
'This shabby environment, the lack of amenities, the high
density remaining in some parts and the poor conditions
of the older housing in the inner areas contrast sharply
with better conditions elsewhere. They combine together
to make these areas unattractive, both to many of the
people who live there and to new investment in business,
industry and housing.' (Environment, 1977d: para 13)
'The Inner Area Studies have shown that there is a coll¬
ective deprivation in some inner areas which affects all
the residents even though individually the majority of people
may have satisfactory homes and worthwhile jobs. It arises
from a pervasive sense of decay and neglect which affects
the whole area, through the decline of community spirit,
through an often low standard of neighbourhood facilities
and through greater exposure to crime and vandalism which
is a real form of deprivation, above all to old people.'
(Environment, 1977d; para 17)
Defining the need to arrest the decline the White Paper commented
on 'social bitterness and alienation' and economic costs as the
Secretary of State in the Commons had done.
'Within the inner cities, although some replacement is necess¬
ary there is much social capital - roads, main services,
public buildings, housing, schools, commercial buildings -
which has a useful economic life. It would be wasteful to
underutilise or abandon so much investment by the community
prematurely and to incur infrastructure costs elsewhere.
Similarly with land: there would be little sense in taking
more fresh land on the outskirts of cities - often of good
agricultural quality - if vacant or underused land in the
inner areas could be used equally well.' (Environment, 1977dt
para 23)
The policies which were seen as being necessary in the White
Paper to change these conditions centred on improving the overall
economy of inner areas to regenerate their environment and effect
a balance between the areas and the other parts of the city in
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terms of population ■ and jobs.
The means to change these conditions were firmly rooted in
some of the planning mechanisms which were seen as having helped
in the past to produce them. Thus, the White Paper advocated an
intra-regional emphasis to industrial incentives policy to help
inner areas. The inner areas legislation included new powers
to local authorities to assist industry in inner areas. Acc¬
ompanying this, the White Paper proposed increased training to
overcome the perceived mismatch in vacancies and unemployment.
Population balance was to be altered through encouraging the slow¬
down in population expansion in new towns and a greater balance
in their intake to discourage the new towns from attracting the
young and mobile, leaving a disproportionate number of the
less employable in the inner areas.
Importantly all the proposals in the White Paper and the Bill
were taking place at a time of cuts in public expenditure. The
emphasis upon major programmes of central government and local
authorities being prioritised to deal with inner areas, while
being a step forward from no emphasis, was largely meaningless
through the lack of extra funding.
The Inner Urban Areas Bill allowed the Secretary of State
to designate districts with 'special social need' (a phrase
whose roots go back ten years and during which time no rigorous
operational definition had been made). Designated districts were
enabled to make special loans at JCF/a for acquisition of or works
on land and loans and grants for improving amenities. Partnerships
between central and local government were mentioned - again
with a very obscure definition of purpose.
'If the Secretary of State is satisfied that special social
need exists in any inner urban area in Great Britiain and
that the conditions which give rise to the existence of
that need are such that a concerted effort should be made
to allieviate them ' (Environment 1977e: Sec 4(1))
The major incentives in terms of loans centered on clearing
land (demolition etc) and development of land. Loans were
available for (amongst other things)
'(a) the construction of fencing or walls;
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(b) landscaping and the planting of trees, shrubs
ana plants;' (Environment, 1977e)
To adopt a successful strategy of boosting the profitability
of industry in urban areas by socialising some of their costs,
much greater financial involvement would have been necessary
and would have had political repercussions unacceptable to both
private capital and the state - greater public direction of
investment and intervention in the economy. Despite the sums of
money involved, therefore, the overall amounts were too small
to achieve their desired aim - to increase profitability. The
Inner Urban Areas Bill can be seen as the last of the series
of token gestures I comment on. This tokenism of the British
projects is not a characteristic shared by the American programmes.
The tokenism of the British projects is clear when their substance
is compared with their stated aims.
Chapter, Four
The Context in Britain and America
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In making a comparison between Britain and the United States,
it is important to consider some of the main differences in the
institutions and structures within which policy is developed.
Such an outline, apart from its obvious importance in delineating
and illustrating the contexts within which decisions are made,
provides an analytical framework within which the importance of
the fundamental differences in structures can be assessed.
Therefore, while being illustrative, it also provides explanat¬
ions for some of the policy differences observed while allowing
the basic similarities to be highlighted.
The question is raised, however, as to which differences are
important to emphasise and it is in answering this question
that the relationship between the state structure, in particular
the organisation of the state apparatus, and policy implement¬
ation is confronted. I do not, at this stage, intend to lay
out, in abstract terms, this relationship, rather to describe
with concrete discussion its outlines.
Three basic differences in the background will be discussed.
Firstly, the important differences in the political structure of
the state in the US and Britain. By the political structure of
the state is meant the organisational and institutional arrange¬
ments of administration and arrangements for the appointment
(by election or selection) of those concerned with the development
of policy, its enactment and its implementation. Secondly, the
different level of welfare provision within the two countries
and the different nature of the related developments that were
occuring at the time. Such a comparison is connected with the
level of poverty and the perception of the extent of poverty.
Lastly, there were the important economic differences and changes
covering the periods discussed in both countries. While these
comparisons begin five years apart, the economic strength of the
US can be broadly contrasted with Britain's continous economic
decline.
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1. The state in Britain and America
To begin with the political structure of the state, there
are three aspects which have an influence upon the policy process
and contribute towards explaining the differences between the
two countries; the electoral system, the administrative and
institutional arrangements of the state bureacracy and the 'state
apparatus at a local level.
The electoral system
Differences in the electoral structure and the party system
make the mobilisation of issues onto the electoral agenda occur
through a different process. This mobilisation of issues reflects
different interests involved in the process. At the central level,
with executive power residing in the President in the United
States and the Cabinet in Parliament in the United Kingdom, the
different composition of their electoral constituencies makes
political calculations a£ the bases of electoral benefit rather
different. In a constituency based election, the poor do not
have any electoral significance. In the United States, on the
other hand, poverty, when connected to racial disadvantage can
attract a national block of voters in an election which is nation
wide. Thus poverty is and was a much more electorally attractive
issue in the United States than in Britain. Presidential elections
can be won and lost through the ability of candidates to attract
blocks of voters whose cohesion as voters would seem to be stronger
than in Britain. With a high rate of abstentions in Presidential
elections, compared to parliamentary elections in Britain, blocks
of voters who do not traditionally participate in elections can
provide large rewards in close contests. Whereas, in a British
parliamentary election key marginal constituencies must be won
to achieve a parliamentary majority, and the 'middle' ground is
contested to win these seats, in an example like the 1964 President¬
ial election, Johnson was concerned with winning key states
with a large number of electoral college members which could be
won by mobilising the votes of previous non-voters. If the pattern
of the Kennedy-Nixon election had been maintained in the election
between Goldwater and Johnson in 1964, it was crucial for Johnson
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to be able to win those states which were not part of his
established constituency within the Democratic Party i.e. the
1
north and eastern urban states . In Britain however, for the
Labour Party, the retention of inner city constuencies is rarely
in doubt except when, through loss of population, their boundaries
are redrawn. While a Prime Minister relies upon the collection of
individual legislators majorities to claim electoral victory, the
President's majority is separate from that of legislators. This
separation has importance for the influence of areas upon the
electoral system and on the degree of party solidarity. The
different electoral importance of areas to the executive plays
a different part in the policy making process in the two countries.
The Model Cities Program met with some resistance from Congress
in its passage. The support of Congressmen for a Presidential
programme is neither a certainty, nor can it be assured through
the'same sort of mechanisms that a British Cabinet can normally
assure the support of their party in parliament. The electoral
success of the President and the same party Representatives and
Senators are not intimately connected. The assurance then of
support can take the form of rewards from the executive which
may improve a Representative or Senator's chances of reelection
independently of the effect it may have upon a President's.
A British government's electoral interests are tied irreducibly
to those of the members of parliament of the same party throughout
the country. The government cannot exist independently of its
ability to have legislation put through Parliament in the way
an American President can. By providing Model Cities funds to
Congressional districts the President could buy the support of
Congress, a support which, if he was to be able to implement the pro¬
grammes of his Administration was almost as important as being elected
in the first place. This separation of power between the executive
and the legislature cannot be underplayed in considering its
effect upon the whole nature of the policy making process and
1 As it was his landslide victory over Goldwater made many of
these calculations largely irrelevant.
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particularly when considering the question of legitimation.
Whereas the government in Britain can claim legitimacy for the
exercise of power through Parliament and the electoral process
itself, no such legitimacy can he claimed by the President in
confrontation with Congress. Both Congress and the Executive
have an electoral legitimacy and are, if only nominally, responsive
to their different electorates and responsive to electoral pressure. -
In this case the electoral process does not have the same mystique
as does the British system, not being as fundamentally sufficient
for the exercise of power. In the case of the US, therefore,
power cannot be only exercised in legislative process on the
basis of a response to supposed electoral 'will' as evidenced
by the ballot box. The electoral calculations therefore involved
in becoming President or being elected to Congress are more apparent
and more explicitly stated"' than would be the case in Britain, not
because US politicians are more cynical than British ones but
because the electoral process itself does not have to have the same
mystique and apparent objectivity as that of the British system.
The legitimacy is derived, in the American political, system, rather,
from aspects external to the process itself. Policies which are
presented to Congress by the Executive cannot in the majority of
cases derive support from future common electoral advantage -
since this may not be a common advantage. Rather policies must
be placed before Congress and a combination of particular elect¬
oral advantage, political reward and external rationality used
to effect their passage. This external rationality becomes the
most important legitimating function for the passage of legislat¬
ion and is manifested in the importance of Congressional Hearings
and their relative power compared to the impotence of Parliamentary
Committees. Within the British system, the Committees have much
less power to examine legislation than Congressional Hearings
have, in terms of manpower and other resources alone, even ignoring
the ability of the Cabinet to reverse Committee defeats when the
1 See page 26
158
legislation returns to the House of Commons floor. Because of
this, I maintain that, for individual legislators the electoral
constituency in the US is much more important than the power of
the President or party affiliation because it is from this electoral
constituency, which in the House of Representatives is on a discrete
area base, that the Representatives derive their support. In
Britain legislators are at times mere lobby fodder, lacking power
without party support. In the American system the party lacks
power without legislators support.
This relationship between the party and the Government has
implications which in the British situation filter down to the local
government level since the fortunes of the party as a whole
are connected to the fortunes of the party at local level. The
CCPs provide such an example. When announced, the CCPs were
conceived of as having a small area focus like other positive
discrimination projects. When implemented, however, they became
an authority wide attempt at positive discrimination. This can
be seen as being the result of pressure within the Labour Party
due to the tensions created between local authority elected
members of the party. Positive discrimination on a small area
base lead to one area receiving what were seen as disproportionate
amounts of resources by other members representing areas which
could also claim to have concentrations of urban poverty. With
the party system in Britain having the strength that it does,
tensions at local level, while not being sufficient to overcome
the pressure for a form of positive discrimination were sufficient
to be translated through to national level resulting in the
reassessment of the proposed programme and its implementation on
an authority wide basis. This translation of party pressure from
local to national level, in contrast with the US, occured in an
unobservable manner and was not the result of open and apparent
conflict, debate and negotiation.
Traditionally the worst areas of Britain's cities have provided
the Labour Party with their most solid majorities and the Cons¬
ervative Party with their least rewarding attempts at election.
In such a system, therefore, the Government of whatever party
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can, within the realm of electoral politics, relatively safely
ignore these constituencies and. struggle for control around, more
marginal ones. In the US this would not necessarily be the
case since the President may need support for programmes on the
basis of unique constellations of interests within Congress and
the manipulation of such support in Congress becomes the corner¬
stone of successful presidential politicking.
The American electoral system and bicameral legislature has
another important difference in the relationship between the
two parts of Congress. Whereas the House of Lords in Britain has
little effective power in the face of a determined government,
the President is faced with a Congress whose two parts may have
different interests. Senators, being elected on a state-wide
basis and numbering two per state regardless of size are subjected
to different pressures than Representatives. The length of their
term being different"1 and their electorates being wider make them
both less reliant upon Presidential preference and less constrained
by their need to be reelected. Given this, their electoral
interests differ from those of Representatives and the President.
Intra-party conflicts in Britain within Parliament may take place
but can be resolved either through compromise by the government
or by inducement. In the majority of cases, except where small
parliamentary majorities exist, there are seldom sufficient
members who will rebel against their party to influence directly
policies which have already been decided upon by the Cabinet or
Prime Minister. Urban poverty and positive discrimination anyway,
largely has not been a subject of inter or intra party dispute in
Britain. This has not been the case in the United States where
programmes such as the Model Cities when presented to Congress
by the President had to be negotiated by the executive both with
respect to the Administration's wishes versus Congress's response
but also between the House and the Senate's intentions with respect
to the legislation. Frieden and Kaplan (1977> 39-64) provide
a comprehensive summary of this conflict. Furthermore within
1 Senators, six years, Representatives, two years
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Congress the separation between authorization and appropriation
add to the extent of negotiation which has to occur, especially
when considering legislators autonomy from the President.
It is important to remember that, with regard to the electoral
system in the two countries, the three aspects of the electoral
system; the importance of area-based constituencies, the role of
party solidarity and the separation of Presidential or Prime
Ministerial power from the legislature, all play an important
role, individually and one upon another, in determining the
viability of policy options. In general the two countries could
be contrasted in that Britain has a high degree of party solidarity
and an executive whose authority and action potential is derived,
through this party solidarity from the legislature, whereas in
America there is a lack of party solidarity and an executive and
a legislature who are opposed in many cases, deriving a separate
authority from their respective electorates.
Administrative and Institutional Arrangements of the State Apparatus
Regarding the political structure of the state other important
differences exist. As well as the processes of the electoral
system playing a role in policy making, the institutional and
administrative arrangements of the state bureacracy play an
important role in shaping policy. While there are many direct
similarities in the state bureacratic structure in the two countries,
there are some basic differences. The administrative structure's
importance lies in how it determines the outcome of conflicts
within the bureacracy.
In America the top levels of the Administration are appointed
by and responsible to the President (subject to Congressional approval)
whereas in Britain the existence of a permanent 'non-political*
civil service provides an appearance of separation between government
and administration. Policies generated from within the state
bureacracy in Britain play an important role in strengthening
civil servants' independance from their 'political masters'.
Thus, a major programme implemented by the executive in Washington,
like the Economic Opportunity Act generates both a legislative and
administrative loyalty to the existing President. In Britain, none
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of the projects considered here produced the same identification
with the government of the day, nor were they constituted as
partisan measures in the way that occured in the United States.
Their planning was mostly executed within the existing departments
by full-time administrators.
The difference in the United States and Britain in the relation¬
ship of the administrative machinery of the state to the elected
government feeds through into the policy making process. While
US Secretaries of large departments and their assistants may forge
close links with other sources of power aside from the Executive
Office, ultimately their authority and continued tenure relies
upon Presidential support. It is as Presidential appointees that
they derive their ultimate power. However, it is not only their
links with the President that are important in their ability to
execute policy. The Congress, lobbyists and major interests
around their departmental concerns have an almost equal role
in being able to inhibit or frustrate their intentions. Secretaries
and their assistants spend a considerable amount of their time
in strengthening these bases of power and providing a coalition
around their departments' policies. It is in this public sphere
that a department derives its strength and ability to act decisively
and effectively.
In Britain, on the other hand, the department itself is a
considerable source of power. Many politicians have commented on
the power of the mandarins over their supposed political masters
(Crossman, 1976, Benn, 1980). Their commitment and loyalty to the
service and the Whitehall bureacracy may be important in determining
their ability to achieve results and advancement than any of their
political overlords' views. This in part explains the nature of
the relationship between policy and politicians which in Britain in
the field of urban deprivation has been weak and in the US strong.
Whereas in the case of the Inner Area Studies civil servants
discouraged ministers from taking an active part in their organisat¬
ion, beyond a token commitment in the form of chairing advisory
committees (interview), HUB encouraged and required the stamp of
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Presidential backing in their launching and implementation of
the Model Cities Program. Ministers in Britain cannot intervene
successfully in an interdepartmental manner whereas the Executive
Office provided an interdepartmental politically oriented milieu
which could influence the course of departmental politics.
This relationship between the administrative mechanisms of
government and the sources of political power has important
consequences for what I call external rational validation. Some
of the arguments I have made above in relation to the split
between the executive and legislature can be applied in the American
system in the negotiation of disputes between the administration
and the government. The system rests upon a plurality of sources
of power and negotiates in a much more public arena. In Britain,
conflict is more concealed and may not be observed taking place
between different power centres. The civil service can remove
some of the more important disputes taking place from Ministerial
review and present Ministers with a seemingly more objective
assessment of a course of action which has been negotiated, not
on objective criteria, but according to a balance of interests and
power behind doors that are closed even to Ministers.
There are few examples in relation to the British programmes
of this kind of controversy and its resolution. The few that
there are indicate that the Minister was presented by decisions
already made, or encouraged to play a minor role in such resolution.
In looking at the relationship between the administrative machin¬
ery of government and the sources of political power, there are
two distinct ways in which this relationship affects the resolution
of conflicts. First, conflicts may arise between the administration
and the politicians over the ends and means of policy. This
conflict in the area which I am interested scarcely arose in
Britain. However in America different interpretations of programmes,
based upon the differing interests of the bureacracy and 'the
Administration' occured both in the Community Action Program and
the Model Cities Program. Such conflicts were resolved through
the restatement of aims or their modification. This resolution
appears to have the same quality (being rational within agreed
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meanings) as the formulation of policies has.
Second, conflict may also arise within the administration,
to then be resolved by politicians as arbitrators on the basis
of their position as supposed political overlords of the state
machinery. This conflict raises questions relating to the inter¬
departmental structure and power bases within the administrative
machinery in both countries.
In both countries, there have been moves over the last decade
to institute departments on a functional basis to overcome some
of the overlapping concerns which give rise to interdepartmental
conflict and attempts to preserve bureaucratic authority. It is
not peculiar to government bureaucracies that these organisations,
as organisations, derive power and authority partly on the basis
of their size and the number of major programmes they are respons¬
ible for. However, especially within the British system of govern¬
ment, departments derive their power in interdepartmental conflicts
from their importance within the Cabinet as well as their place
in the civil service heirachy of promotion. Thus, at least one
of the major departments in Britain (Foreign Office, the Treasury
and the Home Office) are seen as being required experience for
promotion either within the civil service or within parliamentary
party politics. The Home Office is the department which has been
most concerned in Britain (of these three) with the development
of urban deprivation strategies, and it is worth considering some
of the interdepartmental issues that are raised by this and how
these have been resolved.
The Home Office was, from "^361 to 1976, responsible for urban
deprivation policies starting with the Urban Programme. The
Home Office, in becoming involved through the Urban Programme
and the CDPs in the affairs of local authorities was perhaps the
most unsuitable of central government departments. While at the
time of the Urban Programme and CDPs' initial launching the Home
Office was responsible for children's services and probation
services which had a direct link to local authorities, the impending
reorganisation both of central government with regard to social
services and the local authorities themselves made it unlikely
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that the Home Office would continue to have much contact with
local government. It certainly was not a responsibility which
was likely to increase. The two previous positive discrimination
approaches in the field, Section 11 of the Local Government Act
1966 and the EPA programme were run within the Department of
Education and Science. The position of the CDPs in the Home Office
became increasingly anachronistic, going some way to explaining
their lack of direction and purpose.
Two rationales can be put forward for the Urban Programme being
placed within the Home Office. Firstly, the Urban Programme was
announced as a response to the racial questions raised by Enoch
Powell, and the Home Office was responsible for immigration and
through this race relations. Secondly, the Home Office, as one
of the major government departments could be seen as being a suffic¬
iently powerful department to provide the coordinating role necessary
in the administration of the programme. In its initial stages the
Urban Programme was controlled by an interdepartmental committee
chaired by a Home Office civil servant and containing representatives
from the many ministries with interests in the programme. The
initial circulars announcing the programme were sent out under the
joint authority of the Ministry of Education, the Home Office
and the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. With the
reorganisation of central government under the Heath Government
the intention was to replace the existing fragmentation within
Whitehall with major functional departments and in this field
the most important were the Departments of Education and Science,
Health and Social Security and the Environment. These 'super-
departments' subsumed the smaller ministries under their control''.
1 As Crossman (1976: Vol J>) illustrates in relation to the earlier
combination of the Ministries of Health and Social Security, such
a bureaucratic shuffle cannot achieve its objectives merely
through the announcement of the merger. Health and Social Security
under Grossman continued to operate as largely separate Ministries
with their own establishments and ministers under Crossman's
overlordship.
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One of the main rationales for maintaining the urban deprivation
focus in the Some Office after the reorganisation of Whitehall
was claimed to be the ability of the Home Office as a major
department to be able to act as a mediator or arbitrator within
the central government machinery. This is, in a way, a similar
argument to that put forward for the establishment of the 0E0 in
the Executive Office of the President rather than in HEW, where
it might have seemed more appropriate. Both the 0E0 and the Home
Office were involved in projects which had different departmental
concerns. However the specious nature of this argument for the
Home Office in relation to the Urban Programme became apparent
with the creation of superdepartments with wider ranging respons¬
ibilities and an increased influence over parliamentary business.
As I argue subsequently, the attraction of the UP for the Home
Office lay in the narrowing of the Home Office's concerns that
accompanied the creation of super-departments. Thus there was a
struggle on the part of the Home Office as a major department to
maintain its influence and power. A position which was attractive
both to leading civil servants within the department and to
successive Home Secretaries.
It would be mistaken to see the Home Office's concern with
urban policy as only reflecting its concern with social control
- the Ministry of Internal Security of Bridges (1975)• Such an
explanation ignores the evidence that the Home Office managed to
retain control over the Urban Programme against the opposition of
the Department of the Environment on the basis of its strength as
a major department. The history of the Minister of Urban Affairs
in the Department of the Environment reflects this struggle.
3oth Home Office Ministers and civil servants wished to retain the
Urban Programme especially after the loss of the Children's
Department precisely to avoid the image of a Ministry of Internal
Security which would have had repercussions for the Department
in relation both to the 4public' and other departments, but also
effect the careers and experiences of those ministers and civil
servants . Both CDP and the Urban Programme had social control
1 The 'demotion of the Home Office to a Ministry of Internal
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aspects but these were not their main purposes and unless
clearer links can be demonstrated between the urban concerns
of the Home Office and its more actively repressive functions,
I think that the case made by Bridges is overstated. However
the Urban Programme and the CDPs were concerned with social
control in a pre-repressive stage and the alleviation of conditions
in areas of 'special social need' could have reduced the need
for repressive Home Office action. In this sense the programmes
were concerned with the Home Office's repressive functions, although
the link is indirect.
The persistence of the Home Office in retaining control over the
Urban Programme can be contrasted with the establishment of the
CEO in the Executive Office of the President. Whereas the Home
Office retained the programme through political power and bureau¬
cratic interest, the 0E0 was established in the Executive Office
to improve its ability to perform as a coordinating body and
remain independent from organisational inhibitions.
There are two aspects of the Home Office's ability to retain
control over the field of urban deprivation policy long after it
would seem to have been no longer a suitable department in which
a stratpgy could be formulated and implemented. On the one hand,
there is the bureaucratic inertia that I have mentioned and the
conservatism of large organisations, governmental or not. The
second aspect, which provides a contrast with the developments
in America relates to the sources of political power within the
state apparatus and the inability of politicians within the British
machinery to adapt the institutions of government to attain their
objectives.
Considering the links between the CDPs and the IAS at a central
government level illustrates this point. The Inner Area Studies,
while having a wider initial brief than that of the CDP's initial
remit, covered very similar ground in their concerns to those of
Security especially with the growth of the super-departments
such as the Department of Health and Social Security and the
Department of the Environment would weaken its potential
importance in relation to the Treasury and the Foreign Office.
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the CDPs. It would seem that within the same government the
pursuit of the different strategies or explorations into a
similar field should have called for an extensive exchange of
experience and results. As far as I can assess the links that
were made, interdepartmentally, were weak, consisting of a small
number of meetings of personnel involved in the two approaches.
The departmental structures of Whitehall, lines of communication
and modes of operation prohibit more formal central assessment
of strategies dealing with the same problem, unless the problem
is sufficiently politically central to be filtered to the top of
the heirachy where common interdepartmental approaches can be
calculated.
'//here an interdepartmental approach was instituted such as in
the Urban Programme, different departments came together, essentially
as different departments. Bids from local authorities for Urban
Programme funds were not assessed interdepartmentally, i.e.
nursery schools versus housing advice centres. Such an approach
would have required an interdepartmental definition of the causes
and symptoms of urban deprivation. Instead departments allocated
funds to services which were the responsibility of their own
department out of a sum set aside for each department. This
approach avoided potential interdepartmental conflict over the
allocation of funds, while also resulting in a programme that was
cobbled together rather than systemmatically executed.
In both these examples, while the Home Office was nominally
concerned with the urban deprivation strategies pursued by successive
governments, its inability to act as a decisive coordinator
resulted in a lack of coordination of approaches within central
government. Clearly the different size and importance of the
programmes compared with those of America does go some way towards
explaining the inability of the Home Office to provide the
necessary political weight behind its departmental leadership to
amalgamate more effectively the different directions being pursued.
However, this is not a sufficient explanation and I would argue that
this illustrates the different balance of power within the two
institutional structures.
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In America, the Model Cities Program was a programme, one of
whose main aims was the coordination of the existing system
of categorical grants within the cities. Frieden and Kaplan
0977) provide a comprehensive account of the problems faced by
HUP in its largely unsuccessful attempts to achieve such a co¬
ordination. The lack of success is derived from different sources
from that which plagued the British approaches.
The amalgamation of the plethora of categorical grants given
by the federal government to the American cities was to be achieved
by the newest federal department - the Bepartment of Housing and
Urban Development, and it also involved other departmental interests
in Washington. This was the opposite of the Home Office's position.
HUP was attempting to provide coordination from its position as
a functionally based department rather than as in Britain with
the Home Office, a powerfully established department. Likewise,
the 0E0 which had coordinating responsibility with other federal
departments was specially constituted to deal with the War on
Poverty and, not having departmental status, had an indigenous
political leadership which was less powerful than those being
coordinated. The ability, within the American system, to institute
such an approach, over the heads of the existing powerful interests
indicates the way in which the different institutional structure
of the state apparatus in America confers different power within
it. Of course, in part an explanation derives from the differing
importance in terms of resources and political visability of the
American programmes, but I would suggest, as above that this was
not the only factor.
The coordinating role, both within the Model Cities Program
and the 0E0 was not only at the level of the federal government
within Washington with departments passing through their heir-
achical channels commands to the base on the decisions of a central
coordinating body. Regional and local coordinating committees
were set up to achieve results. The difficulties which were
faced are recounted by Frieden and Kaplan (1977) and were the
result of some of the bureaucratic inertia which characterises
large organisations. However, the problems of the Model Cities
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in its attempts to provide desired results cannot be attributed
solely to the difficulties of government agencies coordinating
effectively. The strategy of the Model Cities Program rested
upon more shaky assumptions.
The different institutional arrangements within central govern¬
ment which affected the course of the programmes in the two systems
can be crudely characterised in terms of administrative bureau¬
cratic power versus political direction. In the American system
the departments are more reliant upon political direction than
those in Britain because of their different relationship to the
executive.
This characterisation provides some light on the subject of
the nature of the legitimation provided within the programmes.
In Britain the links between social science and the state apparatus
have been largely within the civil service. In the example of the
CDPs and the EPAs these programmes were developed by civil servants
in collaboration with social scientists. Having been constructed
within the administrative machinery of the state, the politicians
approved their implementation being consonant with the political
demands of the time. In America, Presidential initiatives set up
task forces for both the Economic Opportunity Act and the Model
Cities Program. These task forces then consulted with appropriate
social scientists in the construction of their programmes. The
social scientists, like moths, seem to gravitate towards the power
source. Of course this graviation is not a one way process and
I will argue later that it is explicable in terms of the need to
legitimate policy options by those responsible for selecting them.
The State Apparatus at a Local Level
The issue of coordination raises important questions concerning
the structure of the state apparatus at the local level. The
institution of programmes has been influenced by the different
balances within central government, and how the central state
relates constitutionally and institutionally with the local state.
Within the British structure local governments are, in their
constitution, separate bodies from central government, but essentially
constituted to provide for the implementation of centrally defined
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priorities. Education, social services and housing take up the
lion's share of local authority resources. These services as with
many others are largely defined by the state centrally, while
being administered for central government by local councils. In
America, local governments have not developed historically in such
a manner. Their initial constitution and functions were separate
from, or even opposed to the more central forms of the state.
Until recently the federal government was not involved with
domestic affairs to the extent that the localities were being
dictated (whether constitutionally or through financial carrots).
Localities could however be seen to be separate from, or opposed
to the states themselves and their relationships with one another
was under the direction of the states while being more constitutionally
precarious and based more on institutionalised conflict than
occurs within British local and central relations. In Britain,
the central government can in the last resort replace the local
authority with administrators appointed by them when faced by
a refusal by local authorities to implement centrally defined
policies.
American local government is characterised not only by a
confusion of different units with different purposes but also
with different forms of local government under the same name.
'The more general metropolitan area is characterised by
a maze of governmental units: counties and overlapping,
noncoterminous school districts, municipalities, townships
and special districts. The number of such governments
ranges from only 27 in the Baltimore SMSA (standard Metro¬
politan Statistical Area) to more than one thousand in the
Chicago area posing significant problems in the allocation
of responsibility for performance of functions and the
distribution of financial responsibility.' (ACIR, 1967:
58)
As well as the confusion of units within the cities, the
forms also vary according to function and revenue. Looking at
the sources of local government revenue, the variation between
cities is wide so that whereas Baltimore received 35«2% of general
revenue from state aid, Washington received 10.7%. Boston received
71.5% °f local revenue from property tax whereas Washington
received 30.5%. Other taxes (sales and income taxes) accounted
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for 20.Tfi of Washington's revenue but only 0.7% of Worcester's
(ACIR, 1967! 152). While British local authorities vary in their
receipt of central government funds as a proportion of their
total income, the abscence of such wide discretion for local
governments provides a much greater uniformity than is the case
in the United States.
'Whereas in Britain two tiered authorities are not heirachically
ordered but have a similar constitutional relationship to central
government, in the American system each state provides the legality
for its own local government units but within a much broader frame
than in Britain. Many local governments have chosen their form
of incorporation to be ratified by the state rather than having
a uniform state wide form imposed upon them.
Where both state and federal governments are involved with local
government units, fiscal considerations may be as important
as constitutional ones. The influence that the federal government
may have on, for example, a school board through the use of federal
funds to encourage or promote integration may be much more important
than the constitutional relationship with the state in deciding
policy. This intermeshing of different jurisdictions and lines
of control contrasts sharply with the much more 'orderly' existence
of local government in Britain.
The War on Poverty, Community Action Agencies provide a good
example of how this plethora of units effects the policy options
available to federal government. While there are similarities
in the CAP's direct approach to the poor 'over the heads' of local
governments with that of the CDPs, in that the Home Office also
tried to circumvent the established local authority machinery,
these similarities cannot be conceived of as too important. In
the case of the War on Poverty, the by-passing of both state and
local governments and the setting up of community action agencies
on a community basis followed a tradition of federal intervention
directly in the affairs of the more local community. There were
certain advantages both political and institutional to such an
approach. The first obvious institutional advantage related to
the difficulty, in any direct approach to states and local gov-
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ernments of deciding exactly where, within the government org¬
anisation, such intervention should fit and how funds should be
distributed in an effective manner. Federal government intervention
in any other manner, if it was to produce results on the ground
in a fairly rapid way, would have required liason and contact
with the plethora of existing local government units. Without
fairly close federal direction, which would itself have required
knowledge of conditions on the ground, there would have been no
guarantee that the funds were being spent on the sorts of programmes
that the policies were designed to produce. This is one of the
explanations for the idea of 'maximum feasible participation'
in the Economic Opportunity Act put forward by Moynihan■■ (1970:87).
He argued that maximum feasible participation was included to
prevent employment in the programme going only to social workers
and to assure that Southern Blacks received the benefits of the
programme. This position was supported by Yarmolinsky, who put
forward much the same interpretation. He points out that Richard
Boone of the Ford Foundation and the President's Committee on
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime and an influential member
of the Shriver Task Force argued for maximum feasible participation
'as the process of encouraging the residents of poverty
areas to take part in the work of community action programs
and to perform a number of jobs that might otherwise be
performed by professional social workers.' (Yarmolinsky,
1969: 49)
The political advantages of the by-passing of state and local
governments lay in the voters' identification of the programme
with a Presidential initiative in an election year. Funds that
were distributed through the existing channels of government
could easily have been lost or confused and might not reach the
ground with the same clear federal stamp on them. The War on
Poverty as a nationwide, large scale programme was given greater
visibility.
However, while there were advantages because of the existing
confused structure of local governments, there were also disadvant¬
ages which arose because of it. The institution of CAAs increased
the number of units of government since they could be classed as
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similar to the existing special districts (i.e. fire and
sanitation districts) which already received federal aid.
Hambleton (1978) reports that in 1967 there were 78,259 units
of local government in the United States of which 28,582 were
general local government units, 23,385 special districts and
15,782 school districts (Hambleton, 1978: 91). Adding to the
number of special districts and forms of funding to localities
confused even more an already complex picture. While the War
on Poverty as.a federal programme may have found advantages in
this direct funding, the federal government as a whole became more
confused and less coordinated in its disbursement of funds to the
states and localities. In that poverty was seen as and is a
complex problem with many interrelated aspects, causes and symptoms,
an approach which coordinated only one part of the federal govern¬
ment's response drew away from the resolution of the compexities.
Both the Model Cities Program and the Community Development
Block Grants were approaches which attempted to overcome some of
this confusion of local government from a federal standpoint.
Unlike Britain, the federal government could not intervene to
change the structure of local government in the states. The use
of federal funds to attempt to achieve a more coordinated
approach to what were federal priorities approached this problem
in a different manner.
The Model Cities Program, and gradually the CAAs were incorpor¬
ated into local government. The City Demonstration Agencies of
the Model Cities Program, while being set up to coordinate the
categorical grants of the federal government, were also concerned
with the coordination of local approaches to the Model Cities. The
Demonstration Agencies and their funds were controlled to a lesser
or greater extent by the unit of general local government in the
relevant city under federal guidance.
In conclusion, the federal government in the United States when
deciding upon a course of action which involved the spending of
funds was faced with a multitude of different relatioships with
local government which it could have adopted. As Sharpe has
said of American local government (quoting Banfield and Wilson);
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'To say that it (local government) is fragmented is perhaps
not strong enough: it lacks sufficient critical mass to the
point where 'from a purely formal standpoint one can hardly
say that there is such a thing as local government.'' (Sharpe,
1973b: 131)
Funds could have been channelled through states, through cities,
directly through agencies set up by the federal government and
each of these states and cities will have varied its own institut¬
ional structure and this would have affected the nature of the
relationship with the federal department involved.
A second important feature of local government which influenced
the way in which policies were implemented (and therefore constr¬
ucted) was the constitutional relationship between the federal
government and the states and the states and local governments.
Until recently, the intervention of the federal government in
the domestic affairs of the states was not seen to be a legitimate
constitutional role for the federal government to play. However,
beginning with Roosevelt's New Deal, the legality of federal
involvement has been increasingly upheld. Johnson's Great Society
programmes provided a second wave of federal involvement in
domestic policy. The basic constitutional position is however
the reverse of that in Britain. Whereas in Britain, parliament
is sovereign, at least notionally, in America, 'the people' are
sovereign and the states are federated on a voluntary basis
without abdicating their rights as states. In relation to local
governments, while the local governments derive their constitutional
power through incorporation or charters from the states, the
strength of the ideology of sovereignty in the people is such that
the states cannot make extensive changes in the nature of local
governments without their consent. New York City and Cook County,
Illinois (Chicago) are perhaps the two best examples of local
governments whose power is such that they have a considerable if
not decisive influence over the course of state policy.
Again the institutional pluralism within the American system
has important consequences, both for the visability of negotiations
of power that occur and also for the need to legitimate decisions
ana arguments in an externally rational way to allow for the
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maintenance of the system.
In Britain, on the other hand, local governments are largely
the agents of central government. Parliamentary legislation,
which sets out the structure and powers of local government
prescribes much more precisely what courses of action may be taken
and also imposes a uniform system throughout the country (apart
from variations in Scotland). Legally local authorities have no
powers other than those conferred on them by statute. A council
cannot do things which exceed the powers granted to it by parl¬
iament. Formally, power is given to the local authority by
parliament rather than to the center from the localities as in
the American system.
Local government in Britain, while having a decentralised
form, may be characterised by its concern with the administration
of centrally determined policies. Tensions arise within local
government by its nominal democratic form and the central direction
given local government by the state at national level. These
tensions increasingly occur with the realisation of the importance
of the relationship between process and outcome (the 'within put').
Where national standards are prescribed and local authorities are
given discretion, within their own administrative structure to
provide goods and services up to, at least, national standards,
then the authorities may act with flexibility with regard to their
local electorate. However, as is increasingly the case, the
restructuring of state expenditure involves a revision of established
priorities and processes then the conflict inherent in a 'demo¬
cratically' elected system of administering centrally defined
priorities comes to the fore. 'Participation' mechanisms may
be seen as one attempt to defuse this potential conflict between
local councils and their constituents.
As in America, British local administration contains special
districts such as Health Authorities, but is on the whole a much
more unitary system despite the two tier system introduced in
both England and Scotland. Local government in Britain is controlled
by central government through legislation, through administration
and through financial relationships. Legislative control is the
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most "basic, and is derived from the constitutional nature of the
relationship between Parliament and the local authorities.
Administrative control operates through the supervision of local
authorities by government departments, and the issuing of circulars
and other guidance to local authorities. In some cases the
supervision of local authority departments by central government
is extensive.
'The Local Authority Social Services Act, 1970, is the
most authoritarian piece of local government law to have
been passed in recent years. It requires the responsible
authorities to appoint a social services committee, restricts
the business coming before the committee subject to the
consent of the Secretary of State, empowers the Secretary
of State to prescribe the qualifications to be held by a
director of social services and requires local authorities
to act under general ministerial guidance in relation to
these functions.' (Richards, 1973s 86)
However in the case of other services central government's
administrative control may be much less. The main way in which
central government exercises power over local authorities is through
the extent to which local authorities are dependant upon central
government for their financial support. Local authorities income
comes through the rates, from government grants and by charging
for services. The main source of income over recent years has
been from central government grants. In 1965-66, 51% of local
authority income was derived from government grants and this rose
to 56% in 1970-71 and 67% in 1975-76 (Hambleton, 1978: 53).
However, since the rearrangement of central finance for local
authorities, the majority of this money comes from the Rate
Support Grant which is not earmarked for specific spending as are
categorical grants in the United States. With the number of
functions placed mandatorily upon local authorities, their freedom
to select priorities is much more limited than is the case in
the United States with the Community Development Block Grant.
Central government also controls the extent to which local
authorities can borrow money to finance capital expenditure.
Loan sanctions must be received before local authorities may
borrow and the purpose of the expenditure, as well as the level
of public borrowing, is taken into account by central government
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in allowing local authorities to raise money. Cost controls
are also used to limit capital expenditure.
'These controls on capital expenditure deprive councillors
of control over many fundamental aspects of local government
services. The problem is compounded by the inability of
central government to coordinate the issue of loan sanctions
by different departments.' (Hambleton, 1978: 35)
Local authorities may also be subject to external audit to
check that any expenditure has been legally incurred and therefore
prevent local authorities developing services or other provisions
which they have no power to do.
This control exercised by central government over local author¬
ities is not entirely monolithic as Hambleton points out, since
Whitehall departments have problems of coordination amongst
themselves. The Department of the Environment and previously
the Ministry of Housing and Local Government have the main contacts
with local authorities through their influence on the rate support
grant levels and the general direction of local authorities.
'Where the local authorities are acting mainly as agents of direct
central government policy, i.e. in education or social services,
the responsible central government department has responsibility
for liason and supervision with the local authorities. Local
authorities cannot be seen only as agents of specific central
state policies but also agents of the central state in the conditions
of government and administration that they provide in their own
areas.
Central government's links with local authorities are beset by
institutional and administrative problems. Firstly, the civil
service career structure and administrative practises being
different from that of local authorities means that two different
traditions and modes of operation face one another. Therefore
even when a coordinated policy may exist within a central
government department, the different modes of operation of the
two structures may make liason a problemmatic task.
Secondly, the central government structure is not conducive,
being composed of separate bureaucratic power centres, to the
free flow of information and demands for action. For instance,
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the Home Office did not have departmental responsibility for the
services which CPPs were concerned and therefore was acting as
a coordinating center within central government through which
the results and information from GDPs could be processed. At
the very least, information from GPP was not properly being
utilised within central government. More fundamentally, the
Home Office was unable to persuade other central government
departments to change their policies or procedures on the basis of
recommendations deriving from CPP action-research. The Home Office
was left with a great deal of information for which it, as a
department, had no use.
As I have said, the Pepartment of the Environment has a great
deal more contact with local authorities and it was, logically,
responsible for the Six Towns Studies. Certainly, the Urban
Guidelines Studies which raised questions about the organisation
of local authority structures was within the direct concern of
the Pepartment of the Environment and addresses questions that were
important for the Pepartment of the Environment to be able to
ovecome. In particular, the tension, which I have already mentioned
and will expand upon, between the central control of local authority
processes and policies and the need to have local authorities
legitimated with regard to their electorate.
The Pepartment of the Environment, however, stiffered some of
the same problems, with regard to the Inner Area Studies, as CPP
in relation to the Home Office. The IAS were concerned with matters
beyond the scope of the department's responsibility. An attempt
was structured into the Studies to overcome this through the
development of steering committees representing the different
departmental and local authority interests involved. However
the structure of interdepartmental power limited the viability
of such an approach.
In conclusion, the different structures of the state administr¬
ative apparatus effects both what policy options were available
for implementation, how they were implemented and how 'successful'
they could be. Pifferent sectors of the state apparatus do have
some institutional power which is not necessarily equivalent to
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'state power' and effects how they operate both with regard
to one another and internally.
2, State Services in Britain and the United States
Developments in service structure in Britain
In Britain, unlike America, the highly developed system of welfare
services and provisions played an important part in deciding
what options were open to deal with the perceived problems of
areas of special social need. In Britain, the failure of the
supposedly comprehensive welfare state was initially interpreted
as being a failure in the coordination of different services.
Three major events which influenced the context in which area
based policies were implemented, should be looked at in turn.
Firstly the Seebohm Report on local authority personal social
services (Seebohm, 19&9) and the subsequent reorganisation of
social services in local authorities, secondly the reorganisation
of local government after the Redcliffe Maude Report (Royal Commission,
1969) and thirdly the implementation and advocacy of local part¬
icipation in planning following the Skeffington Report (Skeff-
ington, 1969). These three events can be seen to be within a
similar trend toward on the one hand rationalisation of the
organisation of the state apparatus and on the other hand the need
for democratic legitimacy within a rationalised system.
The Seebohm Committee was appointed in December 19^5 to
'review the organisation and responsibilities of the local
authority personal social services in England and Wales,
and to consider what changes are desirable to secure an
effective family service.' (Seebohm, 19^9s para 1)
Personal social services in England were administered in a
number of small departments within local authorities. 'Social work'
type services were distributed amongst children's, welfare, health,
education and housing departments. The aim of the Seebohm Committee
and subsequent legislation was to unify the services so that the
client was approached on the basis of the full range of their
needs rather than as a client for the housing welfare officer with
a child seeing a children's officer etc. Such an approach was
intended to unify the existing services allowing for greater
coordination over the range of the problems that any one family
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might have. The most important aspect of these services when
compared with the American situation was the relatively similar
service structure to be found across the country.
Most of the Seebohm Committee's recommendations, especially
in the chapter on the community, paralleled the thinking in the
Home Office which led to the setting up of the CDPs. The full
extent of the British Welfare State, embracing education, housing,
the health service, social security etc, is in sharp contrast to
the American situation, not only in the comprehensive nature of
the provision but also in that it was, at least in principle,
a universal system available as of right throughout the country
and did not vary (as did welfare provision in the USA) from area
to area.
Another important aspect of the Seebohm Report was the emphasis
given in it to 'the community' both as an area for social work
practise and as a source of potential self-help. The Seebohm
Report, in this respect, reflected the development of interest in
local neighbourhood approaches.
'Such ideas point to the need for the personal social services
to engage in the extremely difficult and complex task of
encouraging and assisting the development of community
identity and mutual aid, particularly in areas characterised
by rapid population turnover, high delinquency, child
deprivation, and mental illness rates and other indices of
social pathology. Social work with individuals alone is
found to be of limited effect in an area where the community
environment itself is a major impediment to healthy individual
development.' (Seebohm, 1969s para 47?)
The Royal Commission (1969) which proposed the reorganisation
of local authorities was, as I have previously stated, part of
the rationalisation of the state apparatus occuring at the time.
The old system of local government suffered from the piecemeal
way in which it was constructed. The system had been built on
the Victorian structure of local government and developed as
population centers expanded. There were a variety of problems
associated with the old system; the small scale of the largest
units, the lack of coordination between services and the arbitary
division between urban and rural boroughs and county councils and
county boroughs.
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The reorganised system contained within it greater uniformity,
allowing for improved central control and local coordination and
an emphasis on the need for democratic involvement in the affairs
of local authorities.
The Local Government Act 1972 may, therefore, be seen as being
a parallel development to the reorganisation of national government
departments that the government had recently carried out. The
main emphasis of both these developments was on the greater
organisational efficiency of government services through their
reorganisation. This is a common theme throughout the area
based policies and the other developments occuring at national
and local level. In the past, the introduction of new services had
been seen as a way to improve the conditions on the ground. The
late sixties saw the beginnings of a continuing emphasis, which
is still with us today, of reorganising existing services to
maximise their efficiency. It is this reorganisation which I
call restructuring.
The Skeffington Committee was appointed in March 1968 to
'consider and report on the best methods, including publicity,
of securing the participation of the public at the formative
stage in the making of development plans for their area.1
(Skeffington, 19&9; para 1)
While the planning that was being considered by the Committee
was largely in the realm of traditional physical planning, the
importance of the Committee is that it represented a growing move¬
ment towards participation in the processes of government. This
movement towards participation is reflected in EPAs, CLPs and the
other area based strategies as well as in the reorganised local
authorities and the setting up of such bodies as Community Health
Councils. As the Committee said;
'We understand participation to be the act of sharing in
the formulation of policies and proposals Partic¬
ipation involves doing as well as talking and there will
be full participation only where the public are able to
take an active part throughout the plan making process.'
(Skeffington, 19^9s para 5)
However, despite the rhetoric,participation was a process of
consultation by planners of 'the people' or the various interest
groups concerned with changes.
182
In conclusion, in Britain, the existence of an already
fairly comprehensive system of welfare, which was supposed to
prevent anyone falling through the net did not leave the political
scope for the development for new and extra policies to deal with
poverty. The existing services and programmes were rearranged
and reorganised to improve service delivery. However, as I have
argued above, when looking at the developments within the contexts
of other policies being pursued at the time, it can be seen that
this reorganisation of services is only one part of a broader
strategy. The Seebohm Report reflected concerns with reorganising
services to more effectively meet need. The reorganisation of
both central and local government reflected the concerns with
reorganising the administrative apparatus of the state to reinforce
central control and local coordination. The Skeffingtcn Report
reflected concerns with participation within a system which with
increased central control conducts itself more in the language
of a technocracy than a democracy. These three aspects of service
coordination, central direction and 'participation' are reflected
in the area based strategies developed.
Poverty and Welfare Services in the United States
Returning to the American picture, I shall look at the context
of poverty and welfare services which existed in the United
States in the early sixties. If the rediscovery of poverty in
Britain is folklore, so too is the influence of Michael Harrington's
book, The Other America (1963) on the development of the War
on Poverty. The book is credited with awakening the Kennedy
Administration to the problems of poverty in America. This idealistic
interpretation of social policy development is, however, the
main brunt of my thesis. As will be shown later the influence
of such 'facts' can be assessed as being small. However moral
outcries that justify policy have had an important mystifying role
in capitalist democracies. That policy can be argued to be
developed in response to a 'just need' is a more consensually
oriented appeal than that of more naked self interest. Such an
explanation fits in with the ideology of capitalism as responsive
and caring.
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Nationally, an important analysis of the nature and extent of
poverty was carried out by the Council of Economic Advisers staff
as background material in the preparation of the War on Poverty.
The staff updated the work on poverty that had been done by
Robert Lampman. The Economic Report of the President (Council
of Economic Advisers, 1964a) contained the CEA's analysis of
poverty in the United States. The Council make clear a reason for
concern with poverty.
'We pay twice for poverty: once in the production lost in
wasted human potential, again in the resources diverted to
coping with poverty's social byproducts. Humanity compels
our action, but it is sound economics as well.'
(Council of Economic Advisers, 1964b: 63-66)
The Council set a poverty standard of three thousand dollars
per annum for an average family and calculated that 30 million
persons were in poverty on this criterion or 203c of the families
in the United States. They concentrated upon the 11 million
youth who were represented in this population (16.6% of youth).
Analysing the data by breaking down the population to look at who
was poor they reported that the old, less-educated, non-whites
tended to be over represented in the poverty population. They
pointed to the importance of unemployment in contributing to poverty
in families.
Paralleling some of the British arguments around the setting
up of CDPs, the CEA saw poverty to a large extent as a cultural
phenomena.
'Poverty breeds poverty. A poor individual or family has a
high probability of staying poor. Low incomes carry with
them high risks of illness; limitations on mobility; limited
access to education, information and training Lack
of motivation, hope and incentive is a more subtle but no
less powerful barrier than lack of financial means. Thus
the cruel legacy of poverty is passed from parents to
children.' (Council of Economic Advisers, 1964b: 78-79)
The American approach focused on an analysis in terms of a culture
of poverty.
Another important feature of American poverty is racial inequality.
The place of blacks in American society and their poverty was a
powerful political force in the politics of the 1960s. The
civil rights movement and the rioting in the ghettoes are seen
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by most observers as events which have had considerable influence
on the subsequent development of policy (Piven, 1974b). Much
literature focuses particularly on the question of the black poor
and controversy has surrounded many of the debates over the causes
of black poverty and the ways to overcome this (Rainwater and
Yancey, 1967). The black poor are more important in America
for various self-explanatory reasons. Firstly the black poor
are more visible and have been ghettoised in America. Secondly,
the powerlessness of blacks became recognised in the sixties with
their demands for more political power. In Britain no such minority
existed in quite the same way as in America.
In part the appearance of the black poor can be seen as giving
credence to ideas of cultures of poverty. Such an explanation
ignores the basic racism which underlies the position faced by
blacks in advanced capitalist societies. Many of the federal
government's efforts were aimed at ameliorating the symptoms of
this racism. The institutional and quasilegal barriers to black
advancement held in check the self-development of black groups
and resulted in the frustrations which gave rise to both peaceful
political protest and also anarchic destruction. Much of the urban
focus of the Community Action Program and the Model Cities Program
was concentrated on the black poor in the cities.
Poverty within the United States varied geographically to a
much greater extent than in Britain. Partly this is a function of
the size of the country. In 1959 much of the poverty was non-
white poverty in the rural southern states (Morrill and Vohlenberg,
1971s 57). As the poor moved in the 1960s to the ghettoes in the
north and east, so the poverty shifted and the focus of government
concern became urban.
Welfare Provision in the United States
Leiby (1978)- points to tensions in the American provision
of welfare which parallel those in Britain and concern with
central-local relationships.
'On the one hand, the way to the welfare state seemed to
require national initiatives, bureaucratic expertise and
planning, and a professional spirit of service, the promise
of technocracy; on the other hand, programs and services
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seemed to require a local support, initiative, and
organisation that was more intimate and comprehensive
than an assortment of federal bureaucrats could manage.'
(Leiby, 1978: 298)
American provision of welfare services and benefits is much
more complex than in Britain. Provision has grown up in the
states in a haphazard fashion without a necessary direct federal
involvement. The levels of provision varied considerably from
state to state and until the 1960s there was no attempt to
construct a nationally uniform network of social service provision.
The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations went some way towards
attempting to do this. The Great Society legislation of Johnson
was mainly focused on increasing provision for the poor and increasing
the political rights of blacks. While social security arrangements
varied considerably from state to state, the social work services
also varied from county to county. Leiby quotes a research
monograph by Robinson (i960) which revealed;
'that more than one quarter of the counties in the nation
did not have a full-time local public health unit, and
one-fifth did not have public health nurses (who would actually
find cases). Public assistance, which dealt with clients
who were usually under great stress, was a mental health
hazard rather than a help because its benefits were so low
and its administration so demeaning. Thirty seven percent
of the counties had no child welfare services of any sort,
and half of the rest had no public child welfare services;
since these dealt primarily with children who were separated
or likely to become separated from their families, the
deficiency was serious. Probation and parole services
were lacking in one-quarter of the counties, and where
they existed the workers were too few and, usually, poorly
prepared and paid. The public schools were perhaps in the
best condition. They were universal and usually had some
specialized capacity, but even this fell far short of any
reasonable standard, and of course wealthier districts did
much better than poor ones. Two—thirds of the counties
had no public recreation program Only 9 percent
of the counties had a family service agency, fewer than one
quarter had mental health clinics.' (Leiby, 1978: 307)
During the sixties attempts were made to overcome some of
these deficiencies in the American welfare system. The programmes
in America, unlike those in Britain, were basic to this attempt.
Rather than providing a supplement to existing systems of welfare
such programmes as the CAP were a basic part of the newly created
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welfare system. The provision of welfare services expanded
rapidly through the Johnson Administration.
Medicaid which provided health care for all public assistance
recipients and medically indigent persons was part of the un¬
finished business of the New Deal. Like many of these programmes,
the programme was financed through grants-in-aia to states with
the states contributing to the costs. This resulted in a continued
lack of uniformity nationwide. The programme tried to encourage
uniform benefits by requiring coverage of basic services. Variation
between states occured because states were given discretionary
authority to determine eligibility, range of optional medical
services and extent of coverage. However, Medicaid expenditure
increased from 2*5 billion dollars in 1967 to 9 billion dollars in
1973 aJib while ten million people received benefits in 19&7» more
then twenty three million did in 1973 (Davis, 1977).
The Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 1965 provided for
the first time, federal assistance to public schools. This was
important in two ways. Firstly, symbolically, the federal govern¬
ment's intervention in public schools had been bitterly opposed
on both religious and racial grounds. Local autonomous school
boards in the better financed areas did not want federal finance
which also implied elements of federal control over such things
as racial segregation in schools. The poorer school districts,
however, were badly in need of such federal support.
Title 1 of the Act received 12*5 billion dollars over the
decade beginning with 96O million dollars in 1966 and rising to
1*8 billion in 1973. These funds were distributed to states
on the basis of concentrations of children from families below
a specified income level and states distributed the funds to local
educational agencies according to federal guidelines. The Act
allowed for a considerable amount of discretion as to how the
funds were used by the states and educational authorities (Levin,
1977)
In the field of housing, the federal government became involved
firstly in building housing projects providing a residual function
in the housing market, then in rent supplements to local housing
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authorities to allow them to lease homes to poorer families,
in providing income to housing authorities to build houses and
in guaranteeing mortgages for poorer families. The Housing Act
(1961) provided for subsidized below market interest rate mortgage
insurance programmes to assist rental housing for moderate income
families. Under the Housing Act (1965) federal payment could be
made to meet part of the rent of low income families in privately
owned housing built with FHA mortgage insurance assistance. The
Housing and Urban Development Act (1963) established a home owner¬
ship programme providing special mortgage insurance and cash payments
for low and moderate income home buyers, to help them to meet
their mortgage payments (Wallace, 1977).
The food stamps programme provided a convenient way of inter¬
vening in the food market to prevent prices to farmers dropping
because of gluts, while at the same time providing a benefit to
the poor over which there was some control. By 1972, the food
stamps programme's annual expenditure was 1*9 billion dollars.
(Leiby, 1978:324)
The major welfare programme, Aid for Families with Dependant
Children (AFDC) had a caseload which doubled between 1963-69.
In 1972, there were eleven million recipients which included 7*9
million children or 10% of the nation's children. Expenditure
increased from less than one billion dollars in fiscal year 1965
to more than four billion dollars in 1974 (Lynn, 1977).
Other cash programmes included social insurance for old age,
survivors and disability, unemployment insurance, workmen's
compensation, veteran's programmes. However, as Lynn comments;
'Because federal, state, and local agencies, congressional
committees, and private interest groups are divided into
numerous entities concerned with specific substantive or
professional interests, the resulting programs are also
fragmented. As the Joint Economic Committee's 1974 report
on its public welfare study pointed out '11 committees of
the House of Representatives, 10 of the Senate and 9
executive departments or agencies have jurisdiction over
the broad set of income security programs.' The term
income-maintenance 'system' is merely a handy euphemism.'
(Lynn, 1977: 83)
Almost all these different welfare programmes suffered from the
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problems associated with residual forms of welfare: stigma,
low take up, low benefits and low thresholds. Added to this was
the peculiar problem resulting from a federal system of government.
States provided different levels of service and benefit.
The Contrasts
These sweeping pictures of the contexts in which policies
developed in the two countries provide sharp contrasts. Cn the
one hand, the British welfare state was fairly comprehensive and
uniform, on the other hand, the welfare system in America was
piecemeal, residual and varying from area to area. With this in
mind, it should be clear that to approach poverty policies in the
two countries as if they were in some sense taking place within a
comparable frame is a mistake. Policies are clearly developed
in the short term on a process of muddling through or building
upon past provision. This being the case, the foundations upon
which they rested were very different.
The second contrast that is provided is between the reality
of poverty in the two countries and the way that this was artic¬
ulated into the policymaking process. While there were broad
similarities within the poverty population, the British population
did not contain the large black population nor the rural poor
to the extent that is the case in America. As well as this, the
overall level of poverty in the United States was greater and
the degree of relative poverty more severe. These conditions in
both countries existed, however, prior to any 'public' or government
'awareness' of the problem. It cannot be said that the mere
existence of need results in action. Nor is it the case that
its discovery results in action. The 'discovery' of poverty in
the two countries took on different forms and resulted in different
tensions within the existing political structure. In America,
the 'discovery' of poverty matched concerns with the increasing
racial tensions in American cities, while also being consistent
with the desire to expand the domestic economy by increasing
output and consumption. In Britain, the 'discovery' of poverty
played an important role in the strategy of the Labour Government
1964-70. With a Labour Government abandoning its socialist
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commitment's, a traditional 'socialist' caring concern with
the less well off was a counter to some of the clearly capitalist
policies the government was adopting. Cutting areas of public
expenditure, attempting legislation against the unions and supporting
American aggression in Vietnam were policies which carried some
political price with the left. They revealed the nature of the
government. At the same time, the publicity given to the redisc¬
overy of poverty, to lack of educational opportunity, poor housing
and insufficient services made policies which could be portrayed
as serious attempts to deal with the problems much more attractive.
However it is clear that even this minimal attempt itself met with
some resistance within the government.
3. Economic Trends
The most important part of this background material concerns the
economic changes taking place in the two countries at the time.
Particularly after the recession in the early 1970s in both
countries, the influence of the overall economic situation facing
the state became increasingly important. The early 1970s brought
to the fore some of the underlying economic contradictions upon which
the prosperity of the advanced capitalist states is based. The
manifestation of these contradictions, -while demanding more active
attempts to overcome them by the state, also allows some of the
latent characteristics of past social policies to be apparent.
It is important to reflect on the role of the state in the
economic life of capitalism. There are two important aspects to
this role. Firstly the state has an important function in regulating
conflicts between parts of capital and providing the general
social and economic framework within which accumulation can proceed.
The economic framework has two parts. On the one hand, there is
the general fiscal and monetary regulation of the conditions within
which capital can accumulate. On the c^-her hand, this regulation
involves the state itself within the frame of capitalist relations
of production. Education for example does not only imply state
expenditure on education within a system of capitalist relations.
It is also, importantly, state expenditure which, as state exp¬
enditure, is playing a role affecting fiscal and monetary conditions.
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Within the Keynesian approach adopted by many capitalist states
at the time, state expenditure has important functions in regulating
demand, in determining the money supply, and in affecting interest
rates on the national markets. The state entered into some of
these relationships as a capitalist (eg borrowing); in others
it intervened as a capitalist state in the regulation of the
market within which capital is operating.
The 1960s in both America and Britain may be seen as the end
of the period of post-war growth and the beginning of the end
of the Keynesian economic paradigm as the major influence in
government thinking. The post-war period, which in the United
States extended for a longer period of time than in Britain, was
characterised by expanding production, greater consumption, more
consumer goods and a higher standard of living. The 1972 recession
began to reverse these trends.
A clear statement of the Keynesian approach to demand management
through fiscal policies comes from Pechman.
'The major contribution that fiscal policy can make to economic
growth is to help keep total demand roughly in line with the
productive potential of the economy. An economy operating
at less than full employment is one in which potential GUP
is larger than the total of actual spending by consumers,
business and government. The remedy is to increase private
or public spending through fiscal and monetary stimulation.
Conversely, when total demand exceeds the capacity of the
economy to produce goods ana services, the remedy is to
curtail private or public spending through fiscal and monetary
restraint.' (Pechman, 1977s 23)
He goes on to qualify this by showing how difficult this process
has been in practise to achieve. The US economy in the 1960s
reflects this problem.
To view an economic policy based upon the principles of demand
management in isolation from its political corollaries, is to fail
to understand the connection between the political and the economic.
Keynesian policies are not merely a set of policies within the
sphere of fiscal and economic concerns. They are also a set of
political relationships. The way in which the state regulates
the economy and the part that it plays in relation to the economic
context of private capitals, changes and adapts the nature of the
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relationship between capital and labour in a way which reaches
beyond the economic relationship. Xeynesian economic policies
have not merely been accompanied by a series of concilatory
social policies. These conciliatory social policies are an
integral part of the balance of class forces that Keynesianism
attempts to maintain, based upon stability and social peace,
without apparent class conflict.
The American Economy
In America, the sixties can be divided into two parts. Firstly,
the 'success' of Johnson's economic policies and the growth in
the American economy and secondly the beginnings of its decline
as the American economy became overheated by the Vietnam War
expenditure. In the same way the Labour government's policies in
the sixties could be divided around the devaluation of the pound.
In the first period there was an attempt to introduce much more
extensive management into the economy and in the second, the offensive
by the Labour Government against the working class. In both count¬
ries some of the subsequent developments can be understood much
more fully given the background of the economic policies pursued
in the two countries at the time. The subsequent history of the
economic policies pursued and the imposition of the world economic
recession made for very similar considerations in the two countries.
However, the earlier period illustrates a sharp divergence.
The Kennedy Administration took a much more active role in
the management of demand than had the Eisenhower Administration.
Eisenhower had largely left alone the economy in a traditionally
conservative manner and while the Korean War provided for growth
within the US economy, the subsequent mild recession was left
untended. When Kennedy took office, there was a budget surplus
relatively high unemployment and stagnation within the economy.
The way forward he adopted was to introduce a tax cut to stimulate
demand and so take up some of the 'slack' within the economy.
The Administration failed to achieve its tax cut. However, some
other measures were adopted in an attempt to encourage increased
employment, such as the Manpower Development and Training Act.
The Johnson Administration succeded where Kennedy had failed and
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achieved a tax cut. This coupled with the social programmes
began to have an effect upon demand and growth.
The seeming success of keynesian demand management was reflected
in the optimistic lecture given by Walter Heller, the ex-chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisers, under Kennedy and then
Johnson. Speaking at Harvard in 1966, Heller said;
'Economics has come of age in the 1960s. Two Presidents
have recognised and drawn on modern economics as a source
of national strength and Presidential power. Their willingness
to use, for the first time, the full range of modern economic
tools underlies the unbroken U.S. expansion since early
1961 - an expansion that in its first five years created
over seven million new jobs, doubled profits, increased
the nation!s real output by a third, and closed the fifty
billion dollar gap between actual and potential production
that plagued the American economy in 1961.' (Heller, 1966: 1)
However, if the 'new economics' had come of age in 1966, its
middle and old age were not far off. The main target of the
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations was to 'close the gap' between
actual and potential GNP. In the period from 1956-61, the real
GNP rose at an average rate of 2*1% (Okun, 1970: 55)• Between
the first quarter of 1963 and. the second quarter of 1965» the
real GNP increased at an annual rate of 5*7% and from the second
quarter of 1965 to the first quarter of 1966 the GNP increased
at an annual rate of 8*5% (Okun, 1970: 67). As can be seen, the
approach taken by the Administration was successful in the short
term. However by the end of the decade, the annual rate of increase
of the GNP in 1970 was -0*6%.
Unemployment also fell. The rate had been fluctuating between
5*5% and. 6% during 1962 and 1963 and. fell to 5% during 1964, declining
to 4*7% during the spring of 1965 (Okun, 1970: 47). In 1966,
the unemployment rate was at the low point, a rate of 7*5% for
minorities and 3*8% for the overall population. The overall
unemployment rate continued to fall to 3*5% 6y 1969-(see next page).
While unemployment decreased and the GNP increased at a dramatic
rate up until 1966, the effects of demand management were reversed
after 1966. The increase in defence expenditure and federal,
state and local governments expenditure in general, began to have
an effect upon the rate of inflation. 1965 a-nd 1966 saw the consumer
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price index beginning to rise dramatically after a small and
gradual increase over the previous four years. This coupled
with the added inflationary pressures brought to bear on the
economy by the increased commitment to the War on Vietnam,
slowed down the rate of growth in the GNP during 1967# In
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176*2 196*4 224*8 282*6 333*0
Government exp.
as % of GNP 31.4 31 *0 30*0 32*7 34*0
Defence exp. ($b) 49*3 50*7 55*4 78*7 78*4
Surplus/deficit -7.1 -5*9 -3*8 -25*2 -2*8
Unemployment 5*5 5*2 3*8 3*6 4.9
Unemployment for
minorities 10*9 9*6 7*3 6*7 8*2
Consumer Price
Index (1967=100) 90*6 92*9 97*2 104*2 116*3
(Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, 1975• GNP:226, Unemployment:
135, Consumer Price Index: 210, Defence: 1114» Surplus/deficit: 1105,
Total government expenditure: 1119)
Government expenditure as a proportion of GNP fell from 32%
in 1961, to 3C% in 1965 (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1975)
reflecting the effect that the growth oriented policies had upon
the national product. However, from 1966 to 1970, the proportion
rose from 30% 60 34%• The GNP's increase was declining while
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military expenditures were unstable and the effects of prior
commitments to government expenditure were working their way
through the economy.
The advantage of a tax cut for economic stimulation lay in
its immediate effects upon domestic consumption, its disadvantages
were that it was difficult to reverse (as Johnson would have liked
to do to finance the War on Vietnam) and that the money 'freed'
in a tax cut will not necessarily be spent in a way which increases
consumption in the most desirable sectors. Government expenditure
had advantages and disadvantages as well, as a tool of economic
policy. To manipulate demand, increased government expenditure
was a less sharp instrument, in that its effect took time to work
through the economy. Secondly, government expenditures, especially
on social programmes could not be promoted, politically, as one-
off expenditure but imply future and in many cases open ended
commitment to continued expenditure. Tax cuts, unlike government
expenditure, may have a direct effect upon levels of investment and
interest rates, since those receiving tax cuts in the higher income
levels are more likely to save than spend. This is for the 'new
economics' a, two edged sword. On the one hand, increased domestic
consumption encourages a growing GUP, but such a growth in the
GNP requires increased levels of investment. The investment
boom, which had been contributed to by the tax cut had begun to
peter out in late 1966. The fall in the rate of increase in GNP
can be partly attributed to this slowdown.
It is important'to emphasise the fluctuating nature of the U.S.'s
economic fortunes in the 1960s. It seemed up until ^^G6 that
Xeynesian demand management did work and would continue to provide
increasing prosperity. Accompanying this prosperity and growth,
it was argued, would be a filtering down of its effects to the
poorest people. The temporary success conceals some of the basic
economic contradictions within capitalism. Poverty was not seen
as a structural part and necessary product of this mode of production.
This temporary success also concealed the impossibility of separ¬
ating the economic from the political and social. The international
hegemony which the U.S. was fighting to preserve in Vietnam was
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as much responsible for American prosperity as any manipulation
of the American domestic economy.
The period of success in maintaining this international hegemony
began to end, coinciding with the over-effects of domestic economic
policies, during the early 1970s. The American and subsequently
the world economy began to experience a recession. I shall examine
the reasons for this world recession and some of its implications
for the U.S. and Britain later.
Government domestic policies provide an interesting parallel
with the changing position of the U.S. economy as seen through
keynesian eyes. The emphasis changes over the sixties from one
concerned with expanding service provision and encouraging part¬
icipation in the work force, reflecting the desire to decrease
the gap between actual and potential GNP and then towards the
rationalising of services in an attempt, not only to reduce the
increase in government expenditure, but also to allow for a
rationalisation of services to fit them more closely to the new
economic 'reality'. It is important not to see the developments in
the sixties as the total story. The recession which began in the
early 1970s had important repercussions which will be more easily
compared with the development of the recession in Britain.
The British Economy
When discussing the economic changes that occured in Britain
during the 1960s, it is important to make plain some of the differences
in the nature of the British economy from that of the American.
One of the basic differences lies in the role of Britain as one
of the world's major trading nations. America does not rely
for its wealth, to the same extent as Britain, upon its trading
position. However, while both currencies in the sixties were major
world currencies, being held by foreign countries in large amounts,
the dollar was not so dependent upon the balance of payments
position to maintain the U.S.'s ability to honour these dollars.
In Britain the sixties were characterised by recurring balance of
payments crises and the history of the Labour Government's economic
policies is largely one of attempts to overcome these crises.
When the Labour Government was elected in 19^4» it was faced
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with an economy at nearly full employment ana an increasing
balance of payments deficit. While one way of overcoming the
balance of payments problem would have been to devalue the pound
on taking office, the Government resisted such a move to avoid
any unpopular electoral consequences which might occur because
they would shortly have to have another election to achieve an
overall majority in Parliament. Devaluation was also rejected
as an option because of the unfavourable reaction abroad which
could have resulted and the fear that the Labour Government
would be seen as too prepared to devalue out of balance of payments
problems as the post-war Labour Government had done. Instead,
therefore, of devaluing on taking office, the Government attempted
to restore the competitiveness for British goods by instituting
a technological revolution to accelerate the growth in productivity
and through national planning to ensure an increase in exports
and reduction in imports. An incomes policy was also seen as being
a necessary part of this strategy to prevent incomes rising as
productivity rose, so reducing the benefits to profits of such
productivity increases. In summary, national planning was intended
to stimulate growth and productivity and lead to an export boom.
However this soon became an impractical course of action. The
balance of payments problem accelerated rather than declined and
a deflationary strategy seemed to be the only course of action open
although it implied abandoning the commitment to full employment
and growth. This led to a return to the stop/go strategy that the
previous government had adopted and the Labour Government was
pledged to avoid. The introduction of a wages and prices freeze
was part of this strategy. The results were disappointing and the
government was eventually forced to devalue the pound in November
1967, and, with wages increasing to make up some of the ground lost
through devaluation, reinstitute a wages and prices policy, coupled
with cuts in public expenditure and attempts to control the unions
through the proposed industrial relations legislation.
The role of foreign trade in the British economy meant that,
unlike the U.S., full potential growth and employment could not
be achieved only through encouraging domestic demand. Any increase
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in domestic demand produced an inflow of imports which had to
be accompanied by an increase in exports to prevent a balance of
payments deficit. Exports could only become more competitive ana
increase through their prices being kept down through increased
productivity or holding down wages. A strategy of increasing
productivity demanded increased investment and relied upon a
growth in the amount of money in the economy with inflationary and
import prone tendencies that this implies. Keeping down wages
also had the effect, not only of political problems within the
Labour movement, but also of restraining domestic demand and so
decreasing consumption of domestically produced goods. These
tensions produced the stop go cycle of the sixties.
Government also used public expenditure to try and control
domestic demand and deflate the economy. A large increase in
public expenditure of the kind that the Labour Government's
manifesto was pledged to, unless financed by growth in the domestic
economy, would have had to be financed through taxation which might
either reduce investment or further supress wages (depending upon
where the taxation fell). The resulting cuts in public expenditure
implemented by the Labour Government were announced both as
deflationary measures and to increase the amount of money available
for investment without increasing the absolute amount of money which
was available, since this would have had inflationary consequences
for the pound and the balance of payments.
The situation of the British economy in the 1960s was therefore
rather unique, in that the British economy through its historical
development as a major world trader, had in the loss of its imperial
strength to compete in the world markets in a way which it was
unable to, especially given the strength of its labour movement
and the size of its welfare state.
Another important aspect of the economic approach which the
government attempted to follow and which had reverberations through¬
out the British system of government was the use of planning.
While the Tories had set up the National Economic Development
Council in the early sixties as the beginnings of indicative
planning in the country, the Labour Government seemed, in many
198
fields to substitute this concept of 'planning' for a commitment
to socialist planning. The distinction between capitalism
and socialism is in the nature and content of their plans, not in
their existence. Planning in its capitalist form infiltrated the
Labour Government increasingly. With such planning was accompanied
a whole ethos of neutral evaluation, technical development and
statistical indicators. I shall look at it in other fields later.
However the National Plan was perhaps the major platform of the
Government's national economic policy up until 1966.
'Indeed one could date the life cycle of the Plan as:
'conceived October 19^4» born September 1965* died
(possibly murdered) July 1966.'' (Cpie, 1972: 1970)
Opie points to a major failing in the technocratic approach to
planning adopted by the Labour Government.
'The ultimate choice among options is a political choice,
not to be avoided by greater use of research and statistics.
When it came to the ultimate choice, the Government preferred
to sacrifice faster growth and full employment to the existing
exchange rate, and not the other way round. In July 1966,
fierce deflationary measures were imposed, together with a
statutory wage and price freeze, in a frantic effort to close
the external deficit and hopefully to reverse what many
held to be a worsening trend in our external position.'
(Opie, 1972: 170-171)
The progress of the Labour Government's economic policy was such
that by the end of their term in office it could be argued that the
period as a whole was characterised by a failure to have a policy.
Political pressures produced changes in economic policy, which
in turn influenced political forces. The Government muddled through
in classic style so that by the end of the period little had been
achieved. Certainly the period was not characterised by the
optimism in economic management which occured with the American
economy. The basic difference in the development of the two
national economies can be explained in terms of their world position
and the size of their domestic economies. 'Whereas in America,
the domestic economy and its resources were of such a size that the
economy as a whole was relatively self-sufficient, in Britain, the
economy relied almost exclusively on trade with foreign competitors.
America's world position also allowed it to not have to compete
either with foreign competitors or with foreign consumers-. It
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could impose its will. Britain had lost this position of world
hegemony after the first world war. For these reasons the sixties
saw divergent trends in the two economies. The seventies however
began with a capitalist world economic crisis which imposed itself
upon the international capitalist world economy and can be seen
I
to have resulted in similar pressures in the two countries. It
is this which I shall examine next.
Restructuring expenditure and 'the crisis'
The economic recession of 1974-1975 is often attributed to the
rise in oil proces by the OPEC countries. While these had effects
to different degrees upon different countries the source of the
recession is to be found elsewhere. This recession was the first
recession on an international scale since the end of the second
world war. This resulted from the synchronisation of the international
industrial cycle through increased internationalisation of capitalist
production brought about by the growth in multi-national enterprises.
The internationalisation of the crisis created a problem for national
states attempts at avoiding recession in the traditional manner,
through demand management. Increased demand in one country at a
time of international recession, rather than promoting domestic
production was likely to lead to increased imports.
The recession produced a decline in production in all the major
capitalist countries in 1973 and. 1974. In the United States,
between the fourth quarter of 1973 and the second quarter of 1975
industrial production declined by 14*4%» in the U.K. between the
fourth quarter of 1973 and the fourth quarter of 1974 the decline
was 10*1%. With this decline in production, countries exporting
raw materials saw a reduction of their currency reserves from a
combination of inflation and lack of demand for their exports,
which in turn produced a lack of demand for imports. The balance
of payments problems created for some western nations through
the fall in exports resulted in import restrictions of varying
kinds by the imperialist powers (Mandel, 1978).
Looking at the utilization of productive capacity in manufacturing
industry in the U.S., it can be seen how the trend from 1966 onwards
was generally downwards with each successive 'boom' resulting in
1 These accounts of the performance of the United States and British
economies are intended to show general trends, not to provide a detailed
analysis of shifts during the years of the programmes. An important
feature, left out of my account is therefore, the attempts of the
Heath government to make a shift in the management of the economy,
a shift which was reversed in the 'Barber boom' of 1972. I ignore
this in my text, because rather than representing a dramatic
departure which influenced the development of the policies I am
studying, its effect was one of continuing the already well established
trends which I discuss. There were however during this period three
other events in the world economy which had repercussions for the
deteriorating position of Britain; the breakdown of the Bretton
Woods monetary system, the rise of world prices for raw materials
and the oil crisis. Inflation in Britain increased sharply in 1971»
the balance of payments position worsened in 1973 and manufacturing
output fell from 1973 onwards, all this was occuring within the
context of an increasingly militant labour movement.
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a lower utilization than previously.
Rate of Utilization of Productive Capacity in Manufacturing












(Source: Mandel, 1978: 26)
Inflation also contributed to and was symptomatic of the
recession.
Annual Rate of Increase of Consumer Prices in c/
1960-65 (average) 1968 1970 1972 1974 1975
United States 1*5 4*2 5*9 3*3 11*0 7*8
Britain 5*6 4*8 6<4 7*0 16-1 22*1
(Mandel)
As Handel says;
'The prime cause of inflation, however, is undeniably the
swelling of credit in the private sector, in other words
the swelling of bank debts, and of credit facilities, which
was the essential pillar of the long period of expansion
that preceded the acceleration of inflation. The western
economy sailed to prosperit'^ on a sea of debt. 1 (Mande1,
1978: 29, original emphasis)
It can be seen, looking both at the rates of inflation and the
utilization of productive capacity in the U.S., that the recession
did not arrive from the blue. It was a culmination of a trend
and was characterised by its international synchronisation. Higher
levels of unemployment, lack of growth and inflation were trends
developing from the late sixties onwards. The importance of the
recession was that in hitting the capitalist world together, no
one nation could find ways through and out of it.
As I have indicated earlier when looking at the U.S., the Keynesian
way through the recession within one country would be to increase
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domestic demand through increased government expenditure. However,
with inflation running at high levels and with the crisis manifesting
itself as a crisis of credit and finance capital, increased
government expenditure had the effect of increasing the inflation¬
ary pressures which were contributing to the recession. Rather
than going for a straightforward reduction in government spending,
which itself could have a further effect upon the recession, both
in the U.S. and in the U.K., the government selectively restruct¬
ured spending attempting to decrease or stabilise it, in a way
which would not reduce demand within the economy.
There is another aspect of the problem of government expenditure
in the seventies. 'While government spending was caught in this
prong between its inflationary and anti-recession tendencies, so
too was government expenditure in a contradictory political position.
Government expenditure both allieviated some of the social effects
of the recession while being seen as part of the cause of the
recession because of its effect on the money markets.
The solution to such dilemmas cannot be easily found. Both in
Britain and America similar tactics were adopted from the early
seventies onwards. Clearly, the role of public spending in
Britain has had a greater overall political effect than in America.
This can be attributed to the much greater size of the public
sector in Britain, the strength of the labour movement and the
position in which Britain is regarding the stability of its currency
and the effects of the domestic credit markets on that stability
and upon public expenditure. Under capitalism, public services have
the two-fold and contradictory nature of being on the one hand gains
that have been won through struggle by the working class over
the years and provide social provision for workers, raising their
standard of living, and on the other hand, the actual provision
itself reflects the current needs of capitalism in regulating the
form of social relations and the future needs of capital in its
own reproduction. Therefore health services, education and other
social services while providing real benefits to workers provides
them in a context which benefits capital, although in a different
manner.
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With the onset of the crisis, which while being symptomatised
in relation to industrial capital, has its roots in the financial
system of capital, the state is faced with its own contradictory
attempts to, on the one hand increase demand for industrial
goods through deficit spending, and on the other, lower the
rate of inflation and stabilise the financial markets by reducing
the level of borrowing. It is attempting to confront both these
contradictory tendencies that leads to the restructuring of the
nature of state expenditure.
Education, for instance, is an example in which this is part¬
icularly clear. To reduce state expenditure on education across
the board would be cutting off the capitalists noses to spite
their faces. Educational expenditure stimulates demand, provides
for an educated and disciplined work force and is a gain hard won
by the working class. The spending on education is therefore not
cut across the board. The different requirements are attempted
to be reconciled. Firstly, capital spending on future projects
is cut, which while affecting the future level of demand, also
has important implications for future state borrowing requirements.
It could be hoped that with the prospect of future lower or more
stable interest rates, capital can invest and so restitute some
of the potential lost demand. The main areas of educational
spending in current budgets which are curtailed are what may be
seen from the capitalist's point of view as the frills of education.
Nursery education, remedial teaching, pupil-teacher ratios, none
of which will hopefully result in a reduction in the output of
educational establishments. Even if some educational progress is
sacrificied the overall level of unemployment and future likely
unemployment trends allow for some of this reduction in educational
'output'. Meanwhile the ideological struggle takes place to persuade
the working class that expenditure on education is not being cut,
that it is being redistributed or the cuts are merely in increases
in expenditure. In this way, through restructuring the state
attempts to reconcile the contradictory pressures caused by the
position of state expenditure in capitalist society.
These patterns can be seen in all sorts of ways in the programmes
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with which I am concerned. In Britain, from the beginning.of the
area based strategies, they have been positive discrimination
strategies which imply a selectivity and consequent improvement
in 'efficiency'. They also are seen as being important initiatives
although the amount of money spent on them or government interest
in them would seem to be small. They also have an important
propaganda role to play and if they succeed can be useful ways
of saving money in the future. Massive education cuts were being
imposed as the SPAs were launched. School building allocations
nationally were being cut at the same time as the EPA allocation
to primary school building were being announced.
In both countries, there has been a trend towards focusing
upon the reorganisation of the procedures conceals the reorganisation
of priorities which accompanies it.
Another aspect of the restructuring of public expenditure during
crisis which I mention above, is the ideological assault which
accompanies it. If the cuts are seen by the working class as real,
then the second line of defence is to persuade the working class
that they were necessary anyway I Social security scroungers are
the most blatant example. However this process is more discrete
as well. The emphasis, not upon cutting expenditure, but upon
stabilising it, the emphasis upon increased efficiency rather
than on the substance of increased efficiency, these are all parts
of the ideological assault.
Chapter Five
Comparing the United States and Britain
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This chapter considers issues of how the programmes and projects
were presented and how this presentation managed the political
debate taking place. I go on to consider the transatlantic
connections in social science and to show how two particular
themes, developing from tensions in state expenditure and in the
polity of the two countries had important roles in shaping action.
These themes, that of the shift from service provision to service
management, and that of central control and democratic legitimacy,
provide a transatlantic imput into the rhetoric of presentation.
Similar tensions provided a common vocabulary which was translated
into the different contexts of the two countries and incorporated
into the rhetoric of presentation, giving the appearance of similarity
to the programmes and projects, an appearance which was far from
the reality.
The presentation of policy
In discussing these projects and programmes, it is important
to note the use of similar rhetoric in presenting the policies for
public consumption and the use in both countires of social science
to provide an external rational legitimation for policy initiatives.
The aims of the policies in both countries were couched in
consensual terms and were largely unquestioned within the political
process. Any debate concerning the policies tended to be in terms
of the best means to achieve these ends. For example, the Republican
counter proposal to the War on Poverty was their 'Opportunity
Crusade'. The emphasis on improving individual opportunity was
similar although the means were different. Subsequently, the
Model Cities Program was variously attacked for not spending
enough money, involving too great a federal direction over local
affairs or rewarding rioters. In no case was opposition to such
policies on the grounds that the problems articulated did not exist.
In Britain, the Urban Programme, albeit with changes in emphasis, was
launched by a Labour Government, continued by a Conservative
Government and eventually expanded by a Labour Government. Again,
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the debate that did occur was centered on the structure of the
programme not on its aims or the nature of the problems it was
ostensibly constructed to deal with.
Apart from questions raised by the CDP teams (and largely
rejected by those who set the political agenda), in neither
country were questions raised concerning whether the problems
which had been identified were amenable to government solution.
The ideological assumption throughout was that these problems
were abherrations, which were amenable to state action, provided
that policy began with a clear understanding of the problems and
that the problems were tackled on the basis of this understanding.
As I have argued previously, these policies were not developed
primarly for the reasons given. The existence of poverty in and
of itself is not in a capitalist society, a cause of action.
Poverty is a chronic result of capitalism, an unavoidable aspect
of capitalist relations. Policies were developed to meet short or
long term needs under the guise of an acceptable intent, and this
made it even more important to provide, in terms of their stated
aims, rational and technical justifications for the means developed.
Both the Johnson Administration and the Wilson Government can
be characterised as liberal administrations with close ties to
established intellectuals, particularly to the 'new' intellectual -
the sociologist. Economists have, in the past played a variety of
roles, both actively within government and as apologists for the
economic course taken by government. In the sixties in both countries
the sociologist/planner became important. This can be explained
in terms of the relative 'success' of the post war economies giving
rise to changes in the perception of problems - with the
result that problems were defined as social rather than economic.
This optimism was reflected in the thinking of the sixties before
some of the weaknesses of Keynesian economic management were
highlighted. Moynihan (1970) displayed this confidence.
'(The econometric revolution) was part of the extraordinary
growth in knowledge of the twentieth century, with all
its accompanying forms of instability. The economy may
yet suffer utter collapse, just as we may yet blow ourselves
up: intermediary miscalculations are not only to be seen
as possible, but to be expected. But the master term is
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miscalculation: fewer and fewer basic decisions in the
society are made without some form of quantified knowledge
being brought to bear on them.' (Moynihan, 1970: 29)
The relabelling of problems as being social rather than economic
can be illustrated by the rejection by the Kennedy Administration
and its economic advisers of explanations of areas of high unemploy¬
ment and poverty which saw them as manifestations of economic
problems whose roots lay in the structure of the American economy.
This structural view would have required a reappraisal of the
Keynesian policies of demand management that the Administration
was pursuing. Unemployment was believed to be amenable to a
policy of economic growth which was consistent with orthodox
and successful economic policies and also as being exacerbated by
specific 'opportunity-based' factors. Solutions therefore lay,
not in the restructuring of the economy, but through a socially
oriented programme to give effect to desirable economic policies.
The redefinition of problems as being social and more importantly
open to modification through social programmes protected both the
existing distribution of rewards and the ideology of liberal
capitalism.
As Shaw argues;
'We can sum up this crucial transition in bourgeois thought
by saying that sociology arises and assumes the economic
problems are solved, when economic problems have become
transparently social problems which cannot be solved within
the framework of bourgeois economics. Sociology deals with
the manifestations of the contradictions of the mode of
production, social relations between classes in political,
cultural and ideological forms. But it does so by systemm-
atically divorcing them from their basis in the mode of
production itself.' (Shaw, 19 75 s 82)
The approach of both countries was one of piecemeal social
engineering. Problems could be resolved and desirable changes
effected through the well thought out and experimental implementation
of policies based upon an understanding of the problems and the
effects of action upon them.
Halsey (1974) terms this approach 'experimental social admin¬
istration' .
' these programmes .... postulate a new relation
between social science and social policy. They assert
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the idea that reforms may be seriously conducted through
social science experiment The idea is that among
possible policies about which little is known, a rational
plan A seems to be most viable. The politician commits
himself to trying plan A in an experimentally devised
situation, but at the same time commits himself to abandoning
it if evaluation by the most valid social science techniques
show that it does not work and ought therefore to give way
to plan B.' (Kalsey, 1974: 126).
This approach implies two aspects of the relationship between
social science and policy making. On the one hand, there is the
apparent aspect of social science assessment and evaluation of
policy in order to improve politically determined choices. On
the other hand, this connection between social science and policy
making conceals the political choices made.
Halsey's approach centers on a traditional sociological dichotomy.
'.... we must first distinguish the 'scientific' from the
'value' problem: to ask separately what is possible and
thereby, with the-issues and alternatives sharply defined,
to decide on preferences and priorities .... It is nec¬
essary at every step to try and make explicit what are
implicit assumptions of political aims and what are the value
premises of sociological analysis.' (Halsey, 1972: 3-4)
Although he comments on the complexity of such a strategy, he
nevertheless advocates that it should be attempted. I would argue
however that such a course creates a false dichotomy between facts
and values and attempts a distinction which cannot be sustained,,
What is of interest in the growth of sociology in government is
not that 'knowledge' had increased and could be used by politicians
to achieve value choices selected through the political process,
but that in both countries the liberal social democratic political
aims of the government were reflected among a large establishment
of intellectuals. These intellectuals were given a role to play
in government which was not based upon their 'expert' knowledge.
While intellectuals played an important administrative and political
role in their guise as intellectuals, the governments of both
countries were able to present their political choices in terms
of rational means designed on the basis of knowledge.
This is the crux of the transatlantic connection. Words may
represent 'concepts', but 'concepts' require either a theoretical
or operational basis to become more than empty words. These
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intellectuals provided a series of words which were used on
both sides of the Atlantic in these programmes. The use of these
words implied a social scientific basis for policy development
which shared the experience of both countries. Translating words,
theoretically or operationally requires political choices.
For example, a whole series of common words can be identified
which give an appearance of similarity to the programmes and projects
designed on both sides of the Atlantic.
'The long-range objective of every community action program
is to effect a permanent increase in the capacity of indiv¬
iduals, groups and communities afflicted by poverty to deal
effectively with their own problems so that they need no
further assistance.' (Office of Economic Opportunity, 1965:
7)
'.... this support should be aimed not merely at dealing
with their problems but also enabling the individuals,
families and communities concerned to learn to live more
satisfying lives without requiring so much additional
support.' (Home Office, 1968e)
To aim to achieve a position where the poor 'need no further
N,
assistance' or don't require 'so much additional support' is
rhetoric without considering the context within which this is
to take place. Considering the differences between the United
States and Britain on two of the most basic welfare services -
health and social security, these phrases are describing two
different ends. Yet without definition within a particular setting
the aims appear to be identical. If however, the aim is translated
as being a reduction in public expenditure on services for the
poor than perhaps similarities arise, but this is not the aim as
1
stated-. The aim relates to the relationship of the poor to
services, not the relationship of the services to public expenditure.
For a sociologist approaching the question of the independence
(or future independence) of the poor from government welfare
1 Reduction in public expenditure may be a common aim within
the two countries because of the similar position that public
expenditure has within the economy. However, welfare services,
as I show are derived from differing sets of institutional, social
political and economic factors which make the concept of 'welfare
services' vague without explicit reference.
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services, a basic starting point would be to ask, What services?,
not merely to add background but because it makes a substantial
difference. The words become connected to a concrete reality.
Independence within a comprehensive welfare system or independence
within a residual welfare system are not the same.
'The most effective and desirable community action program
is one which is broadly based, organised on a community
wide basis, and involves the coordination of a variety of
antipoverty actions. A broadly-based, coordinated program
should eventually embrace components in all of the major
service systems.... To be broadly-based, a community
action agency must provide ample opportunity for partic¬
ipation in policy making by the major public and private
agencies responsible for services and programs concerned
with poverty, other elements in the community as a whole,
and the population to be served by the community action
program.' (Office of Economic Opportunity, 1965s 16-17)
'The CDP is a modest attempt at action research into the
better understanding and more comprehensive tackling of
social needs, especially in local communities within the
older areas through closer coordination of central and local
official and unofficial effort, informed and stimulated
by citizen initiative and involvement.' (Home Office, 1971)
Coordinating different administrative jurisdictions is not
the .same as coordinating different departments within the same
jurisdiction. While 'coordination' as a word may be the same, it
has a completely different operational meaning in the two countries.
The intial concern of COP with coordination was focused on the
interservice team which, being seconded from existing local
authority departments, was to provide a more comprehensive approach
to the problems of the area than was possible under the existing
system of separate local authority departments. This coordination
was to be achieved through the cooperation of local authorities
and largely rested upon their own initiative. The CAPs, on the
other hand, were imposed by the federal government, receiving
direction and guidance from the 0E0 and attempted to intervene
and coordinate other established services relating to their own
aims.
'Community' is also used in a very different sense in the
two countries. Whereas in America, both in the CAP and the Model
Cities Program, the community aspect of the programmes had implic-
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ations both at a local government level and. at a neighbourhood,
level, the 'community' was articulated, as being a set of interest
groups. In the British CDPs, 'community' referred, to a small
geographical area and. one of the aims of the projects was to
increase the sense of the small area as a homgeneous 'community'.
In the American sense of the word., the focus was upon statutory
relationships and. institutional power. In the sense used by the
Home Office, 'community' was a set of informal interpersonal rel¬
ationships .
The CUBG emphasised the distinctions between the British and
American meanings of 'community development'. The equivalent to
'community' as used in Britain in the American terminology would
he 'neighbourhood'. 'Community' in American legislation implied
a political subdivision in most cases smaller than a state. This
was not 'community' in the sense of 'a community' - the more
active ideological sense of the word as used in Britain. Whereas
in Britain, the ideological aspect of the term relates to its
consensual orientation and its 'cultural' undertones, in America,
the ideology of 'community' is connected to the nature of government
and the state. The formality of American legitimacy and sovereignty
derives from the ideology of government representation of a
plurality of personal and community interests, community interests
and legitimate power, deriving from the sovereignty of personal
interests within the American democratic structure. 'Community'
is an ideological term not a technical one, although at times it
may be presented as such, and being ideological in character
its use and meaning have a historical base.
Participation is another word which was frequently used in
relation to these policies. The CAPs were to be run with the
'maximum participation' of the poor. The Model Cities Program
under Section 103(a)(2) of the Act provided for 'widespread
citizen participation in the program'. The CDPs were to tap
'resources of self-help and mutual help which may exist among
people in the neighbourhood'. Participation through community
councils and community development was increasingly emphasised
in Britain in various fields of local government - e.g. school
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councils, local plans - although these were not necessarily
connected to poverty or deprivation.
Arnstein (1969) divided participation into eight rungs on a
ladder, categorising them in three classes as non-participation,
tokenism and citizen power. The bottom rung she calls 'manipulation',
where people are placed on advisory committees or boards to
'educate' them and engineer their support. Above 'manipulation'
on the ladder is 'therapy'.
'On this assumption, under a masquerade of involving citizens
in planning, the experts subject the citizens to clinical
group therapy, '//hat makes this form of 'participation'
so invidious is that citizens are engaged in extensive
activity but, the focus of it is on curing them of their
'pathology' rather than changing the racism and victim¬
ization that create their 'pathologies'.'(Arnstein, 1969s
218)
The third rung of the ladder she calls 'informing', which
she sees as an important step towards legitimate citizen partic¬
ipation. Frequently however, the information is of a onesided
nature without feedback. Officials give citizens information
that supports the official position.
'Consultation' may be combined with other modes of participation
but may also be a way of assessing citizen feeling without nec¬
essarily using this to effect changes. Public hearings, neigh¬
bourhood meetings and attitude surveys are the most common forms
of consultation that she points to. The fifth rung, 'placation',
is characterised by some degree of influence. The example she
uses is placing a few hand-picked 'worthy' poor on CAAs. She
sees the majority of Model City Program participation structures
as being at the level of placation or below. The remaining three
rungs are within the level of citizen power, where power is
redistributed between citizens and powerholders.
'Partnership can work most effectively when there is an
organised power-base in the community to which the citizen
leaders are accountable; when the citizens group has fin¬
ancial resources to pay leaders reasonable honoraria for
their time-consuming efforts; and when the group has the
resources to hire (and fire) its own technicians, lawyers
and community organizers. With these ingredients, citizens
have some genuine bargaining influence over the outcome
of the plan....' (Arnstein, 1969s 221-222)
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She points out that where power has been shared in most cases
it has had to be taken by the citizens rather than having been
given to them.
Her seventh rung, 'delegated power', is where citizens have
achieved dominant decision making authority and differences
have to be resolved by powerholders starting the bargaining
process rather than responding to pressure. The last rung, with
the greatest level of citizen power, is 'citizen control' as
with 'community' controlled schools and where the citizens have
direct access to funding sources.
Without accepting her categorisations, she makes the point
forcefully that participation has many meanings and can be all
things to all people. Without definition of participation,
operationally or theoretically, it becomes mere rhetoric. It
does, however, serve a useful purpose in being so uncontestably
'a good thing'.
'The idea of citizen participation is a little like eating
spinach: no one is against it in principle because it is
good for you. Participation of the governed in the govern¬
ment is, in theory, the cornerstone of democracy - a revered
idea that is vigorously applauded by virtually everyone.'
(Arnstein, 1969s 216)
At a local level participation is important within a bourgeois
electoral democracy, be it America or Britain, and similar trends
have occured on both sides of the Atlantic. These trends are exp¬
lained in terms of the tensions created within electoral democracy
on the local level. It is on the local level that the state
appears more clearly for what it is.
'In some respects the class antagonism that always lies
just below the surface in British society has been more
evident in urban local government than in national.'
(Sharpe, 1973a: 7)
The building of roads, redevelopment, and the balance of the
provision of services are in the interest of the dominant class.
Increased 'efficiency', 'rationalisation' and 'coordination' on the
local level are all aimed at improving the performance of the local
state as an agent of the central state. To impose efficiency
onto a democratic structure without providing outlets for legit¬
imately expressed dissent would be to construct tension. However,
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participation mechanisms do not only allow for expressing dissent,
hut allow dissenters to be coopted into the state machinery. The
decision making processes of central and local government are not
the neutral channels that they appear to be. As well as the
state being a capitalist, rather than a neutral state, I would
argue that the processes within the state have a capitalist form.
It is not the case that at a central or local level decisions
could be made differently (in a non-capitalist way) with the
inclusion of different participants or groups into the process.
The process mobilises and diffuses within its structure issues that
might be placed on the agenda. Therefore the 'choices' that
are made are defined within the framework of the state as a capit¬
alist state. The levels of local rates may reflect a decision
in terms of improved levels of service provision and less industrial
development (owing to high local taxation to finance services) or
lower levels of service provision and higher levels of industrial
development. This is not a decision which can be avoided through
its reconstruction into different terms. The local state and the
central state are themselves only given part of the control over
decisions affecting their environment. Participation within this
limited frame demands a structured rather than a willed cooption.
Therefore, the emphasis on participation in decisions affecting
the local community can be seen to be basically a method of cooption
of local protest to overcome some of the structural tensions which
arise in the move towards greater control by the state, centrally,
over local decisions.
There is a common aspect of most of the rhetoric to be found
in the policies on both sides of the Atlantic. 'Coordination',
'participation', 'planning', 'evaluation' are all terms in themselves
which are not objectionable. It is hard to make an argument for
an unplanned, uncoordinated approach to social problems. However,
it is the reasonableness of these seemingly technical means that
serves a purpose for politicians, administrators and social
scientists alike. Firstly, policies can be presented in terms
of these uncontestable means and ends and hence gain acceptance
in political debate, and prevent opponents from questioning what
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are presented as consensually agreed ends. Secondly, the means-
ends dichotomy is maintained to the maximum benefit of those
exercising power. The practical implementation of means is
part of the end itself, and is a political choice, exercising
power and changing the sort of society in which policies are
implemented. With all my examples above, and particularly with
participation, the implementation of the means to tackle poverty
provided different rewards to different groups depending upon
how the words were operationally defined. These operational
definitions were not only not passively technical and peripheral
to policy making, they were actively political and central to the
distribution of benefits from these policies.
It is both in the manner in which these ideas were used to put
across policies and in the common themes themselves that a similarity
can be found between the two countries. Not only in both countries
were poorly defined concepts used to present the nature and purposes
of the projects; but they were also, to a large extent, the same
poorly defined concepts.
The management of public and private debate
There is a distinction however which needs to be drawn between
presentation in debate within the state apparatus and presentation
for agreement to a wider audience. In the first case the debate
between government departments and between the administration and
other political parties or interests, is founded upon a shamed
understanding of the nature of and purposes of the system of
government. In this case, emphasis tended to be given to the
fact that the programmes and policies would preserve or improve
existing relationships between government and governed and between
parts of the government.
For instance, departmental control over policies has been a
subject for debate in both countries. In the U.S.A., the establish¬
ment of the 0E0, the placing of the poverty programme in the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare or the distributing
of functions to all concerned departments were debated within the
Johnson Administration. There was a symbolic purpose in creating
a new agency to direct the War on Poverty. However, the discussions
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around the issue are of importance in exemplifying how a concern
with questions of organisation can provide this legitimacy for pol¬
itical options within the state apparatus.
A memorandum from R. P. Kennedy, the Attorney General, to
T. Sorensen, a White House aide, made the focus on organisational
means to reach uncontested ends clear.
'.... we regard it as vitally important to create a 'brain
trust' to develop a genuine rationale for this comprehensive
attack on poverty. This rationale should encompass all of
the areas examined in the study, the result of a new hard
• look at poverty by competent and imaginative people drawn
from within and outside government....' (Kennedy, Robert F.,
1963)
Again in an earlier memorandum from David Hackett of the
Attorney General's Office to William Capron of the Council of
Economic Advisers, the Attorney General's Office argued;
•We believe that fundamental to accomplishing anything
in the Federal government is the development of an
administrative structure which clearly assigns respons¬
ibility. ' (Hackett, 1963)
The discussion of the programme within government was centered
upon its administrative structure and to a degree its administrative
aims. The British experience with the Inner Area Studies and the
CDPs is parallel. The key questions internally being the organ¬
isational structure of the projects and their relationship to
other departments.
Ideas of coordination have their place in coordinating government
action. So for instance the Task Force on the Model Cities saw
the three main principles on which this new approach was to focus
as being; the coordination of available and special resources,
the coordination of all available talent, and the mobilisation
of local leadership and initiative.
'Only by such an approach can we rise to a new level of
effort that resolves the dilemmas we have outlined.'
(Task Force, 1965: 265)
Of course these 'principles' did not represent an approach,
merely the organisational principles of an approach. Focusing
on the process as defined by ill-defined concepts managed the
debate within the government just as the debate without the
state apparatus was managed.
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The presentation of policies for approval outwith the state
apparatus, e.g. to the electorate and the media, tended to be
couched in terms of the overall aims of the programme without
questioning assumptions about the nature of 'the good society'.
For instance, a concern to promote equality of opportunity,
whether in terms of education or defined more broadly, is common
both to the British and the American policies and is emphasised
in both countries.
Johnson in his announcement of the War on Poverty said;
'The young man or woman who grows up without a decent
education, in a broken home, in a hostile environment,
in ill-health or in the face of racial injustice - that
young man or woman is often trapped in a life of poverty.'
(Johnson, 1964e)
He went on to argue that the War on Poverty was not aimed at
supporting people but rather at giving them new opportunities
to allow them to develop.
'It is an effort to allow them to develop and use their
capacity,.... so that they can share as others share in
the promise of this nation,' (Johnson, 19649)
The idea of educational priority areas was also put across
in this way, as an attempt to improve the opportunities for
individuals to share in the benefits of society.
Equality of opportunity is a fundamental part of the ideology
of advanced capitalism. The formal equality and freedom of all
in capitalist society rests upon a belief that everyone has an
equal opportunity to succeed and hence that the system is basically
just. The existence of chronic poverty and inequality of opportunity
negate this ideological justification for an unequal class society.
Equality of opportunity as an aim in terms of which these policies
can be presented then has this two fold nature. First, the existence
of equality of opportunity is recognised as universally desirable
within established political debate. Secondly, the demonstration
of its non-existence is a further spur to action, even if that
demonstration is one which is manufactured or stage managed to
provide support for policies.
This is where the similar nature of the language of political
debate confronts a problem. Whereas in a programme like the
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CAP , the pressure for these policies was generated, within the
Administration and the problem for the Administration was how
to place poverty on the political agenda without running the
risk of the political losses outweighing the political gains,
in other programmes, like the Model Cities Program, the policies
were a response to political pressure and the problem lay in
producing a sufficient response to deal with these pressures.
Why then should the same sort of rhetoric prevail in the two
programmes, let alone the two countries?
The answer illustrates my general point even more clearly.
The similarity in the rhetoric behind the programmes related to
the ideological justification of these programmes within the
general ideology of the operation of society. In two capitalist
countries, the fundamental definition of what constitutes a
'good society' does not derive primarily from two different
national cultural views, but from similar definitions imposed
by a common mode of production.
While this explanation can be used to explain the similarities
in the rhetorical presentation of policies in terms of overall
societal aims e.g. equality of opportunity, abolition of poverty,
decent housing, it does not explain the use of the same words in
the two countries to present different policies i.e. coordination,
participation, partnership. I have attempted to explain this
similarity in terms of the focus of public presentation for internal
debate centering on process and for external debate on agreed
overall aims. This explanation still does not give the full
picture. For this it is necessary to consider the social science
linked nature of the terminology and the international!sation of
social science within the English speaking world. As I will
argue later, the use of social science linked terminology performed
a legitimating function for these policies, being couched in an
expert and technical manner. However, the process of development
of social science ideas is one which relates in this context to
the economic and political developments occuring within the two
countries. The shift which is found in both countries from
service delivery concerns to management and planning is a reflection
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of this.
Transatlantic social science connections
This similarity in the use of terminology derived from social
science is, in part, a result of the international links of
social science and, in part, a result of the governmental links
between the two countries. The Plowden Committee went to the
United States to look at compensatory education there. A Home
Office official went to the United States to make links between
the programmes there and the CDPs. The 0E0 sent the Director of
Evaluation to London to discuss similarities between the projects
in Britain and the American experience and other formal and informal
consultations took place. The translation of terminology is
therefore not surprising in that the programmes and projects were
superficially similar. The emphasis must however be on terminology
not on concepts. As Halsey has said,, ideas came across the
Atlantic, woolly on departure and soggy on arrival.
Two important attempts were made to translate the American
experience to the British context, neither of which seem to have
had a great impact, concomitant with learning throughout these
projects.
The first, the Ditchley Park Conference, was a meeting of
politicians, social scientists and administrators from both sides
of the Atlantic to exchange and develop experiences and was
intended to help develop British thinking on CDPs and EPAs.
The second was Smith and Little's (1971) study of American
compensatory education projects prior to their work with the
EPAs, intending to relate the U.S. experience to Britain.
The Ditchley Park Conference Report clearly illustrates the
degree to which social science evaluation of, and involvement in
the projects in both countries matched the politicians' concern
with the problem of legitimating these policies. Morrell, chairing
the conference was quoted as saying;
'Legitimacy for a policy of reconciliation could be sought
in the process of obtaining consent, and the painstaking
accumulation of evidence. If this hypothesis was helpful
the role of the social scientist was to produce evidence,
while the role of the politician or administrator was to
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generate consent.' (Home Office, 1969a: 2)
Later he said;
' both the politician and the social administrator
had a real need of a body of reliable macro-theory, on
which they could draw in situations in which decisions
about policy had to be made at short notice.' (Home Office,
1969a: 8)
This makes the point clearly, but I would argue that such
macro-theory - already politically determined by the implied
rejection of theoretical approaches inconsistent with liberal
democratic structures - does not exist. What exists is a set of
generalised terminology which can pose as macro-theory.
This was expressed at the Conference by Rein in challenging
some of the interpretations of the links between social scientists
and politicians that had been put forward.
'Professor Rein said that he felt there were two issues
in the minds of politicians. First, they had to improve
efficiency in government without increasing expenditure;
and second, they were looking for new constituencies and
sources of political support. He felt personally that the
whole process of delineating social objectives, as it had
been carried out in the design of successive major American
programmes in delinquency, poverty and urban redevelopment,
was vitiated in that it reflected fashion or whim rather
than any consistent attempt to develop a theory of social
change. This he called 'faddism'.' (Home Office, 1969a:
38)
I am arguing that it was this 'faddism' that led to the simil¬
arities in the terminology applied across the Atlantic and that
the origins of 'faddism' can be found in the need for politicians
and administrators to have effective legitimation for their
policies. The latter theme was frequently referred to at the
conference. The two most obvious statements of this were by the
Chairman and by Shirley Williams, Minister of State at the Home
Office. Williams was reported as saying;
'She emphasised her own recognition of the importance
evaluation in social policy. It was no longer sufficient,
in the complex societies of the West, to legitimise social
policy through political process or hereditary process.'
(Home Office, 1969a: 13)
The same theme was pursued in the remarks of the Chairman in
conclusion.
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'... in the use of power there ought to be a search
for legitimacy. New policies needed an authority der¬
ived not only from political consent, but also from
empirical evidence of their utility .... The process
of searching for a legitimate base for the exercise of
power was obligatory for the politician or administrators
in social policy. It did not matter that success could
not be absolute or that policies lacked the clarity or
precision of academic standards.' (Home Office, 1969a:
47)
This search for legitimacy in general leads into another
similarity between Britain and the United States which was
highlighted by the Ditchley Park Conference - the achievement
of legitimacy through evaluation. The role of evaluation in
these projects was politically and organisationally determined.
Consider the changing role of evaluation in CDP as an example
of this in Britain. Pew of the original research roles were in
fact carried out. The empirical assessment of the achievements
was not produced because of the political setting and organisational
structures of the projects.
Likewise, in the American programmes, both the CAP and the Model
Cities Program were originally intended to be small scale
'demonstration' programmes to assess the possible benefits of
such forms of action. In the memorandum to T. Sorensen from
the Council.of Economic Advisers setting out the proposals for the
Poverty Program, the CEA proposed that one of the major elements
of a Coordinated Community Action Program should be;
'a program which concentrates primarily on a limited
number of demonstration areas - our current thinking
is a total of about 10, .... - to which substantial
amounts of federal assistance would be provided under
existing programs and under new programs.' (original
emphasis, Council of Economic Advisers, 1963)
The Task Force on the Model Cities also proposed a small
scale experimental programme.
'We propose a program that would select on the basis of
criteria outlined below six cities with populations over
500,000, ten cities with populations between 250,000 and
500,000 and fifty cities with populations below 250,000.'
(Task Force, 1965s 295)
The orginal memorandum to Johnson proposing this programme had
suggested a total of six demonstrations (Reuther, 1965). Because
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of both the difficulties in passing through Congress a programme
which didn't distribute rewards more widely and because of the
limited political benefits that a small scale demonstration
programme could provide, the American demonstration proposals,
in both cases, became more extensive, but there was still an
evaluation aspect built into them with the suggestion that such
evaluation would improve the projects through monitoring and assess¬
ment. The issue of evaluation research is one that I shall discuss
later. At this stage, it is important as an example of a similarity
which owes more to rhetoric than to substance. As was clearly
pointed out by the Ditchley Park Conference, evaluation research
was not a technique, nor a procedure, but is merely a relationship
between social scientists and policy. A relationship whose content
can take different forms, but which serves a similar purpose in
providing seemingly technical assessment for policies.
From service provision to service management
The second key similarity in the two developments was the
shift in the language and terminology used from that of a social
service based rationale, to a planning and budgeting rationale.
By social service rationale, I refer to those programmes which
were primarily concerned with social service provision. The
planning and budgeting rationale refers to those programmes which
were concerned with the systems of service delivery and focused on
questions of service planning and budgeting. An example of this
shift in Britain can be found in the movement from EPAs, which
had an almost exclusively service focus in that their main aim was
to change schools to meet the needs of children from deprived
areas, to the CCPs and the Area Management Trials, where the
focus was on the process of government and its structures. The
CCP approach was influenced to a great extent by corporate planning
ideas and budgetary planning. These influences were not entirely
unidirectional in that, while the CCPs in structure were presented
as reflecting corporate planning thinking, this presentation
concealed the economic, political and organisational influences
upon their development. An example of the same shift in the United
States is between the service oriented focus of the Community Action
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Program and the increasingly process oriented reforms associated
with the later part of Johnson's Administration and Nixon's.
This similar shift from a service to a process orientation took
place at different times, over a different period, but had an
influence in both countries on almost all aspects of government
policy, not merely welfare and urban policy, and can be traced
to similar causes. Explaining this provides an interesting example
of the interaction between ideas and the structures in which they
develop. The development of planning theories - in particular
'systems analysis' - which could be applied more broadly than the
previous physical planning theories arose mostly during the late
1960s. Particularly in the United States, systems analysis was
being applied, beyond its original weapons application, in industry
and gradually within the federal government. With this use of
techniques came the associated technocratic views of the nature
of government, both in Britain and the United States. Wood, the
Under Secretary for Housing and Urban Development, stated this
technocratic view clearly.
'The relevance of science and research must be established
anew with a skeptical Congress and with a generation that
wasn't around when radar saved England from the Nazis ...
Together we can establish that rationality and empiricism
are still the best way to approach discontinuities in our
environment - and to do so in hard, cold, tangible, visible
ways.' (Wood, 1968)
The student movement and the Vietnam War led to the fracturing of
the growing consensus of technocracy.
The growth of the technocratic myth had, however, served a
purpose. It gave credibility to the continuing attempts to main¬
tain a consensus post 1968 and having effected a permanent shift
in the climate of opinion a set of theory and techniques had been
built up which, without existing in a consensual vacuum, became
part of the language of government - corporate planning, operations
research, management by objectives etc. While this language
was largely developed in America and at a time of consensus, its
implementation and effects on policy occured later. The economic
crisis propelled what was a politically useful set of language
and techniques from being applicable in general throughout
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government and specifically in departments and agencies with
unstable expenditure demands, to being a crucially necessary
part of the management of the state across all its functions.
While management planning and budgeting techniques are now under
critical scrutiny and questioned to a much greater extent than
they were when first developed, they paradoxically are much
more influential than when previously not open to such a breadth
of criticism. The explanation lies in what these ideas can do
for the state, not in providing an 'objective theoretical' rationale
for carrying out the necessary planning and budgetary measures,
but in helping to select measures on the basis of a process. The
state's operations became not only increasingly similar in logic
to those of a private capitalist, but in its concern with efficiency
began to operate like a private capitalist (Offe, 1975)•
That the War on Poverty should also have had a service emphasis
is perhaps not surprising given the low level of service provision
existing at the time. A direct service aspect also provided a
contact point which literally achieved a direct link up through the
0E0 between the Presidency and the poor.
In both countries this shift did not only occur on the ground -
there was also a shift in the emphasis which was given to the
programmes by spokespersons when presenting them. Whereas it would
have been possible for Johnson to have emphasised the organisational
aspects of the poverty programme in his announcement of the
programme (Johnson, 1964e), he, in fact, emphasised why there
should be a war, and what the content of the war would be, in
relation to the lack of opportunities upon which he had commented.
Just as CDPs view of the causes of poverty combined a pathology
of the poor with a malfunctioning of existing services so too this
was the CAP's basis. The difference, however, lay in the action
implications in the two countries with their different levels
and organisation of existing service provision.
A service oriented programme, emphasised in a service oriented
rationale, provided a match between the economic, political
and electoral demands the programme was designed to face, with a
current social science theme. CDPs emphasis upon service coordination
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followed the same type of proposals for the GAPs from the Bureau
of the Budget. The service coordination view of community action
was put forward by the Bureau of the Budget for the CAP because
of the BOB's place and role within the federal government. The
efficiency of federal services concerns the BOB at all times,
not only when resources are scarce. This service coordination
strategy was replaced however by a participation strategy (Peterson
and Greenstone, 1977) in the actual CAP. For the CAP to coordinate
services that were not funded through the 0E0 was institutionally
difficult given the comparative power of the departments and agencies.
This could only be avoided through a participation strategy
which included CAP funded service provision.
The shifts in the two countries have two important similarities,
as I have said. Firstly, the continuum was the same from service
orientation to a planning orientation to an eventual focus on
budgetary planning. Secondly, the shift in the two countries
had parallels in the economic and political contexts in which it
was taking place.
At a broad level, these shifts can be related to the economic .
problems developing in the late 1960s and becoming acute in the
recession in 1972. This developing crisis had major repercussions
in a variety of fields.
Firstly, the economic implications of the crisis relate, not
only, to the structure of capital accumulation on a world scale,
but also to the economic management role played by the state in
the advanced capitalist economies. The post World War II boom and
the seeming success in the management of capitalist economies through
keynesian economic policies (a success which is clearer in the
example of the United States than in Britain) suffered set backs
in the late 1960s and met with reappraisal in the 1970s as these
policies failed to achieve all that thay had seemed to achieve
previously. The implications were not only located in the sphere
of private accumulation and the state's role in this process.
Increasingly the crisis created a restructuring of state services.
The major restructuring is still taking place and prior to
restructuring, the incipient crisis led only to a retrenchment in
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state expenditure and various attempts to increase the productivity
of state expenditure.
Secondly, the crisis produced a redefinition of problems.
As I have suggested previously, the 1960s after a decade of seeming
success in the management of the economy by the state, the problems
of advanced capitalist nations tended to be redefined as social
problems, open to social solutions. With the retrenchment of state
expenditure in the late 1960s, exacerbated in Britain by the
continuing decline in Britain's industrial base and the Labour
Government's failure to achieve the successful economic climate
through planning, that it had hoped to achieve, and in the United
States through the major expense of the Vietnam War, the emphasis
upon social service solutions became no longer appropriate nor in
tune with the levels of public expenditure. Improvements in planning
- planning in the broader sense of managing resources and assessing
interactions between resources - became better matched to these
conditions. Not only was there a logical continuity within such
a shift in abstract terms (the focus on improving services clearly
raises questions about the nature of the existing services and their
effectiveness), but also the continuity was one which matched
existing economic conditions. The model of experimental social
administration which was being applied in both countries might have
led to other attempts to tackle problems, attempts similar in
their expenditure implications to the programmes developed previously,
i.e. the implementation of 'Plan B' in Halsey's terms. However,
this was not what occured. What happened was that 'Plan A' was
readapted and reconstructed to reduce expenditure and improve
the efficiency of existing approaches. In the same way the
budgeting focus of later programmes like the CLBG or the CGPs
experienced the same shift. The shift recognised the inadequacies
of previous attempts to make planning the main tool to control
expenditure and programme development. The emphasis upon budgeting
and financial planning systems, while being similar to the previous
shift, also included a restructuring element in expenditure.
Early attempts at implementing budgeting based planning systems
such as PPBS in the United States were forerunners of the attempts
226
at restructuring such as zero-based, budgeting or PARs (Policy
. I
Analysis and Review J in Britain.
A concentration on budgeting techniques does not, of itself,
provide for a restructuring of state services, merely the necessary
climate in which such restructuring can take place. Other factors
both within the state apparatus and in the wider environment may
militate against any attempts to restructure. This leads to a
third repercussion of the crisis. As crisis tendencies develop
and become more manifest, there are political problems posed
for the state in its attempts to find ways out and forward. These
political problems may center around a variety of different arenas.
Struggle may develop in different ways and it is this aspect of
the political manifestations of crisis that I shall return to at
the end of this chapter.
While the concepts employed both in setting up and developing
the programmes and in justifying them changed, they had in common
their 'social science' roots. The type of social science concepts
changed from being concepts developed in sociology to those in
planning to those whose source is to be found in the systems analysis
school of planning. The shift across these lines shows how,
while many of the personnel involved may remain the same, the
'discipline' or field itself cannot be seen as being only a reflect¬
ion of its value or its relevance to government at any one time.
The state is, therefore, involved in selecting from the many
different approaches which develop within social sciences, those
that are most applicable at the time to changing conditions. It
must be emphasised as well that there is both rhetoric and substance
in the state's use of these concepts and words. The translatability
may be rhetoric, but the operational use of ideas that have devel¬
oped is substantive.
Before looking at this concretely in the programmes and projects,
there is another aspect of this shift that is similar, for a more
1 Glennerster (1975) discusses in detail the development of budgetary
planning in Britain and the United States. He shows a 'two track'
system developed in Britain. One concerned with forward planning
of public expenditure, the other with reviewing policies and programmes
(eg PAR). In his summary he argues, 'We saw that tight fiscal
constraints, which were partly economic and partly political ia
origin, were a major reason for the British government's attempt
to design a much stricter system of long term budget planning.
The different fiscal position of the United States went a long
way to explain why such planning had failed in the 1960s and
suggested that it might begin to develop in the mid 1970s as the
budget constraints tightened.' (pg 252)
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of the social sciences, that it should occur, though, is another
symptom of the crisis which operated to break down many of the
existing coalitions upon which social democracy was built. In
the United States, the intellectual consensus, within and without
government, developed under the Kennedy Administration up until
the conflict generated within the United States over the War on
Vietnam. In Britain, the 'Butskellite' consensus, which involved
similar links between politicians and intellectuals, began to
break down with the failure of the Labour Government's strategy
and the strengthening of the left and right as the crisis developed.
The break up of the consensus can be explained in terms of the
lessons that were learnt through the failure to achieve the ends
intended. Such a failure was explained in various ways and gave
rise to disagreement over alternative ways of proceeding. However,
such an explanation implies a model of learning and a role for
knowledge in policymaking which is untenable. Rather the break up
of consensus is better explained in terms of the conflict generated
by the crisis. Rewards were redistributed through restructuring
as for example in the CEiBG and previously managed conflicts of
interest became more clearly apparent. In these circumstances,
the material conflicts were reflected in a conflict of ideas and
disagreement on a more fundamental level than previously regarding
the aims of policy and the means of achieving them.
Returning to the programmes under discussion I shall seek to
show how this shift has occured and go into greater detail about
why it did occur, when it did in the two countries. Clearly
this shift was along a continuum so that even the earliest programmes
or projects had some elements which were similar to those in the
later, but that there was no discontinuity in this respect, does
not affect my case. I have taken a programme from each country
to illustrate the shift for purposes of presentation.
I shall use the examples of the CAAs in relation to the Model
Cities Program and the CDPs in relation to the Inner Area Studies
to illustrate the service orientation of their approaches.
The Community Development Projects, in their initial conception
were concerned with the accessibility and effectiveness of existing
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services. The intention being to have neighbourhood based multi¬
service teams representing different central government and local
authority departments bring together in a coordinated way, existing
services, making them more relevant to the particular needs of
the area by encouraging the formation of mutual help through
community development. The roots of such an approach are to be
found in much of the social science theory at the time. The emphasis
that was placed on bringing together services, while having some
clear political and economic advantages, could be related to
criticisms of the organisation of existing services and the
previous problem oriented approach of the British welfare services.
Services traditionally focused on housing problems, child welfare
problems etc., rather than upon the person of the 'community'.
Thus the CDPs represented a shift in emphasis away from individual
service orientation to problems to a focus on the individual's,
family's or community's problems as a whole. While the CDPs
were not, in their conception, intended to provide new services
except in as far as the reorgansiation of services could be argued
to be providing a new service - i.e. information centers - this
concern both with service provision for the poor and the institutional
relationships within which this provision took place had parallels
with the community action agencies of the War on Poverty.
One of the interpretations of community action in the CAP was
this emphasis on the reorganisation of institutions and their
relationship to their clientele. Community action in this sense
was to make services more accessible to the poor and also more
adaptable to their demands.
The service concerns of the CAP and the CDPs were replaced in
the Inner Area Studies and the Model Cities Program. When the Model
Cities Program was set up, it attempted again to focus upon the
coordination of existing services within Model Neighbourhoods.
The programme was, however, initiated at a time when the increase
in federal programmes of a variety of sorts had reached a crisis
of coordination and resulting chaos. Chaos was not only manifested
in the fiscal and budgeting aspects of the programmes but also
in the political control and direction of the programmes at a
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neighbourhood, level.
The Inner Area Studies and the Model Cities Program both contained
service components. The planning phase of the CAP of the War on
Poverty had been diluted owing to the need to implement the
programme rapidly. With the Model Cities Program, the planning
phase was given prominence. Indeed, moves were made in the
passage of the legislation authorising the programme to exclude
all but the planning phase from the authorisations. The Model
Cities were, as I have reported previously, concerned to a great
extent with issues of organisation and coordination. This development,
as with the Inner Area Studies and Urban Guidelines in Britain,
reflected the tensions in the developing crisis of state expenditure.
While increased services or attempts to meet need became more
politically important, they became economically less possible.
Greater central control or direction over the ways of meeting
these needs attempted to overcome some of these tensions. Programmes
such as the Model Cities, with their emphasis on planning, combined
decentralisation of authority and programme implementation with
centralisation of control over methods and means. The Model
Cities Program included a Technical Assistance aspect from the
federal government which had been the result of the downgrading
of the role that had been initially intended in the legislation for
the federal coordinator. Such a strong intervention implied in
the role of federal coordinator was politically unacceptable to
the localities and was removed from the legislation.
The Inner Area Studies included in their brief the question of
area management and, as with the Model Cities Program, the main
professionals involved were the 'planning consultant' type.
This focus on both understanding more fully how the Inner Areas
operated and in what ways they could be better managed reflected
once again the concerns raised by the pressure on public expenditure.
The shift continued through into the CDBG and the CCPs. Here,
not only were existing services being reappraised and replanned
but the actual emphasis of the government priorities became
different. I have already commented on the changes in the nature
of the Model Cities Program brought about by the introduction of
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the Planned Variations which were a forerunner to some extent to
the revenue sharing approaches introduced by the Nixon Administ¬
ration. One of the most basic effects of the development of
revenue sharing in such programmes as the CDBG was not only
to redistribute funds, geographically, but also to change the
nature of the expenditure.
The CCPs and later the Inner City Partnerships included these
aspects of redistribution and shifting expenditures. Here the
stated aims were to be able to redirect major programmes to areas
of greatest need. In other words to restructure the system of
expenditure relating to areas of urban deprivation.
Central control and democratic legitimacy
/
The last major important similarity in these programmes and
projects is the tension which they attempted to manage between
increasing central control and legitimating the policies in a
democratic manner. This tension was a direct reflection of the
nature of capitalist democracies. It highlights the political
repercussions of the developing crisis in capitalist production.
As social problems become more firmly placed on the political
agenda and with their increasing severity, the necessity of
successful resolution becomes more acute for the state. Such
resolution requires greater direction in problem management on
the part of the state, while at the same time - because of the
political nature of 'problem' definition - the resolution of these
problems in terms of dominant interests cannot be seen to be occuring.
To avoid this, the rational and technical facade of the decision
making process must be emphasised to allow solutions to appear
to be neutral. The increased central control that is associated
with crisis management needs increased concealment as central
control in order to be legitimated.
For these reasons, I argue that in both countries participation
in a broad sense has been emphasised while at the same time
central control has increased. Central control has increased
over the most important areas of decision making - size of budgets
etc, while participation has become part of the implementation
process of centrally defined goals. Decentralisation is another
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part of this participation. The decentralisation within the
state apparatus of some of the less important issues, while
increasingly centralising control over the most important
determinants of action. As Scheffer commented on Nixon's revenue
sharing programmes;
'(Nixon's actions) embodied a determined executive central¬
isation of power, while implementing a decentralisation
of administrative authority to the field.' (Scheffer, 1976:
6)
Both participation and decentralisation aimed to create legitimacy
for increased planning at a central level. Greater central
control is incompatible with the view of society as either a
pluralist or consensually based one. Participation can be seen as
being a commitment to democracy and as a countervailing force to
central control.
As with the shift in social science used in the programmes,
so to there has been a shift in the balance between participation
and centralisation. Whereas, in both countries, the early programmes
emphasised participation in various forms, whether maximum feasible
participation of the CAP, or the involvement of parents in schools
of the EPAs, the later programmes emphasised decentralised manage¬
ment structures. The two are not the same. Participation meant
cooption of those without the system of government to increase
the appearance of legitimacy of that system. Decentralising
management decreases tensions within the state apparatus.
Marris and Rein (1972) provide an interesting contrast with
Cockburn (1977) in their assessment of the interests involved
in promoting participation. They argue that the British and
American interest in 'local coordination and planning in community
involvement and selective experiment' (Harris and Rein, 1972: 11)
stem from some similar basic concerns.
'Firstly the disparity between needs and fiscal resources.'
(Marris and Rein, 1972: 10)
They go on to argue that the only hope of economy lay in the
reorganisation or concentration of services. A second concern
that they argue was similar was that;
'.... in both countries, there is a more and more articulate
protest against the prerogatives of government planning.
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People no longer resign themselves so amenably to decisions
which disrupt their neighbourhood or displace them from
their houses. Authority seems at once more intrusive and
more remote, determining the public interest by a collusion
of bureaucracy and expertise beyond effective democratic
control. Thus the structure of representative government
does not seem an adequate protection of the citizens'
authonomy, and threatens to alienate people, losing their
fundamental consent.' (Marris and Rein, 1972: 13)
Marris and Rein fail to observe that it is not only a question
of authority 'seeming' more intrusive. It actually becomes
more intrusive. ' As Cockburn (1977) commented on the aims put
forward by the Department of the Environment for neighbourhood
councils;
'It is all there: saving on public expenditure; building
up a corporate community point of view to match the inter¬
corporate decision process of the state bodies and
the creation of a sense of membership ...' (Cockburn, 1977:
108)
The aspect of incorporation in participation and decentralisation
both in Britain and the United States is indicated by Cockburn and
by Powledge (1970). In both accounts of local government in a
single jurisdiction they have examples of the acceptable limits
to participation imposed by the local state. In the case of New
Haven, as reported by Powledge, this occured in the division of
local neighbourhood groups into responsible and irresponsible, based
upon their attitude towards the existing power structure and how
far their aims could be achieved without changing the status quo
of the relationship of power. Much the same report occurs in
Cockburn's discussion of participation in Lambeth.
This tension between, on the one hand, decentralisation for
greater efficiency and greater legitimacy and on the other hand
greater central control over the most important determinants of
the political and economic context is both overcome and exacerbated
through increasing decentralisation. Decentralisation leads
I
increasingly to the need for greater central control, just as
greater central control leads to greater decentralisation. This contradiction
operates in three ways. Firstly» participation or decentralisation
mask the extent of central control especially when this is an
ongoing process. The establishment, for instance, of community
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consultation structures such as community councils or local
plans in Britain conceals the increase of Both the centralisation
of power (for instance over local government through the rate
support grant and controls over the structure and purposes of
local government) and the increasingly corporate nature of the
decision making process excluding electoral democratic inputs.
As well as masking the centralisation of power, decentralisation
legitimates the centralisation of power by making it appear to be
taking place within the traditional form of democratic government
in consultation and under the control and direction of.'the people'.
Secondly, as Marris and Rein point out, decentralisation,
particularly administrative decentralisation, can be more effective
in managing scarce resources. If part of the cause of the tension
between decentralisation and central control is a political
reflection of the economic crisis which the state faces, then any
reduction in expenditure through improved service delivery can
hope to reduce the tension. However, the separation between
administrative decentralisation to improve service delivery through
increased coordination and central control over more general aspects
of provision (i.e. how much? for whom? and in what way?) cannot
be maintained. Where is the dividing line between administrative
considerations and resource considerations? As I have argued
above the two are largely inseparable, but in being hard to separate,
this division relates to the third way in which attempts to overcome
this tension exacerbates it.
Participation may clash with central control. If participation
is not successfully managed from the centre, more than 'creative
conflict' may result. Participation within a structure of electoral
democratic government demands a consensual base upon which to
operate. Fundamental conflict over the distribution of resources
and control over their allocation may arise without such a consensual
base. For example, the conflicts generated both in the War on
Poverty and the CDPs between established channels of administration
and the programmes operations were created by different aims
and interests 1 Attempts to regain control by the center of the
locality in both countries exacerbated the conflicts over the
1 See Cockburn (1977: 123-127) and articles by Bennington and Kayo
in Lees and Smith (1975)
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interests involved.
The three similarities in the two countries that I have outlined
above; the rhetorical presentation of the policies and the rhetoric
employed, the shift in the concepts upon which the programmes were
based, and attempts to overcome the tension between the need for
greater central control and greater decentralisation of administrat¬
ion, have a nexus in the issue of legitimation. I shall explore
this subject more fully in the next chapter.
Chapter Six
Politics, administration and social science
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•When they (government agencies) use social science at
all, it will be on an ad-hoc, improvised, quick and dirty
basis. A key official needing to take a position, respond
to a crisis, or support a view that is under challenge,
will ask an assistant to 'get me some facts'. The assistant
will rummage about among persons who are reputed to be
expert, who are perceived to be politically sympathetic,
and who are available at the moment. The process may take
a few weeks, it may be done in a few hours. Social science
is used as ammunition, not as method, and the official's
opponents will also use similar ammunition. There will
be many shots fired, but few casualties except the truth.'
(Wilson, 1978: 92)
In his essay Politics as a Vocation, Max Weber provided the
classic statement of the traditionally conceived relationship
between the politician and the administrative expert;
'According to his proper vocation, the genuine official ....
will not engage in politics. Rather, he should engage
in impartial 'administration' Sine ira et studio,
'without scorn and bias', he shall administer his office.'
(Gerth and Mills, 1974: 95)
And in Science as a Vocation, Weber claimed that science would
assist the political actor achieve 'clarity'. Science can say
'If you take such and such a stand, then according to
scientific experience, you have to use such and such a
means in order to carry out your conviction practically.'
(Gerth and Mills, 1974: 151)
Politics in this traditional model concerns itself with ends,
administration and science with the means to these ends.
Habermas explores these relationships further and presents
three models of interaction between the politician and the expert.
His first model, the decisionistic model, is similar to that of
Weber's but he points to the problems of such a strict separation.
'(The politician) makes use of technical knowledge, but
the practice of self-assertion and domination requires in
addition that a person or group with specific interests
make decisions and carry them out. In the last analysis
political action cannot rationally justify its own
premises.' (Habermas, 1971: 63)
This model is based on a Weberian view of politicians making
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value choices with the aid of a technical approach to means.
That this is no longer acceptable as an analysis of the relation¬
ship between science, administration and politics is widely
agreed. Technical rationality, according to Habermas, has escaped
from the essentially subservient role that the traditional model
placed it in.
' politics now takes on a peculiarly negative character.
For it is oriented toward the elimination of dysfunctions
and the avoidance of risks that threaten the system: not,
in other words, toward the realization of practical goals
but toward the solution of "technical problems.' (Habermas,
1971: 102-103)
The association of politics with the solution of technical
problmes is at the basis of Habermas's technocratic model which
reverses the traditional relationship between science and politics.
'The latter (the politician) becomes the mere agent of a
scientific intelligensia, which, in concrete circumstances,
elaborates the objective implications and requirements of
available techniques and resources as well as of optimal
strategies and rules of control.' (Habermas, 1971: 63-64)
Habermas presents a third model which he calls 'pragmatistic'.
'In the pragmatistic model the strict separation between
the function of the expert and the politician is replaced
by a critical interaction. This interaction not only
strips the ideologically supported exercise of power of an-
unreliable basis of legitimation but makes it accessible
as a whole to scientifically informed discussion.'
(Habermas, 1971: 66-67)
These models can be summed up as the decisionistic model
providing legitimation for the exercise of power while the techno¬
cratic attempts to rationalise the exercise of power, but however
both are at the expense of democracy. The pragmatistic model is
the one which Habermas sees as the more rational-democratic form
of decision making. However, in my view this very much depends
upon the definition given to critical interaction and the relation¬
ship between the politican, the expert and existing social classes.
As it is Habermas's models are ideal types and, as such, can be
criticised on heuristic grounds. The world is not a model, but a
series of dynamic processes which do not remain constant. Models
attempt to distill social processes which, by their nature are
dynamic.
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I contend that the public presentation of action is the essential
missing connection in the examination of the relationship between
politics, administration and social science. The pragmatistic
model of decision making requires, for a rational and democratic
approach to decision making, an imput into the political sphere of
public demands.
'In the last analysis the process of translation between
science and politics is related to public opinion. This
relation is not external to it, as though it were a question
of taking prevailing constitutional norms into account.
Rather it follows immanently and necessarily from the
requirements of the confrontation of technical-knowledge
and capacity with tradition-bound self-understanding.'
"(Habermas^l 97'' s 74)
'While integrating technology into the hermeneutically
explicated self-understanding of a given situation, the
process of the scientization of politics could be realized
only if we had the guarantee that political will had obtained
the enlightenment it wanted and simultaneously that enlight¬
enment had permeated existing political will as much as it
could under given, desired, and controllable circumstances.
■v. This could be guaranteed only by the ideal conditions of
general communication extending to the entire public and
free from domination The depoliticization of the
mass of the population and the decline of the public realm
as a political institution are components of a system of
domination that tends to exclude practical questions from
public discussion.' (Habermas, 1977s 75)
Edelman (1977), in discussing the use of symbols in politics
provides evidence of how this depoliticization to which Habermas
refers occurs through the symbolic nature of political actions.
Using elections as an example, Edelman makes a preliminary important
observation that relates to the separation, but not exclusivity
of symbolic action and substance.
'It does not follow that election campaigns are unimportant
or serve no purpose. It is rather that the functions they
serve are different and more varied than the ones we convent¬
ionally assume and teach. They give people a chance to
express discontents and enthusiasms, to enjoy a sense of
involvement. This is participation in a ritual act, however;
only in a minor degree is it participation in policy
formation.' (Edelman, 19775 3)
Neither Habermas nor Edelman make the connection that can be
made between the role of symbols and the mode of domination, but
as Edelman says;
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'Political symbols bring out in concentrated form those
particular meanings and emotions which members of a group
create and reinforce in each other. There is nothing
about any symbol that requires that it stand for only
one thing The point is that every political instit¬
ution and act evokes and reinforces a particular response
in its audiences .... In democratic countries these institut¬
ions (elections etc.) reinforce beliefs in the reality of
citizen participation in government and in the rational
basis of governmental decisions, regardless of what is
said in the course of the proceedings on particular occ¬
asions. ' (Edelman, 1977: 11-12)
I argue that it is through the use of symbols in politics
that the connection between the decision making process (the
science-politics relationship) and the mass of the population is
achieved. The alienation of democratic rights through the ballot
box and the structure of bourgeois democracy reinforces the
power of the symbolic appearance of democracy over the reality
of class domination. Where political institutions and political
acts have this symbolic function, the mobilisation of mass partic¬
ipation and mass democratic action, combining the understanding of
class with the understanding of science to create a pragmatistic
model of decision making remains impossible. As it it the reinforce¬
ment of political symbols in their appearance as political acts
takes place to strengthen this separation and domination.
In this chapter I want to draw on the example of poverty programmes
to begin to analyse the relations between social science, admin¬
istration and politics in Britain and the United States in the
period under discussion. My aim is to go beyond the rather
general type of discussion, valuable though it is, that we have
inherited through Habermas and Marcuse from Weber. As the
advanced capitalist countries began to experience serious 'disturb¬
ances of the conditions of their stability' (Habermas, 1971: 109,
quoting Offe), just what were the relations of science, admin¬
istration and politics?
First, though, a clarificatory note. In Habermas's discussion,
whatever the appearance of concreteness, the terms 'science',
'politics' etc., do not refer to concrete institutions or actors.
They are in the Weberian sense, ideal types. Particular individ¬
uals (say Professor Halsey), or particular institutions (say the
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Home Office) cannot be unequivocably classified as instances
of one or other of these categories. By politician I shall
mean the elected politician, by administrator, the bureaucrat
within the state's administrative apparatus whether he or she
be a political appointee or not, and by social scientist, an expert
who is used in government either on a full-time basis or as a
temporary adviser, but claims to exercise judgement on the basis of
their expert knowledge, not a claim based on expertise in admin¬
istration or political calculation. The individual politician
may combine in her/his role, characteristics of 'science' and
'administration' as well as those of 'politics' (as may the
scientist or administrator) . This is no trivial point of termin¬
ology, for as shall emerge below, one vital rationale for the use
of social scientists in government is precisely that their role
can be much broader than 'science' per se might be taken to imply.
The social sciences come of age
The search for consensus was a prominent part of the political
strategy of Keynesianism. This consensus can be seen in the
'Butskellite' coalition in Britain and through the course of the
Johnson Administration. In the search for consensus, research
provided an important imput.
'The legislation enacted during the 1964-68 period was
largely congruent with this popular and scholarly consensus.
It may have been this congruence that led President Kennedy
to make the remark, now so quaintly dated, that important
problems before the nation were technically complex but
did not involve ideology. By the end of the early 1970s
popular uncertainty matched scholarly disagreement about
how to deal with poverty and unemployment, how to improve
education and build up workers' skills, and how to restrain
inflation.' (Aaron, 1978: 146)
Since Roosevelt's Brains Trust in the 1930s, the use of social
science in the United States' government had been increasing,
not only with social scientist advisors to government, but also
with social science trained bureaucrats within the administration.
1 Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, the present Democratic Senator for New
York State is a very good example of this. He has been an administ¬
rator under both Kennedy and Nixon, a Harvard professor and present¬
ly an elected politician.
240
However, the main use of social science within government, through¬
out the earlier period and then during the war, had been the
use of economic advisers. In the post war period, behavioural
scientists, particularly psychologists were used to develop
strategies to deal with the broad range of 'psychological' conflicts
generated by the war and its aftermath. What distinguishes the
social science consensus developed during the sixties was the
degree to which social sciences played a role in shaping policies
whose aims were not merely economic but also concerned with the
social aspects of the 'good society' of the liberal democratic
consensus.
This reflected the shift towards social programmes as the economic
regulation of capitalism seemed to be being successfully achieved.
The continued post-war growth had not brought the degree of
'filtering down' which had been expected, and as the economic
future looked increasingly optimistic, problems created by rising
expectations, coupled with the failure of economic policies to
deliver social goods became defined in social or psychological
terms. The definition of problems in social or psychological
terms had implications for the policy approaches which were
seen to be appropriate.
The growth in the use of what can be described as generalist
social science in policy making began in the sixties. Generalist
social science had two features. Firstly, the blurring of disciplines
(e.g. the social psychologist cum sociologist cum planner) was
pronounced and secondly, the generalist social scientist was used
to approach a problem in which he or she was seen as an expert
e.g. urban poverty, rather than being asked to bring an approach
in which he or she was an expert (e.g. sociological analysis) to
a particular problem. From now on I shall use the terms social
scientist and social science to refer to this generalist social
science.
A first empirical blurring of the ideal-typical divide between
social science and politics occurs when we remember that the social
sciences, as bodies of trained personnel and established organisations,
are themselves in large part the creation of the state.
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Social scientists are not merely 'used' by the state, just
as the state is not merely used by social scientists to increase
funding for the disinterested pursuit of study within their own
discipline. There is a mutual relationship which is part derived
from the power of the state to generate areas of interest.
' trends suggest that government agencies may be
increasingly involved in determining the shape of not only
the American economy, class structure and everyday life,
but the fundamental character of social research as well.'
(Useem, 1976)
When the CDPs were being launched, there was a shortage of
qualified research workers to take part in the CDP research teams.
In a situation of supply and demand (while price is not necessarily
involved) the openings available at the end of a university
education must have some influence on the numbers likely to become
involved in such a course. The shortage of research workers
in 1969 reflected the high demand for such skills and was in turn
reflected by the large numbers of students entering the social
sciences.
The expansion of the social sciences in the 1960s in Britain
was paralleled by a smaller increase in the applied sciences.
University courses moved away from the more traditional academic
pursuits towards more 'relevant' courses. This movement was even
more pronounced in the United States with the introduction in
universities of a greater emphasis on more vocational courses at
the expense of the traditional pursuit of 'pure' knowledge.
Percentage Increase in Students between 1961/62 and 1966-/67
in British Universities
Undergraduate Postgraduate
Social Studies 181*2 149*0
Arts 26*5 42*4
Applied Sciences 120*2 94*0
Overall Increase 62*3 65*1
(University Grants Committee, 1968: 19)
The increase in social studies is striking, even granted the
small base in 1961/62. An explanation of this rise as being
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created by the differences in the youth of 1961 and 1967 is unsatis¬
factory. For instance, if it was merely that the youth of 196?
were more socially aware than the youth of 1961, why should a
similar large increase have occured in the applied sciences?
More fundamentally, how could these changes in perception by the
youth be explained? I suggest that this sort of increase was
primarily the result of the increased rational technocratic mode
of domination which affected both perception and political 'realities'.
The increase in applied science was part of the same growth
in technocratic approaches to problem solving. Another explanation
which sees the increase in social sciences as a result of increasing
government funding for social science research, leading to an
increased student intake into the social sciences, still leaves
open the question of why government funding increased. This would
be a circular argument if this was explained as being a consequence
of the increase in results which proved valuable to the state
from social science research.
The increase that occured in Britain in the 1960s was also
to be found in America during this period.
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This growth in behavioural and social sciences in the United
States was accompanied by a large increase in federally funded
research. In 195^» the federal outlay for social research was
6 million dollars annually, by 197*1 > the figure was 421 million
dollars, an annual average growth rate of 23% (Useem, 1976). By
the mid-sixties in the United States social science research on
domestic programmes began to dwarf social science research in the
defence field, so that by 1967 100 million dollars was being spent
on social science research in the Office of Education, 35 million
dollars in the Office of Economic Opportunity and 28 million dollars
in the Defense Department (Lyons, 1969).
This growth in state financed social science research in the
United States was part of an attempt to use social science to
solve social problems. While the state looked to social science
to emulate the advances of natural science, the social scientists
looked to the natural sciences as well.
'The successes of the scientists have led to efforts by many
social scientists and some humanists to emulate their
technical - and political - methods.' (Brookings, 1962: 95)
In the American situation, the role of the universities and res¬
earch institutes as part of the system of capital accumulation and
their relationship to the state are much clearer to see than in
Britain. While in Britain the state is responsible for most of
the financing of higher education, the finance is in the form of
basic support with greater flexibility within this. Bodies such
as the University Grants Committee and the Social Science Research
Council have some limited independence from control by the state.
They have an independence in the day to day direction of university
development, within a context controlled by the state. In America,
on the other hand, higher education is a major sector for investment
by private capital and is an 'industry' in its own right. The
extent of higher education and the number of institutions make
for a profitable source of capital investment. The American
university system has generated a set of peripheral industries
(like publishing academic textbooks) to a much greater extent than
in Britain. The state's control over research in the United States
.is maintained by the large research contracts awarded by federal
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bodies for specific research.
Yet the observation that the expansion of the social sciences
was to a large extent state-initiated obviously begs the question
why that expansion should have been seen as desirable. And that
returns us directly to the question of the nature of the inter¬
relation of science, politics and administration.
The promise of social science
The promise of social science was on several levels. Firstly,
social science research had an information function.
Although basic statistical data of the type that was gathered
together for the allocation of EPA funds was fairly haphazard, this
information function of research became more extensive in such
examples as the Inner Area Studies where a great deal of empirical
material was collected by the various studies. In the United
States, the reporting procedures built into the federal government
programmes also provide for this intelligence role. What was the
information's purpose? Could it be used? Parallels can be
discerned in the collection of data by other federal agencies
and government departments which allowed the state, given the
necessary resources, to analyse this information and assess the
changing trends reflected. Economic indicators have been the
forerunners.of the present collection of social indicators in both
countries. How far does this collection of information act in a
meaningful way upon government policy? The main use would seem
to be in the analysis of developing trends and to act as an early
warning system for government of potential problems which may arise.
At the same time it allowed government to assess policies and
indicate the direction in which they might develop. This was
in part a technocratic function.
If however this information gathering function had been the
only promise of social science it would hardly have been exciting.
Caplan et al. (1975) argue that policy makers are more interested
in the use and production of 'soft' knowledge which they define as
non-research based, qualitative and couched in lay language as
opposed to 'hard' knowledge which they define as being research
based, quantative and couched in scientific language. They go
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on to make some points which relate to how and why certain sorts
of knowledge sire used.
'Much of the importance of such an idea for the policy
maker lies in its ultimate integration into his entire
perspective on a problem the use of soft knowledge
suggests that when decision makers contribute to the formation
of policy, they can see themselves moving from scientifically
supported positions without becoming embroiled in the
most esoteric deliberations required to substantiate the
true scientific merit of such positions.' (Caplan et al,
1975: 18)
This 'soft' knowledge of Caplan was what Johnson found an
appealing potential role that social science could perform. It
is worth quoting at some length a speech by President Johnson
on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Brookings
Institution.
'There is hardly an aspect of the Great Society's program
that has not been moulded, or remoulded, or in some way
influenced by the community of scholars and thinkers...
.... there is a third aspect of intellectual power that
our country urgently needs tonight, and in my judgement
it is being supplied sparingly This is the power
to evaluate. It is the power to find the marrow of the
problem, the power to define it as acutely as it can be
defined. It is the power to say about public policies
or private choices 'This works. This does not. This costs
more than we can afford, or this costs more than it is worth.
This is worth more than it costs. This will probably
give us an acceptable result. But this will complicate
the problem and make it impossible for us to solve.''
' I can for instance, imagine no more exciting break-through
in human knowledge than one that still eludes us: under¬
standing the real dynamics of urban life. This is such
a mixture of physical, financial, and psychological questions
as to confound the best minds in this Nation. Overcrowded
streets and housing, unemployment, inadequate schools,
transportation systems that compound problems instead of
relieving them, air and water pollution, blight and ugliness,
rising crime and delinquency, tax structures that impose
the heaviest burdens on the governments that are least
able to bear those burdens, racial riots and tensions,
and so on down a list that is already too familiar to all
of you What do we want our cities to be and then,
how can we achieve what we want?' (Johnson, 1966b)
This speech reflects both the extraordinary optimism in the
ability of 'science' to solve social problems at the time and the
difference between the place of social science in the American
and British systems which I shall go on to discuss. In this speech
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Johnson was making an appeal to social scientists to produce
solutions to problems of political conflict, to make the value
choices that are the traditional responsibility of the politician.
The questions of 'costs' and 'values' which he placed within
the remit of social science are clearly difficult to resolve.
However, in part, his optimism could perhaps be attributed to the
successful prosecution of economic policy at the time. The
introduction of PPBS and cost-benefit analysis into the federal
government were precursors of an approach, which sought, not
merely, to legitimise the resolution of conflict with technocratic
means, but to replace and resolve conflict with technocratic
means. That social science, and particularly economics, is not
able to overcome the political conflict generated over values is
not surprising in retrospect, but the approach taken by Johnson
implied that such an attempt might succeed.
The apocalyptic tone of Johnson's pronouncement severely dates
in time and place. But the basic message, that social science
can inform policy making, can help selection of the best policy
is commonplace. This view has two versions - the traditional,
handmaiden of politics version and the technocratic version.
The traditional version is contained in the emphasis on evaluation
research. Evaluation research grew dramatically in both countries
in the sixties and the programmes and projects in both countries
contained evaluative aspects.
It has not been sufficient for social scientists to say 'this
may work - try it', but it has become common for social scientists
to be involved in the process of evaluating proposals which,
to varying extents, reflect their ideas. Whereas in Britain, the
emphasis was on the experimental nature of the projects, this
was not the case in America.. Although the Model Cities Program
began as a demonstration programme and for the reasons I have
indicated above, expanded, it nevertheless had an experimental
side to it. Evaluation and research was an important part of
the 0E0 and various planning consultants investigated the ways
in which the Model Cities Program was being developed. In Britain
all the initiatives that I am concerned with had some action-
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research component from which government was supposed to learn.
This evaluative aspect was based upon the 'problem solving'
orientation which Johnson extolled.
The more technocratic version was not confined to bona-fide
social scientists but emphasised the role of the expert in policy
making. Even where the political element might have been excluded
from the remit of the expert, the role of expert adviser could
not be effectively separated from that of politician surrogate.
'Despite the President's protestations that the task force
should leave the politics to him, these were not unsophist¬
icated people and they were right to exercise their discr¬
etion insofar as their intimate awareness of the interests
in the housing and city program enabled them to blend the
terms of their own proposal in order to achieve workable
accomodation.' (Haar, 1975• 50)
Johnson increased the role of Presidential task forces to give
him advice on potential programmes. Many of these task forces
were encouraged to work in confidence to avoid generating premature
political conflict over their proposals. The way in which they
were set up supports a view of the dispassionate expert as someone
who generates ideal programmes. However, those usually appointed
to such task forces were of course not dispassionate experts but
frequently people who were involved in a range of ways in the field
which was being considered, and included businessmen, labour
leaders and others whose interest in the field was more than
academic. This use of experts who were neither administrators,
nor social scientists in America is particularly interesting.
Their role could be seen as generating a consensus for the proposals
on the basis of the constituencies that they represented. However,
this would more obviously have been the case if the task force's
work and proposals had not been conducted in relative confidentiality
as was the case. I suggest that these task forces can, more accur¬
ately, be compared with the Departmental Committees and Royal
Commissions in Britain, which contain a similar sort of mix between
the directly involved and the outside expert. What the construction
of groups such as this does achieve is that the group can often
develop a common political paradigm within which they operate.
Therefore their role can be seen as that of the politician surrogate
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- they may not bring identical political views to focus on a
problem, nor may their collective political view be identical
with that of the politicians who instituted their work. What
they generally do is approach the political problem within the
same general political paradigm and in this way act as agents of
the dominant consensus, and achieve this, without generating the
conflicts inherent in a bureaucratic or political initiative.
'On the whole, the report expressed the kind of approach
to which social scientists in the 1960s were likely to
turn when presented with the problems of drafting new
urban programs where previous approaches had seriously
faltered but not to the point of their total disavowal.
There were few of the defense mechanisms that would have
come from an agency sending its ideas through channels,
nor any of the institutional restraints unavoidably present
when departments are asked to generate legislative proposals.
The task force had not presented the type of strategy,
surely, that would have emerged, in the ordinary way of
doing business, from a congressman's staff or from bureau¬
crats responsible for the administration of existing programs.'
(Haar, 1975: 54)
Investigation by experts with a social scientific approach
had advantages, not only for the development of specific programmes.
'Better' programmes could be constructed through the more detached
approach of the appointees to task forces. At the same time,
the approach reinforced some of the basic political directions
of the administration. But to see the role of task forces as
primarily that of providing 'better' programmes because of their
relative independence from other parts of the state apparatus,
begs a number of questions especially when looked at from a
comparative perspective.
I have already indicated that there are bodies in Britain,
which, in terms of their constitution and membership are similar
to Presidential task forces - the difference that stands out is
that in America, the task forces particularly those which dealt
with the Model Cities Program and the War on Poverty, were concerned
with developments which were central components of the President's
political and domestic strategy. No such concern is to be found
within the British system. In the American task forces, pragmatism
and political calculation were very much appreciated. To quote
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Moynihan, the Shriver Task Force for the War on Poverty wanted
a programme that would;
'pass Congress, help win the Presidential election and
eliminate poverty, perhaps in that order.' (Moynihan, 1966)
Both the handmaiden of politics and the technocratic politican
surrogate versions of the promise of social science share assumptions
concerning the pragmatic nature of social science. This view
sees both social science 'facts' and political 'realities' meeting
in the policy making process on an equal basis. Policy makers
can adjust ana redefine these 'facts' in a pragmatic fashion,
giving rise to policy in a way which takes account of both.
This pragmatic social science I shall call 'rationality-in-practise'.
One of the major problems of an explanation which relies on
this 'rationality-in-practise' as an account of the social science-
politics relationship is that it fails to account for the subserv¬
ience of social science to political forces. Rationality-in-
practise cannot uncover this subservience since it is based on
a view of social science as giving policy advice on the basis
of 'realistic' assessment and a sense of rational 'progress'.
Rationality-in-practise?
Looking at the material provided relating to the programmes and
projects in the two countries can lead to a more critical assessment
of this notion of social science in policy making as rationality-
in-practise. The basic assumption is that social science and
politics meet as equals and through pragmatic adjustment move
forward to a compromise.
The concrete way in which this occurs is in the rationalisation
of decision making. Decisions are couched in terms of rationality
not on the basis of comparative power. However, power, democracy
and rationality are a strange mixture. .If democracy allows
preferences and values to dictate policy choices, then these
choices do not have to be rational. Preferences and values are
not always arrived at in a rational manner. Democracy, by its
nature, does not have to be rational. In the same sense, power
does not have to be used rationally to be power. That policy
processes are neither democratic nor rational would be a fundamental
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part of my view. However, the ideas of democracy and rationality
are important symbols which act as veils to the exercise of power.
Democracy as well as being irrational, includes conflict. Viewing
capitalist democracy as a process of class conflict in a class
society removes the veil over the exercise of power, in the
interests of a dominant class.
Consider a particular example of this process. There was a
conflict among academics over educational disadvantage and the
ways in which this could be confronted. Bernstein (1970) argued
against a positive discrimination strategy in education, arguing
that education could not compensate for what were problems arising
through the way that society was organised. Halsey, in setting
up a compensatory education programme paid attention to Bernstein's
objections;
'.... there are many who would share Professor Bernstein's
distaste for the notion of compensation on the grounds that
it is difficult 'to talk about offering compensatory educ¬
ation to children who in the first place nave not as yet
been offered an adequate educational environment ' as well
as the argument that the phrase tends to direct attention
away from the internal organisation and the educational
context of the school and focus attention on the short¬
comings of families ' (Halsey, 1972: 21 )
But in paying attention to Bernstein's criticisms, Halsey
to.ok a pragmatic approach, based not on a social science assess¬
ment, but on political pragmatism. The argument, while couched
in a form of social science assessment, is resolved on the basis
of political realities. Education cannot change the world, but
the DES wasn't providing funds to change the world, and education
could change something. The possibility of change doesn't arise
from the nature of education, but from the definition of education
in political terms that are given. Decisions appear to be decided
upon the basis of rational assessments. The political possibilities
are inextricably linked and shape the definition of the problem.
Political realities determine the nature of the reality which
the social scientist is asked to investigate. Pragmatic consider¬
ations construct the form of investigation. Empiricism emphasises
the information role of social science. Social science presents
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a more complete picture of a politically determined subject.
Social science, above all, remains 'relevant'.
Social scientists in both countries have been used more as
politican or administrator surrogates than for their particular
ability to give academic answers to the problems which arose.
But what distinction can be made between the social science task
and that of either administrator or politician? If there is no
distinction, then this 'relevant' pragmatic social science is to
be expected. I suggest that it is a mistake to see social science
and politics as separate entities operating in different worlds,
rather the two have been inextricably linked. But the essential
linking has occured within an assertion of their separation. A
distinction is made in institutional terms between social science
and politics. The appeals that were made by, for example,
Johnson, implied a higher order of 'truth' in the deliberations
of social scientists. Yet these deliberations take place within
a paradigm which social scientists share with politicians about
the nature of society and long term goals. The use of outside
advisers allowed a progressive liberal government, such as the
Labour Government 1964-70, to adapt the pace of reform. The
sharing of a political paradigm is an important feature of the use
of social scientists. From a survey of 204 persons at upper
levels of decision making in the executive branch of the federal
government, Caplan et al conclude;
'Our data appear to show that the considerations of whether
or not a policy decision is politically feasible overrides
any consideration of the relevant implications of social
science information.' (Caplan et al, 1975s 35)
They go on to say that the knowledge that is used either
supports contemporary political positions or appears to have an
insignificant political implication.
When knowledge has contrary political implications, the result
is predictable. The CDP pamphlet which considered the relationship
between housing finance and the conditions of housing (Community
Development Projects, 1976) was described by the Conservative housing
spokesperson as a 'slick Marxist tract'. Such a dismissal of a
study of the nature of housing finance in terms of a differing
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political perspective allowed the contents of their analysis
to be confronted, not on the basis of knowledge, but in terms
of how it related to political pragmatism and interests. Likewise
the assimilation of the CDP Information and Intelligence Unit's
research into such areas as industrial decline into the policy
making process could not take place within the approach that the
CDPs brought to their analysis of industrial decline, but had
to be changed to adapt to political forces. Therefore, rather
than engaging in a debate about how accurate such analyses are,
how much they expand our understanding of the basic nature of
the processes that are occuring, the CDPs' research was largely
ignored, '/here it was used, it was used in a manner consistent
with the dictates of political pragmatism. Thus, the Inner
City White Paper (Environment, 1977d), while concentrating upon
the importance of industrial decline, ignored the implications
of the explanation for industrial decline put forward by CLP.
All these separate examples are intended to indicate how the
notion of the relationship between politics and social science
as being one which rests upon an interchange of perspectives
is wrong, '/hat does occur is that the political imperatives shape
the nature of social science's role. However, it is not only
political imperatives in a narrow sense, it is also administrative
and institutional forces which play a part.
To conclude this discussion I shall show what the role of
social science was in a particular example of these policies.
Again, the example that I use derives from the American experience
because the necessary information is more accessible to examine
American developments in more detail. I would suggest, while there
is a basic difference arising from the different structures of
the state apparatus, the experience in Britain would also be similar.
Indeed looking at the only three examples for which evidence can
be gathered; the EPAs, CDPs and the Inner Area Studies, the same
administrative, institutional and political adaptation of ideas
occurea, with the emphasis being upon the role of the expert as
expert in pragmatic adaptation of ideas to an imposed political
reality rather than the approach which experimental social engineering
253
advocated.
Using the example of the founding of the Community Action
Program of the War on Poverty, to challenge the view of social
science themes and ideas as an equal force, let alone a determining
force in social policy developments, I can expand upon how policy
objectives relate to social science themes. I have already discussed
the role of electoral politics and economic problmes on these
developments.
The accepted 'idealistic1 view of the role of social science
and intellectuals upon policy was clearly stated by Moynihan.
'The early 1960s were marked by a precipitous and unprec¬
edented rise to influence of university intellectuals in
the councils of government most notably that of the nation¬
al government. They not only adorned the Washington scene,
but to an astonishing degree they shaped it. The late
1960s was marked by an equally precipitous decline in the
position of these professors.' (Moynihan, 1970: xxxi)
It is a common view of the Great Society that the Johnson
Administration combined the intellectual drive identified with
Kennedy and the political will and capability of Johnson to
produce social legislation unparalleled since the New Deal.
Such a view of policy development is voluntaristic and idealistic.
The Administration is portrayed as independent from the political
conditions within which it operates. On the other hand, a determin¬
istic view would be equally suspect. It cannot be argued that
social scientists and intellectuals in Washington had no opport¬
unity to use their perceptions of problems to influence policy.
The imperatives for action cannot be retrospectively identified as
being located entirely within the economic and political structures.
Donovan reported that when Johnson decided to initiate the
War on Poverty;
'it was a team of Eastern liberal intellectual-politicians
under the leadership of a member of the Kennedy family
establishment (Shriver) which was responsible for formulat¬
ing it.' (Donovan, 1967; 29)
Various accounts of the work of the Shriver Task Force exist
(Levine, 1970; Levitan, 1969; Blumenthal, 1967; Moynihan, 1970;
Yarmolinsky, 1969)• This Task Force is of interest as a partisan
intellectual gathering. The Task Force was both concerned with
254
the administrative planning for the War on Poverty and the content
of such a war within the framework of the electoral politics of
the Administration. Although Johnson set up the Task Force at
the end of January to develop a strategy for the war, the basic
issues and methods had been determined already. Levitan (1969)
reported that the ad hoc Task Force of the Bureau of the Budget and
the Council of Economic Advisers that had been set up previously
under the Kennedy Administration had largely written the Economic
Opportunity Act by January 6th 1964 and that the ad hoc Task
Force had been persuaded by the President's Committee on Juvenile
Delinquency and Youth Crime (PCJBYC) to include the community
action concept. Further support can be found for this in a
memo from the Executive Office of the President to the main
departmental heads on January 21st 1964 (White, 1964), which
makes clear that much of the poverty programme had already been
decided upon and included a Community Action Program as a key
element. Thus, Johnson in his Annual Message to Congress on the
State of the Union (Johnson, 1964a) in early January had set the
stage for the community action theme. Although the specific
policies that Johnson recommended did not include the establishment
of a community action programme, if is clear that the community
action concept is contained within his approach. The Shriver
Task Force, in drawing up the Economic Opportunity Act consulted,
and according to Donovan (1967) was strongly influenced by, Paul
Ylvisaker (who was a Ford Foundation executive involved in dev¬
eloping their grey areas program), participants in projects
in New Haven and the staff of the PCJDYC. While Donovan argues
that community action and participation of the poor came from the
PCJDYC, Moynihan (1966) adds to the picture by stating that the
community action concept was firmly embedded in the Shriver Task
Force from the beginning. Walter Heller of the Council of Economic
Advisers had already argued for community action as part of the
War on Poverty in a memo of December 20th 1963 (Heller, 1963f)•
The community action concept of the CEA concentrated though on
the coordination and evaluation of existing federal, state and
local programmes (in a similar way to the initial conception of
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CUP in Britain). The Shriver Task Force, on the other hand,
according to Moynihan, was;
'pragmatic, experimental, and somewhat intellectual
in the sense of an awareness of various currents of thought.'
(Moynihan, 1966)
This shows how much the administrative and political imperatives
dictated the Task Force's deliberations, rather than the construction
of an ideal programme.
The intellectuals of Washington were shaping policy in a different
way from that which could be supposed. As Levitan points out;
'The Administration portrayed the bill as a thoughtfully
conceived, comprehensive and integrated approach to com¬
bating poverty, even though it was really a series of
compromises among various executive departments.' (Levitan,
1969: 39)
The example of the Shriver Task Force is clear - knowledge of
the organisational structure of government and political loyalty
were important. Scientifically precise or rigorous concentration
on the nature of poverty, its causes and its possible cures were
secondary.
The Kennedy Administration's ad hoc CEA-BOB Task Force had
already considered the development of a small number of experimental
demonstration projects after the manner of the PCJBYC projects.
Yet despite an awareness that such an approach was a necessary
part of any exploration that might lead to the elimination of
poverty, the programme expanded into a catch-all affair, embodying
many different conceptions fused together. At the most basic
level, Wofford (1969) points out that no thought was given to
the distinction between poverty as lack of money and poverty as
a way of life. Any consciously innovative approach based on an
understanding would have produced a different programme altogether.
The members of the Shriver Task Force must have been aware of the
contradiction themselves.
As Sundquist points out;
'The bill was thus a composite of new ideas like community
action and long discussed ideas like Youth Conservation
Corps. It had something for children, something for youth,
something for the adult poor and something for the rural
poor. It appealed to altruism, with its bold objective
of wiping out poverty and to conservatism by emphasising
256
that this would be accomplished not through handouts
but through opening opportunity for people to escape
poverty through their own efforts.' (Sundquist, 1969:
77)
The point should be clear. Professionals and social scientists
developed the programme on the basis of their claim to expert
knowledge. Shriver reported to the Committee Hearings in Congress
that he had consulted 137 outside experts and he provided the
Committee with their names. The Task Force had not used 'expert'
knowledge, but their own knowledge of the administrative and
political constraints within which the Administration operated.
Social science justified the programme. Though the ideas
themselves may have had validity and have been worth attempts
to implement them, such an approach was secondary to the political
impetus which gave rise to the programme. As Piven argues;
'.... social scientists and other professionals
provided the theoretical justification for the Great
Society. Each new measure was presented as a politically
neutral 'scientific cure' for a disturbing social malady,
thus obscuring the fact that the federal government was
trying to give something to blacks Finally the
professionals lent an aura of scientific authority to
what otherwise might have been perceived as mere polit¬
ical rhetoric.' (Piven, 1974a: 280)
Piven's assessment of the role of professionals and social
scientists provides one answer to the question of what role social
science plays in the policy making process if it is not a free
exchange of pragmatic rationality. She argues that social scientists
provide legitimation for policy.
External legitimation of policies
One way in which social science could be of importance in
policy making is as the legitimation of policy decisions. 'We
are going to do X because economics/sociology/political science
shows it to be the best thing to do'. This is however in a crude
form. Legitimacy is a much more subtle process.
The increased use of social scientists coincided with a faith
in economics to deal with some of the problems of the economy.
What is of interest is the technocratic view of problem solving
which came to dominate policy making. This technocratic rational¬
ism was a reflection of the need to legitimate political options.
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Rein and Schon (1977) suggest;
'Policy makers use research as an instrument to legitimate
action in the perpetual striving for consensus of belief
and for organisation of the structure of government action,
policy may influence the research agenda more than research
influences the direction of policy.' (Rein and Schon, 1977s
255-236)
However, this itself raises further questions about the role of
legitimacy and technocratic rationalism. Social science has not
always provided legitimacy. Previously other sources of legitimacy
were found. Why then should this technocratic rationalism-have
prevailed in the 1960s? .Why was consensus so important? Firstly,
expectations, changed through increasing economic growth, raised
questions about the nature of the economic, social and political
order. Secondly, whereas capitalism had successfully imposed the
ideology of the market, as a law outside human control, this had
not occured with regard to the political and social. As traditional
forms of domination began to break down, e.g. the church, the
family, other forms of domination replaced them. The breakdown
of this domination was accompanied by an interference by the
state in the social and political arena to rearrange disintegrating
relations. However, in this necessary interference, the apparent
objective nature of social relationships was called into question
(Habermas, 1976: 72). The traditional forms of domination no longer
sufficed to act as a break to demands for change. The legitimation
provided by a technocratic rationality supplemented traditional
forms. This new form of domination became increasingly important
over this period, and the use of social science to achieve consensus
increased. Within the social sciences particular approaches came
to be more appropriate than others at particular times. By
appropriate, I mean they coincided more accurately with the
changing perceived reality and the particular political forces
which achieved prominence and exercised power. In the sixties
and into the seventies, both in Britain and America, the social
science focus moved, as I indicate in the previous chapter, in
the field of urban poverty, from an emphasis on a social psychol¬
ogical and pathological model of poverty, to a concern with the
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coordination and management of government services, to a focus
on planning and the process of decision making, to a concern
more recently with the economic settings of poor areas and the
relationship between their economic development and the development
of the national economy.' These different models were all, to
different degrees available for use as explanations and as bases
for action from the early sixties. However, they tended to gain
prominence, one after another, in what I argue is close coincidence
with the changing reality .of state expenditure, the economy and
the political rewards to be distributed by successive governments
or administrations.
I have already discussed the shift from service provision to
service management. This shift was accompanied by a shift in the
language of legitimation. I shall use the shift in the United States
to illustrate this.
How different policies and understandings are justified by a
claim to rationality can be seen by comparing the public statements
of Presidents Johnson and Nixon at the beginning of their terms
of office. They display different logics but similar claims to
rationality for policies that were intended to deal with the mani¬
festations of urban poverty.
For Johnson, speaking at the beginning of his 'Great Society',
the emphasis in the War on Poverty was upon the delivery of services
to the poor.
'Our chief weapons in a more precipitated attack (on poverty)
will be better schools, and better health, and better homes,
and better training, and better job opportunities to help
more Americans, especially young Americans, escape from
squalor and misery and unemployment rolls where other
citizens help to care for them.
Very often a lack of jobs and money is not the cause of
poverty, but the symptom. The cause may lie deeper in
our failure to give our fellow citizens a fair chance
to develop their own capabilities, in a lack of education
and training, in a lack of medical care and housing, in a
lack of decent communities in which to live and bring up
children.' (Johnson, 1964a,)
Poverty was characterised as being a problem of an individual's
opportunity to develop. Confronting this problem demanded an
increased delivery of services.
1 Since I cover the periods upto 1974 in the United States and 1977
in Britain, this more recent shift is more evident in the British
material than in that covering the United States.
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'I have called, upon all the departments and agency heads
and their personnel to dedicate themselves to this great
task, and to exert their maximum energies and resources
to assist our fellow citizens who are ill-clad, ill-fed,
ill-housed or to whom the door of self-improvement and
opportunity is closed.' (Johnson, 1964d)
Nixon speaking five years after Johnson launched his Great
Society emphasised instead the structure of government.
•We face an urban crisis, a social crisis - and at the same
time a crisis of confidence in the capacity of government
to do its job.' (Nixon, 1969c)
He argued that government was the problem and, through increased
effectiveness would become more capable of reaching its uncontended
goals.
'By rationalizing, coordinating and decentralizing the
systems through which government provides important social
and economic services, we can begin at last to realize the
hopes and dreams of those who created them.
Business learned long ago that decentralization was a
means to better performance. It's time that government
learned the same lesson.* (Nixon, 1969b)
Whereas Johnson focused upon the delivery of new services to
meet needs, Nixon focused upon the management of services.
'One of the principal aims of the Administration's
continuing study of the antipoverty effort will be
to improve its management effectiveness.' (Nixon, 1969a)
These statements do not merely reflect different political
approaches. Political options within government do not result
from the differing goals of different political parties within the
framework of pluralistic bargaining over value choices, and the
development of analyses supporting such options does not result
from the neutral assessment of different means or courses of
action, rather political options result from the changing political
and economic context which faces the state.
President Johnson throughout his Administration emphasised
the importance of building a consensus for his policies based
upon a realistic assessment of objectives, with the implicit
view that the choice of means to achieve these objectives was
a technical rather than a political decision. After declaring
war on poverty, he defended the basic rationality of such a
war before numerous groups ranging from businessmen to foreign
260
correspondents. Consensus not only strengthened the Administration
as a Democratic Administration, but also the state itself. Such
a consensus was fairly successfully maintained in the early stages
of the Johnson Administration. Gradually, though, increased conflict
over Vietnam illustrated the connection, in another area, between
the legitimation of the Administration's domestic policies and the
legitimation of the state.
Johnson's speeches of the time, even linked the legitimacy of
the objective (the elimination of poverty) to the legitimacy
of the state and its instruments. They also reflected the breadth
of the consensus that Johnson was attempting to construct.
On 27th April 19^4> he spoke to members of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and put the rationale for the War on Poverty in these
terms;
'If a peaceful revolution to get rid of these things -
illiteracy and these ancient enemies of mankind that stalk
the earth where two thirds of the masses are young and
clamouring and are parading and are protesting and are
demonstrating now for something to eat and wear and learn
and for health - if a peaceful change of these conditions
is impossible, violent changes are inevitable ......'
(Johnson, 1964f)
Johnson began by basing his case on a moral obligation to
defeat 'the enemies of mankind' and then appealed to direct
self interest and the fear of revolution. He elaborated by
commenting upon the foundations of capitalist democracies and their
stability.
'In this political democracy, what you have and what you
own and what you hope to acquire are not secure when there
are men that are idle in their homes and there are young
people that are adrift in the streets, and when there are
thousands that are out of school and millions that are
out of work and the aged are lying embittered in their
beds.' (Johnson, 1964f)
He portrayed the War on Poverty as being in the interests
of the businessmen to whom he was speaking if they wished to
'acquire securely'. Johnson emphasised his sympathy for the
businessman's position that afternoon. In a speech to the Inter¬
national Labour Press Association, the War on Poverty was again
presented as morally justified and reasonable as well as being
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clearly politically necessary for continued accumulation by
capital. In answer to a question from a member of the ILPA,
he pointed out that without peaceful and orderly changes, violent
changes were inevitable.
'People are just not going to stand and see their children
starve and be driven out of schools and be eaten up with
disease in the twentieth century and they are going to
revolt. These fellows that own these 100,000 acre ranches
better understand it and the Chamber of Commerce better
understand it. I understand it and I have a little nest
egg that I want to protect.' (Johnson, 1964g)
For wider audiences he sought a consensus through a softer
appeal to the ideological justification of U.S. capitalism -
justice, freedom and the quality of the American way of life.
In his Annual Message to Congress; the Economic Report of the
President, he argued;
'American prosperity is widely shared. But too many are
still precluded from its benefits by discrimination; by
handicaps of illness, disability, old age or family circum¬
stances; by unemployment or low productivity; by lack of
mobility or bargaining power; by failure to receive the
education and training from which they could benefit.'
(Johnson, 1965a)
Johnson's attempt to create a consensus for the War on Poverty
based upon the acceptability of its goals and the rationality
of its means can be seen in a speech Johnson made at Baylor
University largely justifying United States intervention in
the affairs of the Dominican Republic under the guise of counter
attacking communist 'subversion'. In the speech he reflected
on the quality of the American system of government.
'At home, with the strong cooperation of our Congress, we
are waging war on poverty; we are opening new paths of
learning for all our children; we are creating new jobs
for our workers; we are providing health care for our older
citizens; we are eliminating injustice and inequality; we
are bringing new economic life to whole regions.'
(Johnson, 1965d)
These excerpts illustrate both Johnson's arguments for his
policies and also his emphasis upon what he saw as essentially
individualised problems unemployment, ill-health, education,
old age etc..
I have already commented upon how this view of the nature and
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causes of poverty was consonant with the prevailing political
and economic forces confronting the Administration at the time.
The shift towards more concern with government structure occured
at the end of the Johnson era and was continued into Nixon's.
The same forces were operating upon the Nixon Administration as
operated on Johnson's. The movement away from the institution of
new services for the poor, the sick, the elderly etc. towards
the rationalisation and coordination of services and resources
began during the Johnson Administration. The increased institution
of PPBS and other management techniques in the Administration
could be correlated with the increase in expenditure on the War
on Vietnam, with its competing demands on public expenditure.
Vice President Hubert Humphrey in a speech in August 19&7 emphasised
the organisational facets of the problems of the cities while he
connected progress in the cities with imperialist expansion abroad.
•If we presume to stand in this world as the friend and
helper of new nations, we must demonstrate our capacity
and willingness to help our own people.' (Humphrey, 1967)
He called the Model Cities Program, a Marshall Plan for urban
America and went on to say that the Act which established the
Model Cities Program does
'.... for the cities what the National Aeronautics
and Space Act did for the space program.' (Humphrey, 196*!)
The shift towards a language of management and legitimation in
terms of organisation continued through into the Nixon Administration,
being pursued with great vigour by the Republicans in their
attempts to dismantle Democratic programmes.
These statements by the President present the language within
which debate was to occur. A public debate can be engaged within
an 'agreed' frame of meanings and understandings by the creation
of apparently rational policies. It is important to emphasise that
it is not a direct appead. to 'social science' that creates legit¬
imacy since social scientists are at different times regarded by
the majority of the population as quacks and charlatans. It is
rather that the role they play confers legitimacy.
It would be a crude view of legitimation to see it as providing
a complete cover for existing policy making. Social science
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ideas provide the language and rationale of legitimacy. Therefore
to see social science's role purely as legitimating particular
policies does not provide a comprehensive explanation of the
social science/politics relationship. I am skeptical as to
the comprehensiveness of this explanation in that if it is merely
a question of generating experts to overcome political divisions,
then experts can be created counter to the experts representing
the official line. Secondly, the population as a whole has little
respect for the status of social science as knowledge.
It is clear that the relationship between politics and social
science has not been entirely unidirectional either, as would be
implied if social scientists were only seen to have a legitimating
role. Their legitimating role was important but was not their only
role - I have already mentioned evaluation and the provision of
information as other roles. Looking at both countries, it can be
seen that while the programmes and projects may have been over¬
whelmingly determined by the political and administrative forces,
they did maintain some of the initial ideas which had been derived
from social science.
External legitimation of policy making
Perhaps though, it is not only particular policies that are
legitimated but the process of policy making itself. Policies
are given 'meaning' (in the sense of a place within the framework
of existing goals) through their advocacy, not necessarily through
their substance. This 'meaning' has a legitimating role that may
be separate from the policies' purpose. Since the substance and
direction of developments are largely determined by economic and
political goals acting through institutions and by administrative
arrangements and bargains, the ability of the government independ¬
ently to impose its will against these forces is limited. In
concealing this, the appeal to external legitimation through ideas
is strong.
Programmes both provide tangible benefits on the ground and
provide symbolic benefits in terms of public relations. The War
on Poverty is a clear example of how the secondary aspect may play
an important part. The War on Poverty as a symbol of concern by
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the Administration for the plight of America's poor gained support
for Johnson from the liberal constituency whose loyalty was to
the Kennedys. This liberal constituency, however, did not contain
those who were affected by the reality of poverty or were to be
affected by the substance of the programme. The symbol of the-
programme in itself was a token of concern for them. At the same
time, the programme was portrayed as a consistent complement to
the foreign policy being pursued by the Administration. In this
way the President could try and achieve a consensus around his
domestic liberalism and his foreign interventions on the basis
that they were part of the same strategy.
Similarly in Britain, the symbolic role of the programmes being
implemented is clear. Whereas the substance of the programmes in
the United States was also considerable, the symbolic importance
of those in Britain was paramount. Crossman's statement about
getting kudos for the urban programme makes it obvious how apparent
this was even to those involved in developing the programme.
Whether Wilson did or did not have some clear ideas about the content
of an urban programme, "his announcement of the programme in his
speech replying to Powell indicated its symbolic value. He did
not propose a programme in the sense of any definable course of
action which the government intended to pursue, what he did
announce was the existence of a programme. In a sense, therefore,
what was important was that the Labour Government was going to
do something and not the details of what that something was. The
announcement itself achieved part of its aims. This can be seen
to be repeated throughout the course of the various programmes in
Britain. The announcement of a new initiative, irrespective of
the nature of the initiative was more important than its subsequent
content in terms of publicity and presentation.
It is important to consider the two ways in which policy is
presented. It is presented within the state apparatus arid towards
the public at large. Both are part of the same process of legitimation
and domination of the understanding of meaning. That, for instance
Johnson should define the debate on the War on Poverty as being
in terms of the ability of the poor to take advantage of the
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opportunities that exist within American society provided a meaning
for the idea of poverty within which policy can then be articulated
and assessed. Whether or not poverty as a reality has any relation¬
ship to this meaning is unimportant for subsequent action.
The use of meanings and symbols separated the relationship
between social science, politics and administration from the
understandings and control of those upon whom policy subsequently
operated and affected. Symbols act as part of the language of
legitimation to achieve what Edelman (1977) calls 'political
quiescence'. In avoiding the substance of policy and in determining
the structure of meanings within which debate occurs, any challenge
to legitimation is contained within a field decided upon by the
power structure.
The Model Cities Program presented Johnson with a problem in
the managing of the debate in such a way that would present the
policy making process in the technical manner upon which his
consensus was built. Johnson's legitmation for the Model Cities
Program was simultaneously a legitimation for the policy making
process itself.
Whereas the initial memorandum from Waiter Reuther to President
Johnson outlining a Demonstration Cities Program proposed a limited
experimental demonstration program, the program was expanded to
cover a considerable number of cities and towns, thus largely
negating its supposedly experimental aspect. This expansion of the
programme took place because of a variety of pressures. These
pressures were primarily political - the desire to expand the base
of the programme and so increase the political support for it in
terms of the number of Congressmen in whose interest it was to
support the programme - and institutional, the desire of HUD,
being a new department, to have control over a large new programme
to enhance its image. Political problems in the passage of the
Model Cities legislation were overcome by making it provide not
merely funding for large cities, which it was argued already
received disproportionate amounts of federal funding and national
prominence. The managing of the measure in the Senate by Senator
Muskie from Maine, a rural state without a nationally prominent
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'problem' city, helped to achieve this. For HUD the expansion
of the Model Cities Program into smaller cities and towns strength¬
ened its role within the Administration in relation to other
large government departments and allowed it to present itself as
a Department not merely concerned with urban America. Such an
expansion within the Administration strengthened the importance of
HUD as a major department. These pressures for a widespread
programme were not appropriate, nor able to be couched in the
right language, to be planed before Congress as reasons for
extending the programme. Indeed the rationale of an experiment
was such that its scale actually denied its experimental nature.
Instead the President in proposing the programme had to emphasise
its value to all America. The President had begun to talk of the
problems of the cities prior to the establishment of the Task
Force and prior to Reuther's memorandum.
'.... the city has been at the center of civilization.
It is at the center of our own society.
Over seventy percent of our population - 135 million
Americans - live in urban areas.* (Johnson, 1965b)
In the message proposing the Model Cities Program., the President
reemphasised the extent of the problem and how it affected all
Americans.
'By the year 2000 four out of five Americans will live
and work in a metropolitan area.' (Johnson, 1966a)
Rather than rationing resources, on the basis of central assess¬
ment of which cities contained the most favourable conditions for
the launching of such an experiment in order to create an experiment¬
al demonstration programme, the President proposed a more circuitous
approach to rationing what were clearly already going to be over¬
stretched resources, even if Congress authorized and appropriated
the full funding that the President was requesting.
'It will not be simple to qualify for such a program.
We have neither the means nor the desire to invest public
funds in an expensive program whose net effects will be
marginal, wasteful or visible only after protracted delay.
We intend to help only those cities who help themselves.'
(Johnson, 1966a)
This reflected the dilemma of the rational external legitimation
of the political process. While the form of demonstration
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programme could be argued and presented as being determined by-
criteria which were generally acceptable and rational, the present¬
ation itself was designed to overcome the conflict generated
by, and resolved on the basis of, political power.
The President gave meaning to the Model Cities Program
structure. He presented the programme as a rationally conceived
and constructed attempt to deal with the problems of the city.
This symbol of the programme in a concrete manner provided a
legitimacy for the policy process, not merely the policy itself.
Internal mediation
As well as legitimation being important for the political process
as viewedfrom outside, legitmation is important in the mediation
of conflicts internal to the process. Social science plays a
role in the internal mediation of conflict.
I maintain that social science has an important part to play
in mediating conflicts within the processes of government in
Britain, and so providing its resolution with a legitimacy. The
legitimacy given to the process, in its very nature, cannot be
defined separately from the overall legitimacy of the mode of domin¬
ation itself. It is equally technical and rational.
In Britain social scientists on the edges of government generate
ideas within the same political paradigm as the politician. These
ideas may subsequently be found to be consonant with some of the
more specific political pressures for action operating at the time
(this was so in the case of the EPAs and CDPs). This role for the
social scientist in Britain emphasises the importance of the processes
of government decision making in providing a legitimate form for
the exercise of power. In America, social scientists, who share
many characteristics with their British counterparts (especially
regarding the party political connections which exist) have a
role which is involved much more centrally within the structure of
government, whether on congressional staffs, or in the Administration,
in providing a common political language for the resolution of
conflict which occurs within a common rational technocratic mode.
Thus just as wizards and soothsayers may have been used in the
past, so now we have social scientists.
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This difference in the two countries provides an important
contrast in the legitimating of the policy making process. The
different structure of government at both a central and local
level in Britain and America leads to a different place within
each system for external rational legitimation.
Institutional, separations are not only important at a Federal
level in the United States, but are built into the American system
of government at all levels, thus replicating the process on a
neighbourhood level and giving the American system of government
its apparent 'pluralism'. A pluralism that is within the structures
of political power, rather than as the term implies, a pluralism
stretching throughout society - a pluralistic state rather than
a pluralistic society.
In Britain, departmental separation gives rise to negotiation,
but a negotiation that occurs outwith the public arena. Whereas
in the British system, the negotiation that does take place,
takes place behind closed doors over issues which are not publically
displayed, in the American structure, the issues are much more
publically accessible because of the institutional separations.
In America therefore, the language in which mediation takes place
is one which has to be consumed publically as well as privately,
1
whether this language represents actual resolution or not-. To
achieve these compromises and negotiations within the separated
structure of the United States, I argue that 'rational resolution'
and the use of a supposedly technocratic approach has been used
to conceal what are accomodations made on the basis of relative
power. Whereas in America, throughout the state apparatus, competing
centers of power struggle over the implementation of policies, in
Britain, the system being unitary and heirachical does not have
this conflict to the same degree (clearly there are interdepartmental
conflicts).
In Britain it is the administrative process, the process of
government itself which is legitimated, rather than specific policies
being developed. Therefore, when there is a changing relationship
1 Edelman (1977? 134) calls this 'hortatory language'.
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between local and central government, it is this relationship
which becomes the focus for legitimation. Either within central
government in the construction of options, or in the direction of
local authorities by central government, an appeal is made to
external rationality that this is the best way to approach policy
making.
The British system of government derives its legitimacy on the
basis of the process of policy making being rational and having a
democratic imput. The American system, on the other hand, derives
its legitimacy on the basis of the separated structures giving rise
to democratic and rational decision making. In the British system
the decision making process is concealed from public scrutiny
and it is in this protection from scrutiny that it achieves its
legitimacy. Where the processes of the state themselves are one
of the main sources of authority , expert knowledge is provided
within the state as a 'neutral' referee in conflicts over means
and ends. If the conflict cannot be resolved through the operation
of the processes themselves, then expert knowledge provides
within the concealed processes an external rational legitimation
to resolve the conflict. This is in a crude form. Decisions are
not opposed to one another and then mediated through the intro¬
duction of an external legitimation. The process contains provision
for legitimation throughout.
In the American system legitimacy is derived from the structure
giving rise to democratic and rational decision making. As I have
already discussed this involves the sharing of meaning within
the political structure. The resolution of conflict occurs on
the basis of relative political power but the 'best' decision
to be taken is presented as the most 'rational' decision. It
is defining this 'social good' that scientists axe asked to play
1 I use the term 'authority' here not in the sense of the power that
is derived from the processes of the state, but in the sense of the
exercise of power which is seen as being legitimate because of the
nature of the processes. In other words, the processes of the
state themsleves are seen to be a construction of the democratic
history of the development of the state into its contemporary
form.
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a role in a public forum.
Social science as entrepreneur
In the British example, experimental approaches such as EPAs,
CDPs or the Inner Area Studies could be launched on a limited
scale. Indeed their limited scale had certain distinct advantages.
Firstly, limited programmes such as the three mentioned, did not
require legislation and therefore were subject to limited disc¬
ussion in Parliament. Secondly, the amount of money involved
was of such a small scale that controversy could be avoided at
national level, since the expenditure implications did not seriously
conflict with established interests. Thirdly, and perhaps as a
result of the second advantage, any positive results deriving
from limited programmes would be a bonus. Whereas large scale
programmes in the United States required to be oversold, small
scale ones in Britain could be underplayed.
Given this, in Britain, support for the implementation of area
based strategies did not require to be mobilised within the
electoral sphere. Apart from the Inner Area Studies, the planning
and approval of the initiatives all took place, to different
degrees among civil servants and those academics close to the
civil service. Whereas in America programmes were constructed to
meet political problems perceived and articulated in the Executive,
in Britain, the projects were first planned by civil servants and
academics and then used existing political conditions to acquire
support.
In Britain, the key features of EPAs, CDPs and the Inner Area
Studies were developed outwith the state apparatus, although they
were subsequently modified and reconstructed to cope with the
political realities which they had to confront. That the EPAs were
not launched on the scale proposed by Halsey and Young should not
downgrade the influence that their ideas had in developing the
project in the first place. In these cases, social science came
into government in an attempt to get government support for projects
which were developed to deal with social problems. These projects
were constructed by social science entrepreneurs, combining
with civil servant entrepreneurs (like Morrell), to provide
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a role for social science within government and connections
between universities and the civil service. It is interesting
to consider that many of the social scientists involved in, for
instance the EPAs and CDPs (in particular Young and Halsey) were
part of the Labour Party establishment in that they already
had close ties with prominent Labour politicians. The Conservative
Party has not had allies of this sort from whom advice was forth
coming, except perhaps in economics. The Labour Government of
1964-70 set a trend, which continued into the following Labour
Government, of using outside academic advisers as think tanks for
new ideas ana policy developments. Heath, later tried to instit¬
utionalise such a function within the Cabinet Office with the
setting up of the Central Policy Review Staff. However, an
important difference was that the Labour Government's advisers
who constituted an extra set of ministerial advisers were (in
an institutional sense) opposed to the civil service.
It is important to recognise the importance of social science
entrepreneurs, because it indicates the two sided nature of the
relationship between the state and social science. It has not
been an entirely one way process.
Knowledge and expertise
What then does the social scientist bring to policy making?
I would say that it is not nothing, but it is less than the
abstracted knowledge which their claim to science would seem to
imply. It is what I would call expertise. This expertise could
be equated with what I have termed pragmatic problem solving. It
is an expertise based upon sharing a political paradigm with
politicians and a knowledge of the political, administrative and
institutional constraints within which policies are developed.
As Wolanin says in his study of Presidential Advisory Commissions;
'.... the full-time professional staffs of commissions
are frequently not oriented toward rational-comprehensive
decision making or scientific inquiry. They are most
often lawyers and middle-level substantive experts from
the federal government. Their training and professional
experience incline them toward a method of problem solving
that proceeds by collecting the available data and analysing
it in terms of making pragmatic adjustments and modifications
in the existing programs and approaches. A rational
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comprehensive or hypothesis-experiment investigation is
foreign to them.' (Wolanin, 1975s 101)
This pragmatic approach and. the construction of what are seen
as possible options had an interesting effect, both on the nature
of social science and also for the sort of legitimation it conceals.
Beneath the veneer of scientific inquiry lies the truth of political
determination. Robert Wood, Under Secretary of HUD, continually ■
reinforced the need for this sort of investigation in speeches
he made to encourage social scientists to take part 'practically'
in the development of new strategies for the cities. But instead
of appealing for rigorous ideas that could be applied to new
strategies, he made clear the need both for political and practical
coincidence between the ideas being developed and the approaches
they implied.
'I believe the opportunity for academic, philosophic contr¬
ibution to urban policy was never greater. My simple theme
is, however, that unless the philosophy is rooted in empir¬
icism, accompanied by precise and rigorous intellectual
discipline and empirical analysis, its basic propositions
will not be accepted. The public will still continue to
correct intuitive specualtion with common sense.' (Wood,
1967)
This statement contains many interesting implications for the
role that social science was to play in urban policy and also '
how that role should shape the epistemological foudations of social
science. To see anything but empiricism as.intuitive speculation
and to equate empiricism with the 'public's' common sense has
totalitarian implications for the development of social science.
Even a crude empiricism would not see the result of empiricist
inquiry as common sense.
The sort of empiricism that Wood extolled was the 'soft' know¬
ledge to which Caplan (1975) referred. For the lay person an
empirical approach avoids some awkward epistemological questions
raised by other methodological approaches, while also avoiding
more fundamental political questions. 'Commonsense' is based
upon political realities. Expertise implies an understanding
based upon experience of the political realities which shape
and form particular situations. The role of social science
in task forces and the use of social scientists as general experts
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implies the use of this expertise. The areas of interest of the
most prominent social scientists used in the United States and
Britain, and their methods of approach have been within the
pragmatic tradition of social policy. Academic relevance has
been determined by political relevance.
This expertise defines not only the role of social scientists,
it can define the nature of the very 'tools' of social science.
Indicators, such as census data, have a conceptual base which is
derived and constructed through a process which owes much to
pragmatic considerations and experience. It is worth digressing
here to make this point using the example of poverty and area
based approaches because it raises some of the basic issues.
Much is made of problems of defining poverty and measuring
its existence. It is clear that almost any definition is relative
since the concept itself is relative. In both countries for the
purposes of action a poverty level has been defined. In Britain
the Supplementary Benefit level is used. This limited monetary
definition of poverty has been broadened to include other aspects
of 'deprivation' (which would seem an almost synonomous term
for poverty). Deprivation has however been defined in terms of
more tangible assets than money, rather akin to the quality of
life. Deprivations such as overcrowding, unemployment, lack of
basic amentities are open to attempts at measurement. However,
within this tradition of looking at poverty in terms of quality
of life, there are aspects which cannot be empirically assessed
with such ease. Environmental standards, mobility, life chances
etc, would logically become part of such an approach. However,
government policies have shied away from these more problemmatic
and less observable aspects.
How are concepts defined and operationalisea in policy terms?
It is now almost folklore in British social policy how the re¬
discovery of poverty came about through the publicising of reports
such as Abel-Smith and Townsend's (1965) showing that monetary
poverty still existed in Britain to quite a wide extent despite
the existence of a Welfare State which was supposed to have
prevented anybody falling below what were basic requirements to
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meet need. Through the sixties concerns were expressed about a
wide variety of broader aspects of living conditions: housing
(Milner-Holland Report, 1965)» education (CACE Reports), social
services (Seebohm). With this concentration on other aspects
of living conditions came the broadening of the concepts being
dealt with under the heading of poverty. An area based focus
developed that looked at areas of cities which had been left
behind and were inadequately serviced by the welfare state.
This interpretation of the continuation of poor conditions
of life in the country in certain areas is a product of the
relationship between existing government policies and methods
of analysis.
Firstly, existing government policies (especially within the
pragmatic tradition of British social research and policy making)
defined the nature of the problems that were explored. Conditions
were examined within the same unstated frame as that within which
policies are constructed. Poverty is defined in terms of income
relative to the SB level. This is an accessible method of measuring
poverty. Poor housing is measured in terms of overcrowding and
lack of basic amenities because the data exists from the census
to make such a definition. The way that statistics and data are
collected affects how they may be used while how they have been
used shapes future investigation and action.
The clearest example of this effect is in the definition of
areas of deprivation. In that data collected for the census are
analysed on the basis of enumeration districts which are geogr¬
aphically defined, a geographical basis is immediately introduced.
The collection of other statistical information about the level
of life in Britain is also collected on other area bases. Local
authorities' wards are used to aggregate data and wards are
compared one to another on basic social indicators. Such an
initial area focus provides an area concept of deprivation.
The second way in which this relationship is reinforced is
through the pragmatism of social policy developments and research.
The rediscovery of poverty did not lead to a major questioning
of the basic structure of British welfare provision. A new approach
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was neither organised nor proposed which would have replaced
the failing Beveridgean approach. Given this pragmatism, a
redefinition occured. Rather than the existence of poverty
being seen as negating the pretensions of the British welfare
state, the existence of poverty was seen as being an indication
of residual failures within an otherwise comprehensive system
of provision. To develop extra means of coping with these failings
became an obvious approach.
This is exemplified in the field of positive discrimination
in education. Data relating to the lack of opportunity for some
children did not lead to the reexamination of the educational
system as a whole, its role in society and its effects upon class.
Rather the failings were seen as peripheral and could be overcome
if not by a process of more of the same, at least through extra
efforts within the same structure.
The development of area based policies in Britain and the
accompanying definition of the problem occured through a cumulative
process. As more 'exceptions' came to light so the breadth of the
definition of poverty had to be expanded. What occured was the
definition of changing concepts in a pragmatic manner.
In this chapter I have tried to explore the politics-science
relationship. I have included administration in a peripheral
manner but administration has an important role when it is recognised
that 'politics' includes the politics of institutional structures.
It is in this broader sense that I use the term politics. I have
attempted to argue that traditional explanations of the politics-
science relationship fail to explain the degree to which social
science is shaped by political pragmatism. I have gone further
than this however in arguing that this pragmatically framed
social science does itself play a role in the policy making process.
Politics and social science do not mutually accomodate one
another in the policy making process. Political forces do not
merely use social science to legitimate political decisions, but
social science has an important role in both providing a rational
technical language and approach which legitimates the process of
policy making. It also provides a way of mediating internal
conflicts. The importance of policy making legitimation and
internal mediation is different in the two countries.
Finally, while social scientists also act as entrpreneurs
who initiate policy developments, the sort of social science,
including its epistemological basis is shaped by the political




In this final chapter I shall first consider some of the
implications of the nature of the relationship between the state
and welfare, social policy and social science. I shall then
consider some different views of policy making. I shall conclude
by considering some of the different roles that social science
could play in policy making, contrasting them with its present
role.
I have described policy as being the outcome of a number of
different relationships. Some of these relationships provide the
context within which the state operates, while others shape the
mode in which the state operates. For example, the political and
economic relationships which constitute the context of the state
both provide the impetus and direction for its action while also
forming the nature of its action. Policy making is an outcome of
these relationships. Within the state apparatus, the institutional
and administrative organisational arrangements of the state
provide another important impetus and constraint for state action.
As can be seen from the previous two chapters, the issues to
be considered in looking at policy development have a complexity
which does not lead to a straightforwardly developmental account
of the policy making process. To attempt to impose a comprehensive
multi-causal model on policy development has not been my aim.
However, there are important common general forces which have been
important. In particular the issues which I consider in my
fourth chapter have provided the context which shaped these policies.
The issues considered in chapters five and six gave the policies
their more particular form.
Higgins (1978s 11-27) reviews three models of policy development,
which she compares with the development of the programmes and
policies in Britain and America. She identifies the first as being
the view which sees policy as developing according to compassionate
concern, pragmatism or the imperatives of industrialisation. The
second she calls a "Conspiracy Theory' of welfare. The last she
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presents as an alternative model which she derives from Lindblom
(1959) and calls 'ad hocism' or 'muddling through'. Her three
models of change in social policy are unsatisfactory for a number
of reasons. Firstly, her models are not all encompassing in the
sense that there are other possible explanations which she leaves
unexplored. Secondly, particular explanations are not clearly
attributable to any of her models. For instance, Piven and
Cloward's views in Regulating the Poor (197*1 )» which she terms
conspiratorial, also emphasises the imperatives of industrialisation.
Thirdly, the models themselves are not mutually exclusive in that
ad-hocism can be a form of pragmatism and can be easily be combined
with a model of conspiracy. Conspiracy can take place in an ad-hoc
way. Her alternative model leaves as much unexplained as there
is to explain.
'Many influences were at work. Change could have gone in
a number of different directions on a number of different
occasions. There was nothing inevitable about the form
it eventually took. Attempting to explain its particular
manifestations is a frustrating task and there are no clear-
cut answers. In such a situation the attractions of a hol¬
istic view of change are obvious. The Conspiracy Theory
is neat, comprehensive and simple, while the alternative
model described here is complex, untidy and unable to offer
conclusive explanations.' (Higgins, 1978: 26)
It is an unsatisfactory approach to study the complexity and
untidyness of the world and deliver the verdict - it is complex
and untidy. This is in part because her conclusions are arrived
at merely from viewing the appearance of the world without
sufficient critical reflection.
First, it is important to lay to rest the bogey of 'Conspiracy
Theory'. 'Conspiracy Theory' is a stick with which bourgeois
social scientists frequently try to beat marxists and neo-marxists.
It seems sufficient to say that something is a 'Conspiracy Theory'
to condemn it. Conspiracy theory replaces functionalism as a
sociological insult. If there was a 'Conspiracy Theory*, which
I have yet to come across, it could not be rejected so simply.
Conspiracies do take place. Politicians do act in sinister,
devious and underhand manners, and a conspiracy may contribute
to a specific event. Kennedy (Bay of Pigs), Johnson (Vietnam) and
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Nixon (Watergate) all took part in conspiracies. My main difference
with Higgins is that I do not seek to say X is why Y occured.
Such an approach would lead me into having to say, as Higgins does
that there are no simple answers. The formuldtion of Biggins'
investigation is itself inadequate. The sole object of the study
of social policy change cannot merely be to explain specific
events - in my view, it must also consider the forces, which are
not necessarily observable, and identify the essential features of
social change. To focus exclusively on observable events entails
an epistemology which cannot adequately comprehend the nature of
the world.
In rejecting Conspiracy Theory, Higgins says;
'In order to substantiate the Conspiracy Theory we will
need to look not only at the effects of policy but at the
motives of policy makers.' (Higgins, 1978: 17)
There are some Marxists who attribute the formulation of policy
to the direct consciousness of a ruling elite. However, their
approach is open to the same criticism as Higgins'. To study social
change only on the level of individual motivation leads to the
disregard of important epistemological questions and a denial of
the real nature of the object of study. The appearance of social
forms is clearly shaped by the world in which they appear. This
is not merely a question of perception (i.e. of how appearance is
organised) although the organisation of appearance in perceptual
terms is important. To put it in simplistic but concrete terms,
an approach to the world based upon an understanding of the class
nature of capitalism allows the class nature of the world to appear.
On the other hand, an understanding which approaches the world in
a pluralistic fashion, itself creates the appearance of pluralism.
However this is not sufficient. If this were all, then we could
say that what the world was depends upon how it is seen (within
what frame of perception it is viewed). To go beyond that it is
necessary to realise that (as a basic requirement of a scientific
approach) some understanding of the relationship between the
perceived world and why it appears as such is important.
To be more concrete in my criticisms of Higgins, the labelling
of Piven and Cloward as Conspiracy Theorists is misconceived on
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two counts. Their functionalism, which is undeniable, can be
criticised in that it does not sufficiently explain how the
functional coincidence between the 'demands' of the state and
policy making occurs. This allows the gap to be filled in the
minds of critics by a motivated conspiracy. This is in part
the result of an insufficient theoretical consideration of the
nature of political and economic imperatives and how they are
mobilised.
It is tautological to see changes taking place which maintain
but adapt capitalism as occuring to achieve their own ends. Such
an explanation would allow everything to be explained merely in
terms of itself. The process is not as simply elucidated. I
shall try to deal with this by taking examples from my own work
which might well be accused of being functionalist or over cons¬
piratorial. When (and I acknowledge Piven and Cloward's influence
upon this), I argue that electoral benefits were to be gained
by the development of the Community Action Program, I introduce
a consciousness on the part of the Administration which clearly
existed. The evidence is there to show that Johnson was aware
of his electoral needs and also that politicians do enter politics
with such calculations in mind. However, I am not saying that this
was the only reason, or even that this function was a sufficient one
to create the War on Poverty. Other relationships are also of
great importance, for instance the relationship of the War on Poverty
to state expenditure, and to the overall economic picture.
Although there is a conscious and functional element involved in
this approach, and the approach does not explain in a complete
way what occured, it approaches a more complete explanation than
the 'ad hocism' of Higgins. It is only by going beyond the
frame of the apparent that the nature of the broader forces can
be studied. Therefore by counterposing alternative developments
which could have occured, which are outwith the bounds of pragmatism
the policy making process can be confronted with its own nature.
Doing this it can be seen that what was occuring was not an open
and experimental development, albeit within an incremental frame.
Policy developed within a set of boundaries.
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State policy (in this particular example, state welfare policies)
are the outcome of conflicting relationships within society and
within the state apparatus. The conflicting relationships within
society can be reduced to the balance of class forces at any
particular time. It is through this balance of class forces
that state economic and fiscal policies derive their particular
form. Economic and fiscal policy, as I have already shown, cannot
be separated from political and social relations - including
those within the electoral arena. The conflicts within the state
apparatus, whose source lies in the institutional and administrative
aspects of the bureaucracy, provide for a more immediate impetus
for the development of policy in a particular manner. These
conflicts within the state apparatus are also dependant upon
the nature of the constitutional relationships which govern the
form of the state apparatus.
In the example of these policies, within the overall frame of
the development of welfare policies in the nineteen sixties and
the early nineteen seventies, the political and economic balance
being sought was the compromise and conciliation of conflicting
class interests. The state engaged increasingly in a series of
policies whose aim was both to 'include' those who had previously
been 'excluded' (by emphasising equality of opportunity and
productive potential) and to do this in a non-contentious way,
without exacerbating other existing conflicts (the evidence is
clear both in the War on Poverty and the Urban Aid Programme with
regard to exacerbating racial tensions). Part of the process of
inclusion involved the identification of new possibilities for
representation (i.e. participation) and for the allocation of
resources. This was to be achieved within existing relation¬
ships of representation and distribution.
The relationship between social science and social policy
in these programmes can be seen within this frame of analysis.
Social science had the two important roles of providing for the
legitimate resolution of conflicting interests and providing for
the generation of a consensus on the basis of an authority which
was presented as being separate from the value choices applying
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within the political process. That this consensus was not success¬
fully constructed is not surprising when seen in these terms. The
generation of such a consensus was based upon an ideological view
of the nature of social relations which excluded the possibility
of fundamental class conflicts as being a source of political and
social conflict. To maintain existing social relations was to
maintain the source of the problems. Consensus, inclusion and
conciliation could not resolve these conflicts, but could only
mask them to a lesser or greater extent. Ultimately, of course,
whether they succeeded in reducing conflict or not, this was a
cosmetic achievement which left conditions 'on the ground' unresolved.
This view of the nature of the policy process and the role of
social science in it differs significantly from the more establish¬
ed views of policy making. It is important to note that these more
established views of policy making go a long way towards creating
the context within which it has been seen as being possible for
social science to play some technical role in 'improving' social
policy making. These established views can be seen broadly to be
encompassed within three themes . One seeing policy as in some
sense as an outcome of function. This includes different views
of social change ranging from Marxist 'functionalists' through to
those convergence theorists who see welfare development as a
response to the social demands of industrialisation and its
associated productive forces. Another sees policy as being an
outcome of bargaining, whether this is expressed as 'ad hocism'
or as pluralistic bargaining between identifiable interests.
Here too, there are Marxists who see policy developments as being
the outcome of bargaining, albeit not within a pluralistic frame
but from a class frame. The least expressed, but most often
implicit view is that of policy as being the outcome of rational
humanism. Indeed this rational humanism is frequently implied as
a motive force behind some of the functionalist or bargaining
views of policy making; the initial impetus being derived from a
1 I deliberately use the word 'theme* rather than model. These
are not intended as heuristic classifications to replace Higgins'
unsatisfactory models. Rather they provide analytical outlines.
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rational humanism, mediated through other forces. While it may-
seem unnecessary to spend time refuting this rational humanism,
it has some important implications. Those who, like myself, reject
the rational humanistic basis of policy making may be accused both
of empirical inaccuracy (because we cannot provide alternative
motivations) and also of the bogey 'conspiracy'. These allegations
are unjustified. To deny that rational humanism is a basis for
policy outcomes is not to imply that policy makers pretend that
they are concerned with welfare, while they are actually developing
other more devious schemes. It is only to imply that the best 'will'
does not necessarily win through. It is not enough to be well
intentioned, and even the best structured institutions would not
lead to outcomes which are a distillation of rational humanism.
Action derives from a complex interplay of will, circumstance
and conflicting interest. I have attempted to outline some of
the most important of these. Abstracted will had little place in
the process.
The basic assumption of a rational humanistic basis for policy
direction leads to an ideological construction which places policy
within the realm of the rational and the technical. The search
for the resolution of conflicts to allow the light of sweet
reason to shine through implies that these conflicts are not
fundamental and can be resolved. My view is of course the reverse.
Reason is not masked by conflict. Conflict is masked by reason.
This reason takes a rational and technical form in its attempts
to impose a consensus. This 'consensus' has two aspects. Firstly,
it implies that the existing distribution of class power, despite
its shifting nature, is in some sense natural. Capitalism is
posed as being a universal law for the ordering of economic and
political relationships. Secondly, and more specific to the period
that I am examining, the rational technical mode of domination, as
I have previously said, is an important part of Keynesianism.
Under Keynesianism the rational technical form of domination
provides conciliation through rationality.
No doubt some readers will expect some prescriptive recommend¬
ations. Policy recommendations are within the main stream of
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writing in social policy, and in most accounts of these programmes
such prescriptions exist. However, such an expectation suggests a
failure to understand the main point of studying these programmes.
Perhaps Higgins comes closest to this;
•It has not been the purpose of this book to spell out
an alternative poverty programme. That has been done more
comprehensively and in more detail elsewhere. Indeed its
purpose has been almost the reverse. The foregoing chapters
have been intended to show that the debate about the desir¬
ability of one poverty programme as against another is
academic if there is no means of ensuring that either
gains political support. The real problem is not the
content of the programme but how to win that support.'
(Higgins, 1978: 139)
While recognising that the essential aspect of a prescriptive
account of the programme is the requirement for political support,
I argue that her conclusions do not go far enough. The main
point is that she presents the state as being capable of learning,
not merely in an ad hoc manner, but also in a rational and reflexive
manner. Many analysts of social policy are drawn into social policy
examination in such a way that they base the nature of their
analysis on the assumption that government will learn.
Hambleton (1978) is one of the most striking examples, exhibit¬
ing considerable faith in the ability of the state to learn and
arguing that its apparent inability is derived from its structure
and approaches, rather than, as I argue, from its nature. Using
Schon's work (1971)» Hambleton argues that there are two facets
of public learning; problem recognition and adaptive capacity.
Hambleton says the former
•is concerned with the ability of government to perceive
and understand the true complexity of problems in the
community - the way they interrelate and often reinforce
one another and the way they change over time.'
(Hambleton, 1978: 10)
and sees the second as being
•concerned with the ability of government to respond to
these differing and changing problems at the appropriate
organisational level in a timely and effective manner.
This requires the development of institutions which are
capable of bringing about their own continuing transformation.'
(Hambleton, 1978: 11)
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Underlying Hambleton's view is a view of the state which I
suggest is incapable of being sustained. The state is not the
adaptive and reflexive organ that he would like it to be, not
merely because it is not organised in this way, but also because
of the role that the state plays in capitalist society. To be
able to consider how the state can act and how the state can
learn requires an explicit theory of the nature of the state-
as it is, rather than an assumption that the state is adaptable
to whatever the 'people' want it to be. The state is not a
collection of institutions, organised in a haphazard manner
and capable of adaptation without limit. It is a capitalist state
deriving its form, functions^ and legitimacy from capitalist
relations.
Edwards and Batley (1978) fall into the same trap by failing
to have an explicit view of the nature of policy making. In
drawing their conclusions and 'lessons' from the Urban Programme,
they say;
'What then would be the prescription for the future if the
implications of these arguments were to be translated
into policy? It would be the development of a more
intellectually-discriminating response to urban deprivation
wherein the major tactic would be to employ broad-based
policies that would be supplemented only where research
deemed them expedient by limited area-specific programmes.'
(Edwards and Batley, 1978: 251)
It is however the ideological relationship between 'learning' and
'government' which leads to this form of pragmatic criticism.
Attempts at prescriptive statements are imposed upon social
science through the relationship that it has with the state.
To disregard this is to be seen as being 'irrelevant', 'politically
motivated' and 'unscientific'. However I am posing a non-prescript¬
ive social science approach.
Relevance for policy makers cannot be a criterion by which
knowledge is judged. If social science and social scientists
are to see their role as improving the organisation of society
within a consensual or pluralistic framework, then they abdicate
both their responsibilities as social scientists and their resp¬
onsibilities as human beings in a political world. However, the
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growth of the social sciences as government funded areas of
knowledge depends upon their perceived relevance and results that
are seen to be useful. This leads to the inbuilt conservatism
of much applied social research and social policy analysis.
Empiricism and practicality are seen as inherent goods.
To move beyond this, it is necessary, neither to see policies
in the terms which they are given nor take the state as unproblem-
matical. Its appearance and the appearance of policy are dictated
by its nature. But does this deny the ability of social policy
analysis to be able to help government improve its understanding?
Where the increase in the rational technocratic mode of domination
becomes clear is in the degree to which this pragmatic approach
becomes the approach. Two strands can be seen to have been drawn
together, and Hambleton's work illustrates this well. On the
one hand, there is the substantive knowledge of a particular area,
on the other hand, deriving from planning theory, there is the
thread concerned with the processes of policy application. They
are brought together within the existing frame of political
possibilities and the limits defined by their own pragmatism.
My work has been exploratory. I have outlined different
presentations of policy development. The different conclusions
which I draw from these policies are not rigorously 'proved'.
To provide, within the scope of a PhD thesis a comprehensive and
conclusive argument covering the themes that I have been pursuing
is unrealistic. It would have been impossible to set out with
rigorous hypotheses, without detailed knowledge of the programmes
which comes with original investigation. In this sense this work
raises more questions than it answers. In particular, it would be
interesting to investigate more exactingly the particular uses
that social science has been put to in the policy making process.
To do this it would be necessary to take some discrete developments
in both countries and collect as much relevant information on them
as possible. This would be difficult in Britain with the secrecy
which surrounds government policy making.
Given the information that is available in both countries, it
would have been possible to concentrate on a small number of events.
287
In Britain, the launching of the Inner Area Studies and their
relationship to the Community Development Projects would have
provided an interesting source of information regarding the use
"by central government of CDP results. Information could be coll¬
ected on the precise links within central government between the
Home Office and the Department of the Environment. The directions
in public expenditure at the time could be charted and the decision
to use outside consultants could be looked at in the light of CDP
experience. Likewise, the launching-of the Inner Urban Areas
Bill with the accompanying White Paper raises interesting questions
which could be open to investigation, especially the precise timing
of the publication of the Inner Area Study Reports. The conclusions
I have drawn here about these events axe not proven. However they
raise plausible and interesting questions.
In America, a similar development open to comparison would be
the launching of the Model Cities Program and the same sort of
detailed information regarding previous experience, the relation¬
ships of different government departments, the move from study to
action and the use of social science results would go into making
an illuminating source^ of conclusions. Frieden and Kaplan ("1978)
cover much of this ground but not with the focus that I should like.
It is also of concern that some of those who have been privy
to the decision making process in Britain have allowed themselves
to be constrained by the civil service in reporting their invest¬
igations. For instance, Edwards and Batley were in a unique pos¬
ition to be able to tell us more about how the Urban Programme
developed. It is understandable, given the degree of power that
central government can weild over academics that they resisted
the temptation of producing an unauthorised account. To continue
to be restrained by constraints which have nothing to do with
understanding the processes of the state, forces what are pres¬
ented as objective academic investigations, to be apologias of
different sorts. Social policy analysts or social policy advisers
will never maintain standards of self-criticism and reflective
analysis if they maintain that it is more important to be 'included'
in policy making - despite constraints, than to be excluded. The
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choice is clear. We can either be apologists and legitimators,
or we can be ignored while probing in ways which, while the
information may not be there for us to provide conclusive 'proofs'
of our theses, can at least provide material which raises issues
and discussion in a way which is not constrained by political
and bureaucratic dictates.
A state that can spend £5,000 million on Trident missiles,
maintain an army of occupation in Northern Ireland, and build
Concorde cannot provide meaningful employment, reasonable housing
and a good quality of life for everyone. Social scientists
maintain an approach which vacillates between pessimistic talk of
'intractable problems' to optimistic 'new approaches'. Each new
policy development is greeted with enthusiasm, jobs are gratefully
received, research diligently pursued, but when nothing happens




1978 Politics and the Professors
Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution
ABEL-SMITH, Brian and TOWNSEND, Peter
1965 The Poor and the Poorest
London: G.Bell and Son
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
1966 Intergovernmental Relations in the Poverty Program
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1987 Fiscal Balance in the American Federal System
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
ARNSTEIN, Sherry
1969 'A Ladder of Citizen Participation'
Journal of the American Institute of Planners, July 1969
ATKINSON, A.B.
1975 The Economics of Inequality
London: Oxford University Press
BACHARACH, Peter and BARATZ, Morton S.
1970 Power and Poverty
New York: Oxford University Press
BARNES, Jack




1980 The Case for a Constitutional Civil Service
Institute for Workers Control
BERNSTEIN, Basil
1970 'Education Cannot Compensate for Society'




1972 'Remarks to Conference', at Conference on the
Urban Programme, 25/11/72
Liverpool: Liverpool Council of Social Service
BLUMENTHAL, Richard
1967 Community Action: The Origins of a Government Program




1979 Improving Boston's Neighborhoods: A Guide to the
Housing and Community Development Act
Unpublished: City of Boston, Mayor's Office
BRIDGES, Lee
1975 'The Ministry of Internal Security: British Urban
Social Policy 1968-74
Race and Class xvi (4)
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
1962 The Effects of Federal Programs on Higher Education
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution
CABINET OFFICE
1968a 'Minutes of the First Meeting of the Official Cabinet
Committee on Social Services, Sub-committee on
Community Development Area Projects, 10/9/68'
Unpublished: Confidential Source
1968b 'Minutes of the Official Cabinet Committee on Social
Services, Sub-committee on Community Development
Area Projects, 15/10/68'
Unpublished: Confidential Source
CAPLAN, Nathan et al.
1975 The Use of Social Science Knowledge in Policy
Decisions at the National Level
University of Michigan: Center for Research on the
Utilization of Scientific Knowledge, Institute of
Social Research
CARRIER, John and KENDALL, Ian
1973 'Social Policy and Social Change'
Journal of Social Policy 2(3)
1977 'The Development of Welfare States: the production
of plausible accounts'
Journal of Social Policy 6(3)
CENTRAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR EDUCATION (ENGLAND)
1963 Half Our Future (Newsom)
London: H.M.S.O.
1967 Children and Their Primary Schools (Plowden)
London: H.M.S.O.
CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE
1979 Annual Abstract of Statistics
London: H.M.S.O.
CLOWARD, Richard and OHLIN, Lloyd
1960 Delinquency and Opportunity
New York: Free Press
COCKBURN, Cynthia
1977 The Local State
London: Pluto Press
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
1976 Profits against Houses
London: Home Office
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
1960 Guide to the Election Results
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1966a 'Problems follow rapid expansion of 'War on Poverty'
21/1/66
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1966b 'Antipoverty Amendments' 27/5/66
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1966c 'Antipoverty Bill' 10/6/66
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1967 'OQ Fact Sheet on Model City Grants' 1/12/67
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1970 Congressional Quarterly, 28/8/70
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
CONRAD, Joseph
1973 Heart of Darkness
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
1963 'Poverty Program' Memo to T. Sorensen, White House
20/12/63
John F. Kennedy Archives, Boston: Heller Papers
1964a Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers,
Transmitted to Congress, January 1964
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1964b 'The Problem of Poverty in America', reprinted from
Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers
1964 in Burton A. Weisbrod (ed), The Economics of
Poverty (1965 )
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall
CROSLAND, C.A.R.




1969 'Letter to the Town Clerk of Coventry, 7/2/69, from
the Secretary of State for Social Services
Unpublished: Confidential Source
1976 The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister
London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape
DAHL, Robert
1961 Who Governs?
New Haven: Yale University Press
DANGERFIELD, George
1966 The Strange Death of Liberal England
London: MacGibbon and Kee
DAVIS, Karen
1977 'A Decade of Policy Developments in Providing Health
Care for Low-income Families' in Robert Haveman (ed),
A Decade of Federal Antipoverty Programs
New York: Academic Press
de BRUNHOFF, Suzanne
1978 The State, Capital and Economic Policy
London: Pluto Press
DEMUTH, Clare
1977 Government Initiatives on Urban Deprivation
London: Runnymede Trust
DODDS, D.H.
1975 'The Origins of the EPA at Denaby', a study presented




1967 The Politics of Poverty
New York: Pegasus
DOWNS, Anthony
1957 An Economic Theory of Democracy
New York: Harper and Row
ECKSTEIN, H.
1960 Pressure Group Politics: The case of the BMA
London: George Allen and Unwin
EDELMAN, Murray
1977 The Symbolic Uses of Politics
Urbana: University of Illinois Press
EDWARDS, John and BATLEY, Richard
1978 The Politics of Positive Discrimination
London: Tavistock Publications
ENVIRONMENT, Department of
1974 Proposals for Area Management, Liverpool Inner
Area Study (lAS/Ll/3)
Liverpool: Liverpool Inner Area Study
1976a 'Tackling the Problems of Inner City Areas'
Press Notice 582 (23/6/76)
London: Department of the Environment
1976b Speech by Peter Shore M.P., Secretary of State for
the Environment at Manchester Town Hall
Press Notice 835 (17/9/76)
London: Department of the Environment
1977a 'Change or Decay', Final Report of the Liverpool
Inner Area Study
London: H.M.S.O.
1977b 'Unequal City', Final Report of the Birmingham
Inner Area Study
London: H.M.S.O.
1977c 'Inner London: Policies for Dispersal and Balance',
Final Report of the Lambeth Inner Area Study
London: H.M.S.O.
1977d Policy for the Inner Cities (Cmnd 6845)
London: H.M.S.O.
1977e Inner Urban Areas Bill
London: H.M.S.O.
1977f Speech by Peter Shore M.P., Secretary of State for
the Environment, to the Save Our Cities
Conference, Bristol
Press Notice 63 (9/2/77)
London: Department of the Environment
1977g 'Urban Aid for Inner City Partnerships for 1978/79
Announced'
Press Notice 654 (1/12/77)
London: Department of the Environment
FARKAS, Suzanne
1971 Urban Lobbying: Mayors in the Federal Arena
New York: New York University Press
294
FRIEDEN, Bernard and KAPLAN, Marshall
1977 The Politics of Neglect
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
FRIEDLANL, Roger 0.
1977 Class Power and the Central City: The Contradictions
of Urban Growth
University of Wisconsin, Madison: Unpublished PhD
FRIEDLAND, Roger 0., PIVEN, Frances Fox and ALFORD, Robert
1977 'Political conflict, Urban structure and the
fiscal crisis'
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 1(3)
GERTH, H.H. and C. WRIGHT MILLS (eds)
1974 From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
GINSBERG, Norman
1979 Class, Capital and Social Policy
London: Macmillan
GOUGH, Ian
1979 The Political Economy of the Welfare State
London: Macmillan
GROSS, Bertram M. and MARIEN, Michael
1968 'The President's Questions - And Some Answers'
in Bertram Gross (ed), A Great Society?
New York: Basic Books
HAAR, Charles
1975 Between the Idea and the Reality: A Study in the
Origin, Fate and Legacy of the Model Cities Program
Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
HABERMAS, Jurgen
1971 Toward a Rational Society
London: Heinemann Educational Books
1976 Legitimation Crisis
London: Heinemann Educational Books
HACKETT, David
1963 'Memo to William Capron, Council of Economic Advisers,
(5/12/63)'
J.F.Kennedy Library, Boston, Mass: Heller Papers
HALL, Phoebe, LANE, Hilary, PARKER, Roy and WEBB, Adrian
1975 Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policy
London: Heinemann
GLENNERSTER, H. ...
1975 Social Service Budgets and Social Policy
London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
295
HALL, Pheobe
1976 Reforming the Welfare
London: Heinemann Educational Books
HALSEY, A.H.
1972 Educational Priority Vol 1: EPA Problems and Policies
London: H.M.S.O.
1974 'Government against poverty in school and community'
in Dorothy Wedderburn (ed), Poverty, Inequality
and Class Structure
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
HALSEY, A.H. and YOUNG, Michael
1967 'Letter to Patrick Gordon-Walker, 29/12/67'
Unpublished: Confidential Source
1968 'Letter to Shirley Williams, 17/1/68'
Unpublished: Confidential Source
HAM, Chris
1980 'Approaches to the study of social policy making'
Policy and Politics 8(1 )
HAMBLETON, Robin




House of Lords 14/3/87
19676 Lord Plowden
House of Lords 14/3/67
1967c Lord Eccles
House of Lords 14/3/67
1967d Lord Ritchie-Calder
House of Lords 14/3/67
1967e Charles Morrison M.P.
House of Commons 16/3/67
1968a James Callaghan M.P.
House of Commons 22/7/68
1968b Quint in Hogg M.P.
House of Commons 22/7/68
1972a Peter Walker M.P.
House of Commons 23/3/72
296
1973a David. Lane M.P.
House of Commons 5/3/73
19736 Edward Heath M.P.
House of Commons 17/7/73
1974a Alex Lyon M.P.
House of Commons 15/5/74
19746 Roy Jenkins M.P.
House of Commons 18/7/74
1977a James Callaghan M.P.
House of Commons 6/4/77
19776 Peter Shore M.P.
House of Commons 6/4/77
HARRINGTON, Michael
1963 The Other America
Baltimore: Penguin Books
HECLO, Hugh
1974 Modern Social Policies in Britain and Sweden
London: Yale University Press
HELLER, Walter
1963a 'Memo to John F. Kennedy, 1/5/63'
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers
19636 'Memo to John F. Kennedy, 8/6/63'
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers
1963c 'Notes on a meeting with John F. Kennedy, 21/10/63'
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers
1963d 'Notes on a meeting with John F. Kennedy, 19/11/63'
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers
1963© 'Notes on a meeting with Lyndon B. Johnson, 24/11/63'
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers
1963f 'Memo to T. Sorensen, White House, 20/12/63'
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers
1964 'Memo to Lyndon B. Johnson, 17/7/64'
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers
1966 New Dimensions of Political Economy
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press
HIGGINS, Joan
1978 The Poverty Business, Britain and America
Oxford: Basil Blackwell
297
HOLLCWAY, John and PICCIOTTO, Sol
1977 'Capital, Crisis and the State'
Capital and Class 2
HOLTERMANN, S.
1975 'Areas of Urban Deprivation in Great Britain: an
analysis of 1971 Census Data' in Central Statistical
Office, Social Trends No 6
London: H.M.S.O.
HOME OFFICE
1968a 'Minutes of the First Meeting of the Interdepartmental
Working Party on Community Development Areas, 17/1/68'
Unpublished: Confidential Source
1968b 'Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Interdepartmental
Working Party on Community Development Areas, 2/4/68'
Unpublished: Confidential Source
1968c 'Community Development: An Experiment in Social
Growth', Report of the Interdepartmental Working
Party on Community Development Areas, 21/5/68
Unpublished: Confidential Source
1968d Urban Programme Circular No 1, October 4th
London: Home Office
1968e CLP Draft Information Paper, 15/10/68
Unpublished: Confidential Source
1968f 'Memo to the Official Cabinet Sub-committee on
Community Development Areas Project, 15/10/68'
Unpublished: Confidential Source
1968g Community Development Areas, Note by Joan Cooper,
28/10/68
Unpublished: Confidential Source
1969a 'Experiments in Social Policy and Their Evaluation'
Report of an Anglo-American Conference held at
Ditchley Park, Oxfordshire, 29-31 October
Unpublished: Confidential Source
1969b 'Community Development Project - A Major Experiment
in Improving the Social Services for the Most in
Need', Press Release 16/7/69
London: Home Office
1970a Urban Programme Circular No 3> April 20th
London: Home Office
1970b 'Collaboration with the US Department of Housing
and Urban Development', Internal memo from
J. Banks to G. Otton, 21/7/70
Unpublished: Confidential Source
1971 'CDF: An Official View' in Ray Lees and George
Smith (eds), Action-Research in Community Development
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul (1975)
1974 'New Government Plans to Tackle Acute Deprivation'
Press Notice, 18/7/74
London: Home Office
1975 'CCPs', Note by the Home Office, Urban Deprivation
Unit for discussion with senior officers of the
Local Authorities in England who have expressed
an interest, 4/9/75
Unpublished: Confidential Source
HOUSING ML URBM DEVELOPMENT, Department of
1967 'Improving the Quality of Urban Life', A Program
Guide to Model Neighborhoods in Demonstration Cities
Washington D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban
Development
1972a 'Citizen Participation in the Model Cities Program'
Community Development Evaluation Series No 2
Washington D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban
Development
1972b 'Planned Variations: First Year Survey'
Community Development Evaluation Series No 7
Washington D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban
Development
1972c 'Coordinating Federal Assistance in the Community'
Community Development Evaluation Series No 8
Washington D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban
Development
HUMPHREY, Hubert
1967 'The Challenge of Our Cities', Address to the
Congress of the Cities, Boston, 7/8/67
Washington D.C.: Office of the Vice President
JOHNSON, Lyndon B.
1964a 'Annual Message to the Congress on the State of
the Union, 8/1/64'
Public Papers of the President, 1964
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
299
1964b 'The Economic Report of the President, 20/1/64'
Public Papers of the President, 1964
Washington B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1964c 'Annual Budget Message to Congress, 21/1/64'
Public Papers of the President, 1964
Washington B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1964d 'Letter to Sargent Shriveron his Appointment
to direct the Program to Eliminate Poverty, 12/2/64'
Public Papers of the President, 1964
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1964e 'Special Message to Congress Proposing a Nationwide
War on the Sources of Poverty, 16/3/64'
Public Papers of the President, 1964
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1964f 'Remarks to the US Chamber of Commerce, 27/4/64'
Public Papers of the President, 1964
Washington B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1964g 'Answer to a Question from a Member of the International
Labor Press Association, 27/4/64'
Public Papers of the President, 1964
Washington B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1965a 'Annual Message to Congress: The Economic Report
of the President, 28/1/65'
Public Papers of the President, 1965
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1965b 'Special Message to Congress on the Nation's
Cities, 2/3/65'
Public Papers of the President, 1965
Washington B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1965c 'Message to Congress on Area and Regional Development, 25/3/65'
Public Papers of the President, 1965
Washington B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1965d 'Commencement Address at Baylor University, 28/5/65'
Public Papers of the President, 1965
Washington B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1966a 'Special Message to Congress Recommending a Program
for Cities and Metropolitan Areas, 26/1/66'
Public Papers of the President, 1966
Washington B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
300
1966b 'Remarks on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary
of the Brookings Institution, 29/9/66*
Public Papers of the President, 1966
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1967 'Letter from Lyndon B. Johnson to Senator Mike
Mansfield, Senate Majority Leader, 16/8/67'
Public Papers of the President, 1967
Washington B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1971 The Vantage Point
New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston
KAUFMAN, Herbert
1958 'The Next Step in Case Studies'
Public Administration Review Vol xviii
KENNEDY, John F.
1963 'Annual Budget Message to Congress', 17/1/65
Public Papers of the President, 1963
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
KENNEDY, Robert F.
1963 'Attack on Poverty', Memo to T. Sorensen, White
House, 16/12/63
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Kennedy Papers
LEE, Douglass B. and DYCKMAN, John W.
1970 'Economic Impacts of the Vietnam War: a primer'
Journal of the American Institute of Planners xxxvi (5)
LEIBY, James
1978 A History of Social Welfare and Social Work
in the United States
New York: Columbia University Press
LEVIN, Henry M.
1977 'A Decade of Policy Developments in Improving
Education and Training for Low-income Populations',
in Robert H. Haveman (ed), A Decade of Federal
Antipoverty Programs
New York: Academic Press
LEVINE, Robert A.
1970 The Poor Ye Need Not Have With You: Lessons from
the War on Poverty
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
LEVTTAN, Sar A.
1969 The Great Society's Poor Law: a new approach to poverty
Baltimore: John Hopkins Press
LEES, Ray and SMITH, George
1975 Action-Research in Community Development
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
LINDBLOM, Charles
1959 'The Science of Muddling Through'
Public Administration Review, Spring
LOCAL GOVERNMENT GRANTS (Social Need) BILL
1968 London: H.M.S.O.
LONDON EDINBURGH WEEKEND RETURN GROUP
1980 In and Against the State
London: Pluto Press
LUKES, Steven
1974 Power: a radical view
London: Macmillan
LYNN, Laurence E.
1977 'A Decade of Policy Developments in the Income-
Maintenance System', in Robert H. Haveman (ed),
A Decade of Federal Antipoverty Programs
New York: Academic Press
LYONS, Gene M.
1969 The Uneasy Partnership: Social Sciences and the
Federal Government in the Twentieth Century
New York: Russell Sage Foundation
MANDEL, Ernest





MARRIS, Peter and REIN, Martin
1972 Dilemmas of Social Reform
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
MASON, Tim et al.
1977 Tackling Urban Deprivation: The Contribution of
Area Based Management
Birmingham: INLOGOV, University of Birmingham
MAYO, Marjorie
1975 'The History and Early Development of CDP', in
Ray Lees and George Smith (eds), Action-Research
in Community Development
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
MILIBANL, Ralph
1972 'Reply to Nicos Poulantzas', in Robin Blackburn (








1977 Society and Social Policy
London: Macmillan
MORRELL, Derek
1967 'Acceptance, communication and cooperation*
Unpublished: Confidential Source
e
1968a 'Letter to Michael Young, 17/1/68*
Unpublished: Confidential Source
1968b 'Letter to the Chairman of the Sub-committee on
Community Development Areas, 13/10/68'
Unpublished: Confidential Source
MORRILL, Richard L. and WOHLENBERG, Ernest H.
1971 The Geography of Poverty in the United States
New York: McGraw-Hill
MORRISON, Charles M. (ed)
1974 Educational Priority Vol 5s EPA - A Scottish Study
Edinburgh: H.M.S.O.
MOYNIHAN, Daniel P.
1966 'What is 'Community Action'?'
The Public Interest, Fall 1966
1970 Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding
New York: Free Press
McCONAGHY, Des
1978 'Setting up Six Towns: An Urban Strategy Gap'
Town Planning Review 49(2)
NATHAN, Richard et al.
1977 Block Grants for Community Develoment
Washington D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban
Development
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
1969 The Behavioural and Social Sciences: Outlook and Needs,
Report by the Behavioural and Social Science Survey
Committee of the Committee on Science and Public Policy,
National Academy of Sciences, The Committee on Problems




1969a. 'Special Message to Congress on the Nation's
Antipoverty Programs, 19/2/69'
Public Papers of the President, 1969
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1969b 'Statement on Establishing Common Regional Boundaries
for Agencies Providing Social and Economic Services,
27/3/69'
Public Papers of the President, 1969
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1969c 'Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs, 8/8/69'
Public Papers of the President, 1969
Washington B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1971 'Special Message to the Congress on Special Revenue
Sharing for Urban Community Development, 5/3/71'
Public Papers of the President, 1971
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
O'CONNOR, James
1973 The Fiscal Crisis of the State
New York: St Martin's Press
OFFE, Claus
1975 'The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem
of Policy Formation', in L.N. Lindberg et al. (eds),
Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism
Lexington, Mass.: D.H. Heath and Co.
OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY
1965 Community Action Program Guide Vol 1: Instructions
for Applicants
Washington D.C.: Office of Economic Opportunity/
Community Action Program
1966 'The Quiet Revolution', First Annual Report of the
Office of Economic Opportunity
Washington D.C.: Office of Economic Opportunity
1977 Grantee Reporting Manual - Management Information
Reporting by Community Action Agencies
Washington D.C.: Office of Economic Opportunity/
Community Action Program
1968 Applying for a CAP Grant
Washington D.C.: Office of Economic Opportunity
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE SOCIAL SERVICES




OFFICE OF THE VICE-PRESIDENT
1967 The Vice-President's Handbook for Local Officials
Washington D.C.: Office of the Vice-President
OKUN, Arthur M.
1970 The Political Economy of Prosperity
Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution
OPIE, Roger
1972 'Economic Planning and Growth', in W. Beckerman,
The Labour Government's Economic Record 1964-70
London: George Duckworth and Co.
PAYNE, Joan
1974 Educational Priority Vol 2: EPA Surveys and Statistics
London: H.M.S.O.
PECHMAN, Joseph A.
1977 Federal Tax Policy
Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution
PETERSON, Paul and GREENSTONE, J. David
1977 'Racial Change and Citizen Participation: The
Mobilization of Low-income Communities through
Community Action', in Robert H. Haveman (ed),
A Decade of Federal Antipoverty Programs
New York: Academic Press
PHILLIPS, Kevin B.
1970 The Emerging Republican Majority
Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books
PIVEN, Frances Fox and CLOWARD, Richard
1971 Regulating the Poor
New York: Vintage Books
PIVEN, Frances Fox
1974a 'The Great Society as Political Strategy', in
Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, The
Politics of Turmoil
New York: Pantheon Books
1974b 'The Urban Crisis: Who Got What, and Why?', in
Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, The
Politics of Turmoil
New York: Pantheon Books
POULANTZAS, Nicos
1972 'The Problem of the Capitalist State', in Robin





New York: Simon and Schuster
RAINWATER, Lee and YANCEY, William L.
1967 The Moynihan Report and The Politics of Controversy
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press
REIN, Martin and SCHON, Donald
1977 'Problem Setting in Policy Research' in C. Weiss (ed),
Using Social Science Research in Public Policy Making
Lexington, Mass.: D.H. Heath and Co.
REUTHER, Walter
1965 'Memo from Walter Reuther to L.B.J., 15/5/65'
Reprinted in Charles Haar, Between the Idea and
the Reality
Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
RICHARDS, Peter G.
1973 The Reformed Local Government System
London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
ROBINSON, Reginald et al.
1960 Community Resources in Mental Health: Joint Committee
on Mental Illness and Health, Monograph Series No 5
New York: Basic Books
RODGERS, Barbara
1977 'Comparative Studies in Social Policy hnd Administration',
in H. Heisler(ed), Foundations of Social Administration
London: Macmi11an
ROYAL COMMISSION ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND
1969 Redcliffe-Maud Report, Cmnd 4040
London: H.M.S.O.
SCHEFFER, Walter F.
1976 'Intergovernmental Relations and Decentralization',
in W.F. Scheffer (ed), General Revenue Sharing
and Decentralization
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press
SCHON, Donald
1971 Beyond the Stable State
London: Temple Smith
SCHULTZE, Charles L. et al.
1971 Setting National Priorities: The 1972 Budget
Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution
306
SEEBOHM REPORT
1969 Committee on Local Authority and Allied Personal
Social Services, Cmnd 3703
London: H.M.S.O.
SHARPE, L.J.
1973a 'American Democracy Reconsidered Part 1'
British Journal of Political Science 3(1)
1973b 'American Democracy Reconsidered Part 2'
British Journal of Political Science 3(2)
SHAW, Martin
1975 Marxism and Social Science
London: Pluto Press
SKEFFINGTON REPORT
1969 People and Planning
London: H.M.S.O.
SMITH, G.A.N, and LITTLE, A.
1971 Strategies of Compensation: A Review of Educational
Projects for the Disadvantaged in the United States
Paris: OECD
SMITH, G.A.N, (ed)
1975 Educational Priority Vol 4s The West Riding Project
London: H.M.S.O.
SUMNER, Colin
1979 Reading Ideologies: an investigation into the
Marxist theory of ideology and law
London: Academic Press
SUNDQUIST, James L.
1969 'Origins of the War on Poverty', in James L. Sundquist
(ed), On Fighting Poverty
New York: Basic Books
TASK FORCE REPORT
1965 Proposed Programs for the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, reprinted in Charles Haar, Between
the Idea and the Reality
Boston: Little, Brown and Co.
TIMES
1968 'Unemployed Child is Danger to Society'
Article by Education Correspondent, 10/5/68
London: Times Newspapers
TIMES EDUCATIONAL SUPPLEMENT
1967 'After Plowden- Down East with the Deprived, 20/1/67'
• London: Times Newspapers
307
TOWNSEND, Peter
1976 The Difficulties of Policies Based on the Concept
of Area Deprivation. Barnett Shine Foundation Lecture
London: Department of Economics, Queen Mary College,
University of London
UNIVERSITY GRANTS COMMITTEE
1968 University Development 1962-67> Cmnd 3820
London: H.M.S.O.
U.S. BUDGET
1964 Budget of the U.S. Government for Fiscal Year 19&5
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Offieye
1969 Budget of the U.S. Government for Fiscal Year 1970
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1975 Budget of the U.S. Government for Fiscal Year 1976
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1977 Special Analysis of the Budget for Fiscal Year 1977
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
U.S. CONGRESS
1964 Economic Opportunity Act of 19649 88th Congress,
2nd Session, Public Law 88-452
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1966 Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act,
89th Congress, 2nd Session, Public Law 89-754
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Bureau of the Census
1962 Statistical Abstract of the United States
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
1975 Historical Statistics of the U.S.: Colonial Times to 1970
Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office
USEEM, Michael
1976 'State Production of Social Knowledge: Problems
of Academic Social Research'
American Sociological Review vol 41
WALLACE, Phyllis A.
1977 'A Decade of Policy Developments in Equal
Opportunities in Employment and Housing', in
Robert H. Haveman (ed), A Decade of Federal
Antipoverty Programs
New York: Academic Press
308
WHITE, Lee
1964 'Memo to Secretaries of Labor, Agriculture, H.E.W.,
Commerce, Interior, the Attorney General and the
Administrator of HHFA, 21/1/64'
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers
WILSON, Harold
1971 The Labour Government 1964-70
London: Weidenfield and Nicholson
1970 'Reply to a toast by President Nixon, 27/1/70'
Public Papers of the President, 1970





Social Science and Public Policy: A personal note
in Lynn (ed), Knowledge and Policy: the uncertain
connection, Vol 5» National Research Council, Study
Project on Social Research and Development
Washington D.C.: National Academy of Sciences
'Memo to T. Sorensen, 23/1/64'
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston: Heller Papers
W0FF0RD, John G.
1969 'The Politics of Local Responsibility: Administration
of the CAP, 1964-66', in James L. Sundquist (ed),
On Fighting Poverty
New York: Basic Books
WOLANIN, Thomas R.
1975 Presidential Advisory Commissions
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press
WOOD, Robert
1967 'New Role in Urban Research', Address to the Association
of Urban Universities, Detroit, Michigan, 6/11/67
Washington D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban
Development
1968 'Science: The Good Urban Witch', Speech to
the Annual Symposium of the American Society for
Cybernetics, Washington D.C., 24/10/68
Washington D.C.: Department of Housing and Urban
Development
YARMOLINSKY, Adam
1969 'The Beginnings of 0E0'
On Fighting Poverty
New York: Basic Books
in James L. Sundquist (ed),
309
YOUNG, Michael
1967 Teach In of the Advisory Council for Education
on the Plowden Report, Reported in the Times
Educational Supplement, 27/1/67
London: Times Newspapers
1970 'Letter to A.H. Halsey, 20/10/70'
Unpublished: Confidential Source
